Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21, 32, 14, 142 — Prisoners, rights of — Elderly and terminally ill convicts — Continued incarceration despite advanced age (above 70 years) or terminal illness — Held, imprisonment does not suspend constitutional guarantees of dignity and humane treatment — Right to life under Art. 21 continues in custody and extends to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment — NALSA's nationwide Special Campaign identifying 5,393 vulnerable prisoners, including 11 terminally ill and 84 above 70 years across 17 States and 1 Union Territory, disclosed systemic gap between executive policy and ground-level implementation — Continued detention causing avoidable suffering held constitutionally impermissible — Supreme Court, invoking Arts. 32 and 142, directed States/UTs to formulate uniform compassionate-release policy.

 NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY

Vs.

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

( Before : Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ. )

Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s). 162 of 2025

Decided on : 16-07-2026

A. Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21, 32, 14, 142 — Prisoners, rights of — Elderly and terminally ill convicts — Continued incarceration despite advanced age (above 70 years) or terminal illness — Held, imprisonment does not suspend constitutional guarantees of dignity and humane treatment — Right to life under Art. 21 continues in custody and extends to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment — NALSA's nationwide Special Campaign identifying 5,393 vulnerable prisoners, including 11 terminally ill and 84 above 70 years across 17 States and 1 Union Territory, disclosed systemic gap between executive policy and ground-level implementation — Continued detention causing avoidable suffering held constitutionally impermissible — Supreme Court, invoking Arts. 32 and 142, directed States/UTs to formulate uniform compassionate-release policy.

B. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 — Section 4(d) — Locus standi of NALSA — NALSA, a statutory body with no personal interest, held entitled to maintain writ petition espousing collective rights of vulnerable prisoners in discharge of its public duty to undertake social justice litigation — Traditional rules of locus standi relaxed in matters of fundamental-rights enforcement for marginalised sections — Reliance on NALSA v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 348.

C. Constitution of India, 195 — Sch. VII, List II — Entry "prisons" — Federal distribution of powers — Held, prisons and persons detained therein fall within exclusive State legislative domain; primary responsibility for prison reform and policy implementation rests with States/UTs — Supreme Court's role confined to enforcing constitutional guarantees, not legislating — However, persistent executive inaction warranting judicial directions under Art. 142 to ensure Art. 21 does not remain illusory.

D. Terminal illness — Definition — Uniform standard adopted — UNODC Handbook on Prisoners with Special Needs (2009) definition — "a situation where there is no reasonable medical possibility that the patient's condition will not continue to degenerate and result in death" — Held, States/UTs directed to incorporate this or similar definition ensuring objectivity, consistency, and medical certification through independent Medical Boards for compassionate release determinations.

E. Prisoners — Compassionate/premature release — Directions issued — Supreme Court directed States/UTs to notify comprehensive release policy within three months, constitute Divisional/State Medical Boards, integrate Under Trial Review Committees for periodic review of elderly/terminally-ill prisoners, mandate time-bound and transparent procedures, and link processing to National e-Prisons Portal for monitoring, transparency and accountability — Union of India directed to provide technical and infrastructural support — Compliance affidavits to be filed within six months.

Mere utterance of threatening or abuse/vulgarity words during altercation, without intent to Cause Alarm, insufficient for Criminal Intimidation Under S.506 IPC

 MANI @ SUBRAMANIYAM

Vs.

STATE REP BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ….of 2026 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.4516 of 2025)

Decided on : 17-07-2026

Mere utterance of threatening or abuse/vulgarity words during altercation, without intent to Cause Alarm, insufficient for Criminal Intimidation Under S.506 IPC

A. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 294(b) — Obscenity — Distinction between "obscene" and "abusive"/"vulgar" language — Test of — Held, to attract S. 294(b) IPC, prosecution must prove: (i) an obscene act done, or obscene word/song/ballad uttered, in or near a public place; and (ii) such act/utterance caused annoyance to others — Word "obscene" undefined under IPC but judicially construed, in the context of S. 292 IPC, to mean material which, taken as a whole, is lascivious, appeals to prurient interest, and tends to deprave and corrupt persons likely to be exposed to it — "Community standard test" (Aveek Sarkar) applicable, not the Hicklin test — Mere vulgarity, abuse or profanity, however distasteful, uncivil or shocking, does not ipso facto constitute obscenity — Vulgarity may evoke disgust or revulsion but lacks the depraving/corrupting tendency essential to obscenity — Appellant's utterance of abusive and expletive-laden words against complainant during a quarrel, though coarse and offensive, held neither lascivious nor appealing to prurient interest nor shown to have caused annoyance to others in the public place — Conviction under S. 294(b) IPC set aside. (Paras 11-17)

Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 52; Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687; Aveek Sarkar v. State of W.B., (2014) 4 SCC 257; Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC 289; S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600; Madhanagopal v. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818; Apoorva Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 6 SCC 181 — relied on.

B. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 506(ii) — Criminal intimidation — Ingredients of — Held, offence requires: (1) threat of injury to person, reputation or property of the complainant or of someone in whom he is interested; and (2) such threat made with intent to cause alarm, or to compel the person to do/omit an act which he is not legally bound/entitled to do — Bare utterance of threatening words during an altercation, unaccompanied by proof of intent to cause alarm or to coerce a particular act or omission, insufficient to sustain conviction — Allegation that appellant waved a billhook and uttered threatening words, even if accepted in entirety, held not to disclose the requisite intent — Conviction under S. 506(ii) IPC set aside. (Paras 18-19)

Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604 — relied on.

C. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 326 r/w Section 320 — Grievous hurt by dangerous weapon — Fracture of nasal bone — Whether attracted — Held, essential ingredients: (i) voluntary causing of hurt; (ii) hurt being grievous within S. 320 IPC; and (iii) such hurt caused by dangerous weapon or means — Fracture of a bone, including nasal bone, squarely falls within cl. "Seventhly" of S. 320 IPC — Medical evidence (CT scan confirming nasal fracture) corroborated ocular testimony that injuries were inflicted with a billhook — Contention that S. 326 IPC inapplicable in absence of incised wounds, rejected — Nature of weapon, not form of wound, determinative — Conviction under S. 326 IPC affirmed. (Paras 20-21)

Mathai v. State of Kerala, (2005) 3 SCC 260 — relied on.

D. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) — Acquittal by High Court — Not appealed by State/complainant — High Court's acquittal of appellant under the SC/ST Act, on finding absence of caste-based motive and no reference to complainant's community in the altercation, attained finality, having gone unchallenged. (Paras 8-9)

E. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 401/S. 482 read with Penal Code, 1860, S. 326 — Sentencing — Modification — Advanced age and health of convict — Appellant, about 70 years of age, convicted under S. 326 IPC — Considering the origin of the incident in a land dispute and consequent animosity between families, and appellant's advanced age and health condition, sentence modified to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, with fine of Rs 50,000 payable within two months. (Para 22)

Held, appeal partly allowed — Conviction under Ss. 294(b) and 506(ii) IPC set aside; conviction under S. 326 IPC affirmed with modified sentence as above. (Para 23)

Compensation under Section 124A Railways Act is "no-fault liability," attracted irrespective of negligence, except for statutorily carved-out exceptions like suicide.

 LATA

Vs.

UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No……of 2026 (@Special Leave Petition(Civil) No .30726 of 2025)

Decided on : 17-07-2026

Compensation under Section 124A Railways Act is "no-fault liability," attracted irrespective of negligence, except for statutorily carved-out exceptions like suicide.

A. Railways Act, 1989 — Sections 123(c)(2) and 124A — Compensation on account of untoward incidents — 'No-fault' liability — Accidental falling of a passenger from a running train constitutes an "untoward incident" — Liability under S. 124A arises irrespective of wrongful act, neglect or default of the Railway Administration, subject only to statutory exceptions such as suicide, self-inflicted injury or the passenger's own criminal act — Provision held to be beneficial and welfare-oriented in nature. [Paras 5-7]

B. Railways Act, 1989 — Burden of proof — Bona fide passenger status — Absence of ticket not conclusive — Mere absence of ticket on the person of the deceased does not negate bona fide passenger status — Initial burden on claimant dischargeable through affidavit; burden then shifts to Railways — Standard applicable: preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt — Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2019) 3 SCC 572, followed. [Para 9]

C. Railways Act, 1989 — Duty of Railway Administration — Overcrowding and safety compliance — Extensive provisions of the Railway Commercial and Operating Manuals cast specific duties on railway staff regarding ticket checking, prevention of overcrowding, and passenger safety — Recurring incidents of death/injury due to overcrowding across the country noted — Non-enforcement of these safeguards, rather than absence of guidelines, found to be the deficiency. [Paras 10-15]

D. Railways Act, 1989 — Claim for compensation — Application to facts — Ticket allegedly misplaced with luggage — Claimant's affidavit stating deceased possessed a valid ticket, subsequently misplaced with his bag which could not be recovered by police, held sufficient to discharge initial burden — No dispute regarding travel, occurrence of incident, or applicability of statutory exceptions — Denial of compensation by Tribunal and High Court for want of ticket recovery held erroneous. [Paras 19-20]

E. Railways Act, 1989 — Compensation — Quantum — Compensation for death of passenger determined with reference to Schedule I of the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, as amended, fixed at Rs. 8,00,000/-, payable within four weeks, failing which to carry interest at 8% from the date of filing of the claim petition. [Paras 20-21]

F. Railways — Judicial observations — Passenger responsibility and terminology — Court observed that responsibility for such incidents cannot rest solely on the Railways; passengers must also exercise caution — Suggestion made that the term "class" in railway parlance be attached to the coach rather than the passenger, to avoid connotations of class distinction inconsistent with constitutional values. [Paras 16, 18]

G. Beneficial Legislation — Rule of construction — Purposive and liberal interpretation — Beneficial and welfare statutes must receive purposive, liberal construction favouring beneficiaries where two views are possible, rather than a narrow, literal or technical approach — Legislative intent must be given practical effect — Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa v. Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108, and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527, relied on. [Paras 7.1-7.3, 8]

Once Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31 IBC, only claims incorporated therein survive; all others stand extinguished under the "clean slate" doctrine.

 M/S TATA STEEL LTD

Vs.

VARSHA AND ANOTHER

( Before : Manoj Misra and Manmohan, JJ. )

Civil Appeal Nos. 9052-9053 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 24000-24001 of 2026) (@Diary No.36520 of 2019)

Decided on : 17-07-2026

Once Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31 IBC, only claims incorporated therein survive; all others stand extinguished under the "clean slate" doctrine.

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 31 — 'Clean slate' doctrine — Effect of approved Resolution Plan on claims — Upon approval under S. 31(1), claims provided in the Plan stand frozen and are binding on the Corporate Debtor and all stakeholders — Claims not incorporated in the Plan stand extinguished, withdrawn or abated — Resolution Applicant entitled to commence operations free from unforeseen liabilities — Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons v. Edelweiss ARC, (2021) 9 SCC 657, followed. [Para 51]

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Commercial wisdom of Committee of Creditors — Non-justiciability — Treatment of Operational Creditors' claims and sub-classification thereof, as approved by the Committee of Creditors, held non-justiciable — NCLT/NCLAT jurisdiction circumscribed by the Code; they cannot act as courts of equity — K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank, (2019) 12 SCC 150 and Essar Steel, (2020) 8 SCC 531, relied on. [Paras 51, 53]

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Finality of Operational Creditors' List — Notional value of Re. 1 — Final List of Creditors, admitting sub-judice claims at notional value of Re. 1, attained finality as unchallenged by Respondent-Creditor; Intervenor's challenge dismissed as withdrawn and never assailed — Deletion of the qualifying note (subjecting the notional value to adjudication) in the Final List, replaced by a note without such qualification, held to convert the claim into a quantified Re. 1 claim, not one kept alive pending litigation. [Paras 52, 54]

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Treatment of sub-judice claims — Amount payable — Liquidation value being NIL, no amount statutorily payable to Operational Creditors — Plan voluntarily earmarked a Settlement Amount, of which only a specified pro-rata pool was payable to claims crystallised and admitted as on the date of the Final List — Only crystallised claims as on the effective date payable pro-rata; indeterminate/sub-judice claims not entitled to further payment. [Paras 55-56, 61]

E. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Extinguishment clauses — Sub-judice claims and pending proceedings — Clauses providing for withdrawal/abatement/extinguishment of legal proceedings by Operational Creditors, save to the extent of the Settlement Amount, held to extend to sub-judice claims — No express carve-out found protecting such claims from extinguishment — Pending civil suit and arbitration proceedings held abated/extinguished upon Plan approval. [Para 57]

F. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — CIRP Regulations, 2016 — Regulation 12(2) — Cut-off for filing/crystallisation of claims — Operational Creditors permitted to file claims only until approval of the Resolution Plan by the Committee of Creditors — Corporate Debtor's liability required to be crystallised and quantified by that date — Subsequent increase in verified claims held impermissible as it would disrupt pro-rata distribution already effected. [Para 58]

G. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Rule 11, NCLT Rules, 2016 — Allegation of fraud in securing Plan approval — Allegation of manipulation/fraud in procuring NCLT approval held unsubstantiated in absence of any application filed under Rule 11 seeking recall of the approval order — Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, (2024) 6 SCC 767, distinguished on facts. [Para 53]

H. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Operational Creditors, particularly MSMEs — Structural disadvantage — Judicial observation — Court observed that the Code, despite being an improvement over the earlier regime, does not adequately protect small Operational Creditors and MSMEs placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall — Legislature/Law Commission urged to examine a fair and balanced repayment mechanism. [Paras 62-63]

I. Contract Interpretation — Contra proferentem — Applicability — Principle of contra proferentem and 'face value reservation mechanism' proposed by a party held inapplicable in absence of any ambiguity in the Resolution Plan, which was not itself under challenge. [Paras 59-60]

Section 299 CrPC has no stage-limitation; deceased witness's earlier deposition against absconding accused is admissible if abscondence and unavailability are proved.

 THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Vs.

KADER KHAN

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No(S). 1164 – 1166 of 2023

Decided on : 17-07-2026

Section 299 CrPC has no stage-limitation; deceased witness's earlier deposition against absconding accused is admissible if abscondence and unavailability are proved.

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 299 — Record of evidence in absence of accused — Scope and applicability — Exception to the rule that a witness must be examined in presence of the accused and to the principle under S. 33, Evidence Act — Being an exception, all prescribed conditions must be strictly complied with — Deposition recorded in absence of an absconding accused admissible against him upon arrest, if deponent is dead, incapable of giving evidence, cannot be found, or cannot be produced without unreasonable delay, expense or inconvenience. [Paras 12-14]

B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 299(1) — Preconditions — No formal order required — Two facts must be established for use of earlier deposition: (i) accused is absconding; and (ii) no immediate prospect of his arrest — No statutory requirement of a formal order by the Magistrate recording compliance with these conditions before the witness deposes — What matters is whether the two essentials stood established as on the date of deposition. [Para 14]

C. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 299(1) — Splitting of trial — Use of evidence recorded in trial of co-accused against subsequently arrested absconder — Evidence in earlier trial cannot ordinarily be used against an absconding accused arrested later, except as provided under S. 299(1) — Where deponent is dead or unavailable despite due efforts, prosecution justified in relying on evidence already on record — High Court's restrictive reading of CBI v. Abu Salem Ansari, (2011) 4 SCC 426 disapproved. [Para 15]

D. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 299(1) — Purposive interpretation — Stage of invocation — Provision contains no limitation regarding the stage at which it may be invoked — Restrictive interpretation would defeat the object of preserving evidence against a deliberately absconding accused and could incentivise accused persons to abscond awaiting the death or unavailability of witnesses — No corresponding change made in S. 335, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. [Paras 19-21]

E. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 299(1) — Application to facts — Respondent declared absconder and shown as such in chargesheet before deposition of victim (deceased witness) was recorded — No immediate prospect of arrest at the relevant time; respondent arrested three years later — Victim having died in the interim, preconditions of S. 299(1) held satisfied — Order of High Court excluding such deposition set aside. [Para 22]

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — "Decree or order" — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of "civil death", must be strictly construed — Expression "decree or order" must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a "court" in a "suit" — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge's quashing of insolvency notice, upheld.

 H.D.F.C. BANK LIMITED

Vs.

KISHORE K. MEHTA (DEAD) THR. LRS.

( Before : Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 4211 of 2010 [Arising Out of SLP(Civil) No. 18860 of 2008]

Decided on : 13-07-2026

A. Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Section 9(2) — "Decree or order" — Whether includes a recovery certificate issued by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (pre-2016 amendment) — Held, no — Insolvency Act, being weighed with grave civil consequence of "civil death", must be strictly construed — Expression "decree or order" must bear the meaning assigned under Ss. 2(2) and 2(14), CPC, requiring adjudication by a "court" in a "suit" — A DRT recovery certificate, not being a decree or order of a court within this meaning, cannot found an insolvency notice under S. 9(2) — Ratio of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 (rendered qua arbitral awards) held to rest on a wider principle applicable equally to DRT recovery certificates — Impugned judgment of Division Bench, Bombay High Court, affirming Single Judge's quashing of insolvency notice, upheld. (Paras 3, 10-12, 20)

B. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 — Section 19(22-A) [inserted by Act 44 of 2016] — Deeming fiction equating DRT recovery certificate with a decree/order of court for purposes of insolvency/winding-up proceedings — Held, insertion of sub-section (22-A) in 2016, instead of aiding Bank, demonstrates legislative recognition that no such equivalence existed prior thereto — Amendment not given retrospective effect — Casus omissus cannot be supplied by courts — Recovery certificate issued in 2004, prior to the amendment, cannot be equated with a decree or order for invoking S. 9(2) of the Insolvency Act. (Paras 13-14, 19)

C. Interpretation of Statutes — Vested rights — Date for determining — Rights and liabilities of parties to a lis crystallise on the date of institution of proceedings and must ordinarily be adjudicated with reference to the law as it stood on that date — Subsequent legislative change (here, insertion of S. 19(22-A), RDB Act in 2016) cannot retrospectively validate a cause of action that was not maintainable when initiated — Converse of the principle that delay in adjudication should not deprive a litigant of relief otherwise due — Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 SC 49; P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409; Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726, relied on. (Paras 15-18)

D. Precedent — Doubt expressed, effect of — Correctness of Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322 doubted in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Ashok D. Soniminde — Subsequently, a 3-Judge Bench, by order dated 23-4-2015 in Civil Appeal No. 485 of 2008, held that Paramjeet Singh Patheja (supra) did not require reconsideration — Ratio in Paramjeet Singh Patheja reaffirmed as good law and applied. (Para 21)

E. Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 — Death of certificate-debtor pending proceedings, effect of — Death of an insolvent/certificate-debtor during pendency of insolvency proceedings does not cause abatement; proceedings continue for administration of the estate for benefit of creditors — However, since appeal itself dismissed on merits, no further order required against co-certificate-debtors (sons of deceased) who were not proceeded against by the Bank — Liberty reserved to Bank to pursue remedies against them in accordance with law, subject to limitation — Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani, (1953) 1 SCC 621, relied on. (Paras 5, 24)

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge's direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent's superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on.

 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Vs.

BALI RAM NO. 850808321

( Before : Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015

Decided on : 13-07-2026

A. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Non-discrimination in government employment — Employee acquiring disability during service — Mandatory obligation on employer to shift employee to alternate post with same pay and service benefits, or, failing that, to accommodate on supernumerary post till superannuation — Respondent, a CRPF Constable (Driver), rendered blind/partially blind in 1996 and medically invalidated from service in 1998 without consideration of alternate posting — Held, S. 47 casts a positive and mandatory obligation on employer to protect disabled employee and not await a request for accommodation — Order of medical invalidation dated 11-3-1998 held ultra vires S. 47 and Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution — Single Judge's direction reinstating respondent, upheld by Division Bench, affirmed in principle, though relief modified in view of respondent's superannuation — Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2008) 1 SCC 579; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 209, relied on. (Paras 31-32, 58, 60, 74-79)

B. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47, proviso — Exemption notification dated 10-9-2002 exempting combatant personnel of CPMFs (including CRPF) from S. 47 — Held, prospective in operation, containing no express or implied retrospective application — Delegated legislation, including an exemption notification carving out establishments from a beneficial statute, ordinarily operates prospectively and must be strictly construed — Respondent's invalidation (1998) having preceded the notification (2002), S. 47 applied in full force and was breached — Subsequent exemption cannot legitimise an act void ab initio — Right of employee crystallises on date of breach — Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh, (2015) 4 SCC 421, distinguished on facts (invalidation therein post-dated notification) — Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 186; Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422; Mohinder Lal v. Saroj Kumari Verma, (2000) 2 SCC 65, relied on. (Paras 53-61)

C. Waiver — Essentials — Intentional relinquishment of a known right — Elements: (i) existence of a right; (ii) clear knowledge of that right; (iii) voluntary and conscious relinquishment despite such knowledge — Mere silence, inaction or delay insufficient — Waiver of statutory right conferred for public welfare generally disfavoured — Plea of waiver, not raised in LPA or in grounds of appeal and unsupported by material showing respondent's knowledge of S. 47 right, rejected — Onus on employer to show conscious relinquishment, not discharged — Krishan Lal v. State of J&K, (1994) 4 SCC 422, relied on. (Paras 45-52)

D. Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ jurisdiction — Relief beyond pleadings/prayer — General rule that courts must confine themselves to pleadings and prayer clause — Exception — Where record clearly establishes entitlement to wider relief than claimed, owing to ignorance, bona fide mistake or inelegant drafting, and opponent is not prejudiced or taken by surprise, court may in its discretion grant wider relief — Exception to be sparingly and judiciously invoked, confined to cases of clear entitlement and absence of prejudice — Single Judge's grant of relief under S. 47, PwD Act though not specifically pleaded, held justified since no ground of pleading-deficiency raised by appellants at any stage — Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595; Dwarka Nath v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81; ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India, (2004) 3 SCC 553, relied on. (Paras 34-44)

E. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Section 47 — Attributability of disability to service, irrelevance of — Protection under S. 47 unqualified and unconditional, applicable irrespective of whether disability is attributable to or aggravated by service — Relevant enquiry is not fitness at initial appointment but whether employer explored alternatives before ouster — Ten years of unblemished service followed by acquired disability warranted accommodation, not invalidation. (Para 76)

F. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 — Sections 47 — Relief — Respondent having attained superannuation age, actual reinstatement impracticable — Held, appellants' default being the sole cause of prolonged non-employment, principle of "no work, no pay" inapplicable — Full back wages, interest and costs awarded in lump sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 in lieu of reinstatement, computed with reference to salary respondent would have drawn till superannuation (Rs. 82,80,195) — Direction for disbursal within eight weeks and for guidance of visually-impaired respondent by State/District Legal Services Authority for safe investment of amount. (Paras 80-83)

Auction sale — Setting aside of, post-confirmation — Once an auction is confirmed and possession/sale consideration has passed, courts must ordinarily refrain from setting it aside unless vitiated by material irregularity, fraud or collusion — Mere prior correspondence between Corporation and eventual auction purchaser expressing interest in the property, without more, held insufficient to establish collusion — Auction purchaser having remained in possession for nearly three decades — Rights crystallized pursuant to a statutory sale not to be lightly unsettled after such long lapse of time.

 BIHAR STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Vs.

BHUSHAN SINGH AND OTHERS

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )

Civil Appeal Nos. .........of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 16552-53 of 2025) with Civil Appeal No. ...................of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 24073 of 2025)

Decided on : 09-07-2026

A. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

B. State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Section 29 — Fairness and reasonableness of Corporation's action — Test — Reasonableness to be tested against the dominant consideration of securing the best price through maximum public participation — Corporation permitting auction purchaser to pay consideration in instalments while denying similar accommodation to defaulting borrowers, held not arbitrary or mala fide but a commercial decision taken in ordinary course of business — Borrowers, being recalcitrant defaulters, cannot claim parity with a bona fide auction purchaser who had deposited the entire sale consideration.

C. Auction sale — Setting aside of, post-confirmation — Once an auction is confirmed and possession/sale consideration has passed, courts must ordinarily refrain from setting it aside unless vitiated by material irregularity, fraud or collusion — Mere prior correspondence between Corporation and eventual auction purchaser expressing interest in the property, without more, held insufficient to establish collusion — Auction purchaser having remained in possession for nearly three decades — Rights crystallized pursuant to a statutory sale not to be lightly unsettled after such long lapse of time.

D. Partnership Act, 1932 — Section 69(2) — Bar under — Applicability — Bar applies only to suits for enforcement of a right arising from a contract entered into by an unregistered firm with a third party in the course of its business — Suit filed against statutory action of Financial Corporation under Ss. 29 & 30, SFC Act, not being one for enforcement of a contractual right against a third party, held, not barred by S. 69(2) — Concurrent findings of courts below on this issue, affirmed.

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1), 21(1) & (2) and 2(d) — Duty to report — Persons liable for failure to report — Only those persons who receive information directly from the victim regarding sexual assault are under obligation to report under S. 19(1); their failure attracts S. 21 — Persons who are not direct recipients of the complaint, and to whose knowledge no such offence is shown to have occurred (whether by direct information from victim or otherwise), cannot be prosecuted for non-reporting merely because they were present during a subsequent internal "verification" or were part of an institutional decision-making process — Absent direct credible information reaching such persons, a decision taken collectively not to report, even if erroneous, does not by itself establish criminal liability under S. 21

 AAA

Vs.

LINDA SEMA AND OTHERS

( Before : Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ..... of 2026 (Arising out of SLP Criminal No. 4772 of 2024)

Decided on : 09-07-2026

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — "Knowledge that such an offence has been committed" — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person's own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining "knowledge" to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior "verification exercise" to ascertain correctness of the child's complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — (Paras 45 to 47, 56)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1), 21(1) & (2) and 2(d) — Duty to report — Persons liable for failure to report — Only those persons who receive information directly from the victim regarding sexual assault are under obligation to report under S. 19(1); their failure attracts S. 21 — Persons who are not direct recipients of the complaint, and to whose knowledge no such offence is shown to have occurred (whether by direct information from victim or otherwise), cannot be prosecuted for non-reporting merely because they were present during a subsequent internal "verification" or were part of an institutional decision-making process — Absent direct credible information reaching such persons, a decision taken collectively not to report, even if erroneous, does not by itself establish criminal liability under S. 21 — (Paras 60, 63 to 64)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 21(3) — Exemption for child informants — Victim's minor sister, minor friend, and minor Head Girl of the school, all being "child" within S. 2(d), held not liable to be prosecuted under S. 21 read with S. 19(1) for not independently reporting, notwithstanding they had knowledge/information of the incident — (Para 61)

D. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 176 — Omission to give information to public servant — Read with S. 21(2) POCSO Act — Headmistress, having received direct information from victim of sexual assault, but instead of reporting conducting her own verification exercise and thereafter suppressing the information based on her own assessment that no assault had occurred, held to attract grave suspicion sufficient for framing of charge under S. 21 POCSO/S. 176 IPC — Order of discharge qua her set aside — (Para 62, 65)

E. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 201 & 120-B — Causing disappearance of evidence; Criminal conspiracy — Charge against Principal, Vice-Principal and other teachers/staff not receiving direct information from victim — Held, ingredients of "knowledge or reason to believe" under S. 201 not established qua persons who neither received direct complaint from the victim nor had, to their own understanding (also consistent with the medical report and CCTV footage), any material indicating commission of offence — Mere participation in institutional decision, taken after considering all available material including CCTV footage, not to report, does not establish conspiracy to suppress information or cause disappearance of evidence, in absence of direct credible knowledge — Order of discharge of such persons, affirmed by High Court in revision, upheld — (Paras 63 to 64)

F. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 227 & 228 — Discharge — Scope of enquiry — At stage of discharge in a case instituted on police report, court to consider only materials collected during investigation forming part of the police report; defence material not part thereof cannot be looked into — Court to proceed on assumption that materials brought on record by prosecution are true and to assess only probative value thereof, to determine whether there is ground for presuming that offence has been committed, not whether ground exists for conviction — Test is one of grave suspicion, not proof; court not to conduct a mini trial — (Paras 20 to 21) — State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, relied on.

G. Words and Phrases — "Knowledge" — Distinguished from "reason to believe" and "suspicion"/"doubt" — "Knowledge" an awareness on part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind; on a higher plane than "reason to believe" — A person is "supposed to know" where there is a direct appeal to his senses, but for purposes of S. 19(1) POCSO Act, "knowledge" additionally includes awareness founded on credible information received, particularly from the victim directly — (Paras 31, 39, 45, 47) — A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576; Sr. Tessy Jose v. State of Kerala, (2018) 18 SCC 292; State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298; Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611, referred to.

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Companies Act — "Amalgamation" — Effect on tenancy rights of a company-tenant — Amalgamation denotes the fusion of two or more companies into one, whether by merger or by one taking over the other; on amalgamation, the transferor company ceases to exist and its rights and liabilities pass to the transferee under the scheme — Held, this loss of separate corporate identity by the original tenant, coupled with vesting of tenancy rights and possession in the transferee without the landlord's written consent, squarely constitutes "parting with possession" within the meaning of S. 14(1)(b), regardless of whether the amalgamation was voluntary (as under Ss. 391/394 of the Companies Act, 1956) or effected pursuant to a banking-sector regulatory scheme

 BRITISH MOTOR CAR COMPANY (1939) LTD.

Vs.

M/S HINDUSTAN COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. SINCE HAS BEEN MERGED INTO PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 5714 of 2012

Decided on : 09-07-2026

A. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord's written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and "any other mode" by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord's written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected — (Paras 7, 12 to 15 and 21)

B. Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 45 — Scheme of amalgamation framed by Reserve Bank of India — Nature: administrative, not legislative — Held, a scheme framed under S. 45 of the BR Act and sanctioned by the Central Government does not acquire the status of a legislative enactment merely because it is required to be laid before both Houses of Parliament — Distinguished from a scheme framed under S. 9 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980, which is legislative in character since Parliament retains power to modify or reject it before it takes effect — Consequently, a S. 45 scheme cannot override or exclude the operation of a special statute such as S. 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — (Paras 16 to 20)

C. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Companies Act — "Amalgamation" — Effect on tenancy rights of a company-tenant — Amalgamation denotes the fusion of two or more companies into one, whether by merger or by one taking over the other; on amalgamation, the transferor company ceases to exist and its rights and liabilities pass to the transferee under the scheme — Held, this loss of separate corporate identity by the original tenant, coupled with vesting of tenancy rights and possession in the transferee without the landlord's written consent, squarely constitutes "parting with possession" within the meaning of S. 14(1)(b), regardless of whether the amalgamation was voluntary (as under Ss. 391/394 of the Companies Act, 1956) or effected pursuant to a banking-sector regulatory scheme — (Paras 9, 10 and 14)

D. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Precedents distinguished — Statutory tenancy under Esso Acquisition Act inapposite — Decisions holding that vesting of tenancy rights in the Central Government under Ss. 5 and 7 of the Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974 created a statutory tenancy, held inapplicable, since those provisions expressly and legislatively vested tenancy rights, unlike an administrative scheme under S. 45 of the BR Act — High Court's reliance on a decision arising from amalgamation under S. 9 of the Acquisition Act, 1980 (a legislative scheme) held misplaced, that provision being materially different from S. 45 of the BR Act — (Paras 18 and 20)