Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92 — Interpretation of Written Agreements (Deeds)

 Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92 — Interpretation of Written Agreements (Deeds) — Exclusion of Oral Evidence — The terms of a written contract, grant, or disposition of property must primarily be ascertained from the document itself — Oral evidence contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from the terms of such a written instrument is inadmissible between the parties, unless the situation falls within the specific exceptions provided in the Provisos to S. 92 (such as fraud, mistake, illegality, want of execution, separate oral agreement on a silent matter, condition precedent, subsequent modification, usage/custom, or relating language to existing facts) — Evidence to show that there was no agreement at all is admissible, but not evidence to vary the terms of an admitted agreement.

ANNAYA KOCHA SHETTY (DEAD) THROUGH LRS

Vs.

LAXMIBAI NARAYAN SATOSE SINCE DECEASED THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

Supreme Court Lays Down Guidelines For Interpretation Of Deeds & Contracts

 The Supreme Court observed that when the language of a deed is clear and unambiguous, there is no justification for judicial intervention to interpret it differently. It added that applying the literal rule of construction, the words must be given their plain and natural meaning, as they are presumed to convey the true intent of the parties.

“the court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not covey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. In constructing a deed, looking at the surrounding circumstances and subject matter is legitimate only if the words used are doubtful.”, the court observed upon placing reliance on the case of Provash Chandra Dalui and another v. Biswanath Banerjee and another, (1989) Suppl 1 SCC 487.

Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices Pankaj Mithal and SVN Bhatti laid down the guiding tools for the construction of contracts and deeds, which are:

1. The contract is first constructed in its plain, ordinary and literal meaning. This is also known as the literal rule of construction.

2. If there is an absurdity created by literally reading the contract, a shift from literal rule may be allowed. This construction is generally called the golden rule of construction.

3. Lastly, the contract may be purposively constructed in light of its object and context to determine the purpose of the contract. This approach must be used cautiously.

Further, relying on Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court reiterated that when an agreement is reduced to writing, oral evidence cannot be introduced to contradict its terms unless the case falls under specific exceptions such as fraud or mistake mentioned under proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act.

“Unless and until the case falls under one or the other exceptions enabling receipt of oral evidence on a written document, the court is precluded from entertaining oral evidence. The document or deed interpreted in a particular case is not relied upon, but the subject deed is construed on well-established principles. The law recognises both ownership and possession of an owner of a property. A lease recognises the outcome of a rightful separation of ownership and possession between lessor and lessee. Section 108 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with the rights of the lessor and lessee. Under the said section, one of the conditions is that the lessor is bound by lessee's request to put lessee in possession of the property.”, the court observed.

“In the case on hand, admittedly, defendant no. 1 is in possession of the property from defendant no. 2. Whereas the Agreement of Conducting business does not deal with the possession so enjoyed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The absence of such a crucial clause in the agreement dated 16.08.1967 is a vital circumstance in construing the subject matter of 18 the said agreement. This is an added circumstance to hold that what has been entrusted is to run the business in the plaint schedule but not occupying the plaint schedule under leave and licence. In the case on hand, the terms of the agreement dated 16.08.1967 are clear that the entrustment to the plaintiff is the ownership of the hotel business of the first defendant and not the tenancy right of the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff.”, the court added.

Thus, the Court held that the 'conducting agreement' was not a leave and license agreement but an agreement for operating a hotel.

ANNAYA KOCHA SHETTY (DEAD) THROUGH LRS VERSUS LAXMIBAI NARAYAN SATOSE SINCE DECEASED THROUGH LRS & OTHERS

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151

 Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151 — Minor Discrepancies in Witness Statements — Minor and immaterial inconsistencies in witness statements do not harm the prosecution's case, especially when explained by the circumstances of the case

S. 45 Evidence Act | Opinion Of Handwriting Expert Must Be Treated With Caution

 The Supreme Court observed that while expert evidence may not always require corroboration, courts must exercise caution when relying on expert testimony particularly the handwriting expert due to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting.

The bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the case where the Appellant challenged his conviction under Sections 120B (criminal conspiracy), 468 (forgery for the purpose of cheating), and 471 (using a forged document as genuine) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case involved the fabrication of a mark sheet used for admission to an MBBS course.

 

The prosecution relied on the testimony of a handwriting expert to prove that the handwriting on the postal cover matched the appellant's. However, the original postal cover was never exhibited as evidence, and the prosecution failed to prove its existence.

The Appellant challenged his conviction, arguing that the expert's evidence report cannot be relied upon in the absence of the original postal cover.

 

Finding merit in the Appellant's contention, the judgment authored by Justice Mehta noted that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the disputed postal cover, which was central to the case.

The court cited the landmark case of Murari Lal v. State of M.P. (1980) 1 SCC 704, which established principles for assessing expert evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. It held that while expert testimony is not inherently unreliable, it must be carefully scrutinized, with the reasoning behind the opinion thoroughly examined. Further, it held that corroboration may be necessary depending on the case, but there is no strict rule requiring expert evidence to always be corroborated.

Evidence Law--May presume and shall presume--Difference between--In the former case the Court has an option to raise the presumption or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the presumption--If in a case the Court has an option to raise the presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed, unless and until it is disproved--Evidence Act, 1872, Section 4.

sclaw.in

Medical Evidence--Ocular Evidence—Variance between—Oral evidence has to get primacy as the medical evidence is basically opinionative

sclaw.in

Evidence Law--Confession--Extra Judicial Confession--Conviction made on basis of extra judicial confession--Held; While dealing with a stand of extra judicial confession, Court has to satisfy itself that the same was voluntary and without any coercion and undue influence--Extra judicial confession can form the basis of conviction if persons before whom it is stated to be made appear to be unbiased and not even remotely inimical to the accused

sclaw.in

Evidence Law--Extra Judicial confession--Circumstantial evidence--An extra judicial confession is, on the face of it, a weak piece of evidence and the Courts are reluctant in the absence of a chain of cogent circumstances to rely on this evidence for the purpose of recording a conviction--Evidence Act, 1872, Section 3 and 24.

sclaw.in