Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1), 21(1) & (2) and 2(d) — Duty to report — Persons liable for failure to report — Only those persons who receive information directly from the victim regarding sexual assault are under obligation to report under S. 19(1); their failure attracts S. 21 — Persons who are not direct recipients of the complaint, and to whose knowledge no such offence is shown to have occurred (whether by direct information from victim or otherwise), cannot be prosecuted for non-reporting merely because they were present during a subsequent internal "verification" or were part of an institutional decision-making process — Absent direct credible information reaching such persons, a decision taken collectively not to report, even if erroneous, does not by itself establish criminal liability under S. 21

 AAA

Vs.

LINDA SEMA AND OTHERS

( Before : Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ..... of 2026 (Arising out of SLP Criminal No. 4772 of 2024)

Decided on : 09-07-2026

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — "Knowledge that such an offence has been committed" — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person's own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining "knowledge" to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior "verification exercise" to ascertain correctness of the child's complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay — (Paras 45 to 47, 56)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1), 21(1) & (2) and 2(d) — Duty to report — Persons liable for failure to report — Only those persons who receive information directly from the victim regarding sexual assault are under obligation to report under S. 19(1); their failure attracts S. 21 — Persons who are not direct recipients of the complaint, and to whose knowledge no such offence is shown to have occurred (whether by direct information from victim or otherwise), cannot be prosecuted for non-reporting merely because they were present during a subsequent internal "verification" or were part of an institutional decision-making process — Absent direct credible information reaching such persons, a decision taken collectively not to report, even if erroneous, does not by itself establish criminal liability under S. 21 — (Paras 60, 63 to 64)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 21(3) — Exemption for child informants — Victim's minor sister, minor friend, and minor Head Girl of the school, all being "child" within S. 2(d), held not liable to be prosecuted under S. 21 read with S. 19(1) for not independently reporting, notwithstanding they had knowledge/information of the incident — (Para 61)

D. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 176 — Omission to give information to public servant — Read with S. 21(2) POCSO Act — Headmistress, having received direct information from victim of sexual assault, but instead of reporting conducting her own verification exercise and thereafter suppressing the information based on her own assessment that no assault had occurred, held to attract grave suspicion sufficient for framing of charge under S. 21 POCSO/S. 176 IPC — Order of discharge qua her set aside — (Para 62, 65)

E. Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 201 & 120-B — Causing disappearance of evidence; Criminal conspiracy — Charge against Principal, Vice-Principal and other teachers/staff not receiving direct information from victim — Held, ingredients of "knowledge or reason to believe" under S. 201 not established qua persons who neither received direct complaint from the victim nor had, to their own understanding (also consistent with the medical report and CCTV footage), any material indicating commission of offence — Mere participation in institutional decision, taken after considering all available material including CCTV footage, not to report, does not establish conspiracy to suppress information or cause disappearance of evidence, in absence of direct credible knowledge — Order of discharge of such persons, affirmed by High Court in revision, upheld — (Paras 63 to 64)

F. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 227 & 228 — Discharge — Scope of enquiry — At stage of discharge in a case instituted on police report, court to consider only materials collected during investigation forming part of the police report; defence material not part thereof cannot be looked into — Court to proceed on assumption that materials brought on record by prosecution are true and to assess only probative value thereof, to determine whether there is ground for presuming that offence has been committed, not whether ground exists for conviction — Test is one of grave suspicion, not proof; court not to conduct a mini trial — (Paras 20 to 21) — State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, relied on.

G. Words and Phrases — "Knowledge" — Distinguished from "reason to believe" and "suspicion"/"doubt" — "Knowledge" an awareness on part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind; on a higher plane than "reason to believe" — A person is "supposed to know" where there is a direct appeal to his senses, but for purposes of S. 19(1) POCSO Act, "knowledge" additionally includes awareness founded on credible information received, particularly from the victim directly — (Paras 31, 39, 45, 47) — A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576; Sr. Tessy Jose v. State of Kerala, (2018) 18 SCC 292; State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298; Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611, referred to.

Conviction under pre-amendment SC/ST Act S. 3(2)(v) requires proof that the victim’s caste identity was a ground for the offence, not merely known.

 RAJU @ UMAKANT

Vs.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

( Before : Sanjay Karol and K. V. Viswanathan, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No…..of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 17398 of 2024)

Decided on : 01-05-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 366, 376(2)(g), 342 — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114A — Rape — Testimony of Prosecutrix — Corroboration — The testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual assault case, if found to be credible, consistent, and confidence-inspiring despite minor contradictions or variations from initial reports, is sufficient for conviction without corroboration — A victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice, and her evidence should be evaluated keeping in mind she is an interested witness, but trustworthiness remains the primary test — The statutory presumption under S. 114A of the Evidence Act regarding absence of consent applies where the prosecutrix deposes she did not consent.

Abetment of suicide (Sec 306 IPC) requires proof of direct/indirect proximate instigation; remote harassment allegations alone insufficient, justifying quashing under 482 CrPC as abuse of process.

 SHENBAGAVALLI AND OTHERS

Vs.

THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, KANCHEEPURAM DISTRICT AND ANOTHER

( Before : Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 4268 of 2024 and Criminal Appeal No. 4269 of 2024

Decided on : 30-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 306 — Abetment of Suicide — Ingredients — To constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the essential ingredients of abetment as defined under Section 107 IPC must be established — There must be proof of a direct or indirect positive act of incitement to the commission of suicide by the accused, reflecting a mens rea to instigate or aid the deceased to end their life

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 499, Exception 9 & Section 500 — Defamation — Imputation in Good Faith for Protection of Interests

 SHAHED KAMAL AND OTHERS

Vs.

M/S A. SURTI DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER

( Before : K. V. Viswanathan and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 2033 of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9942 of 2024)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 499, Exception 9 & Section 500 — Defamation — Imputation in Good Faith for Protection of Interests — Exception 9 to S. 499 IPC engrafts the principle of qualified privilege, stating it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided it is made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good — Good faith requires due care and attention but, unlike Exception 1, does not mandate proving the absolute truth of the imputation — In a business relationship like that between homebuyers and a developer, airing specific, fact-based grievances via a banner, using mild and temperate language without malice, to protect their collective interests, falls squarely within this exception. (Relied on: Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590; Harbhajan Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 118; Kuruppanna Goundan vs. Kuppuswami Mudaliar, 1935 MWN 365; Queen-Empress vs. E.M. Slater, (1891) ILR 15 Bom 351; Valmiki Faleiro v. Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1584)

Circumstantial Evidence — Murder (Filicide) vs. Suicide

 SUBHASH AGGARWAL

Vs.

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ….of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1069 of 2025)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Murder (Filicide) vs. Suicide — In cases based on circumstantial evidence where the question is whether the death was homicidal (filicide) or suicidal, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances that points exclusively to the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence — Conviction upheld where circumstances, including (i) gunshot residue (GSR) found on the accused father’s dominant (right) hand, (ii) the accused being the first to discover the body and propounding a false theory of suicide (by screwdriver), (iii) absence of blood on the alleged suicide weapon (screwdriver), (iv) medical and ballistic evidence indicating a close-range (but not contact) gunshot wound inconsistent with typical suicide patterns (location on chest, weapon not found in hand), (v) false and contradictory explanations by the accused under S. 313 Cr.P.C. regarding the weapon and GSR, formed a complete chain pointing solely to the accused’s guilt. (Relied on: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Ingredients — Nature of Injury vs. Intention/Knowledge

 STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Vs.

SHAMSHER SINGH

( Before : Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 2015

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Ingredients — Nature of Injury vs. Intention/Knowledge — To attract S. 307 IPC, the crucial element is the intention or knowledge to cause death with which the act is done, irrespective of the nature or severity of the injury actually caused. S. 307 uses the word ‘hurt’, not ‘grievous hurt’ or ‘life-threatening hurt’ — Therefore, an accused cannot be acquitted merely because the injury inflicted was not grievous or dangerous to life, if the evidence establishes that the act was done with the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death. (Relied on: State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kanha @ Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605; State of M.P. vs. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554)

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 498A & 306 — Cruelty & Abetment of Suicide —

 JAGDISH GOND

Vs.

THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND OTHERS

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No.2605 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 498A & 306 — Cruelty & Abetment of Suicide — Allegations supporting charges under Sections 498A and 306 IPC must be specific and substantiated — Vague complaints about the deceased being lazy or sick, without evidence of physical violence or persistent harassment meeting the threshold of cruelty likely to drive suicide, are insufficient for conviction under these sections.

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — False Promise of Marriage

 JASPAL SINGH KAURAL

Vs.

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANOTHER

( Before : B. V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No…of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4007 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — False Promise of Marriage — For consent to sexual intercourse to be vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising from a promise to marry, the promise must be false ab initio, made without any intention of being adhered to, and must have a direct nexus to the complainant’s decision Where the complainant was aware that the accused was married at the inception of the relationship, and the relationship was prolonged (spanning several years, even after both parties obtained divorces from their respective spouses), the consent given by a mature complainant is deemed reasoned and conscious, negating the element of “misconception of fact” — A subsequent breach of promise does not automatically convert the initial consent into one obtained by deceit under S. 375 IPC.

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — Misconception of Fact — Promise to Marry

 BISWAJYOTI CHATTERJEE

Vs.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER

( Before : B. V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No….of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4261 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — Misconception of Fact — Promise to Marry — Consent to sexual intercourse given by a mature individual, fully aware from the outset that the promisor is already married (though separated), cannot be deemed to be vitiated by a “misconception of fact” under Section 375 IPC merely based on a promise to marry after obtaining a divorce — Such knowledge precludes the necessary “misconception” and indicates a reasoned decision to engage in the relationship, especially when the relationship is prolonged and consensual.

'Instigation Must Have Close Proximity To Suicide', Supreme Court Quashes Abetment To Suicide Case Against Business Partners

 Observing that there must be a close proximity between the positive act of instigation by the accused person and the commission of suicide by the victim, the Supreme Court on Thursday (March 27) upheld the quashing of an abetment to suicide case against the business partner of the deceased, who committed suicide alleging harassment from his business partner.

“We are, therefore, of the considered view that even taking the allegations at its face value, it cannot be said that the allegations would amount to instigating the deceased to commit suicide. In any case, there is no reasonable nexus between the period to which the allegations pertain and the date of death. In that view of the matter, we do not find that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings under Section 306 of IPC.”, 

“The learned Single Judge of the High Court, in our view, while quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC, has acted in a casual and cursory manner. If the learned Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that even investigation papers as collected by the investigating agency did not constitute an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC, then the least that was expected of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was to give reasons as to why the material collected by the investigating agency which has been placed before the learned Single Judge of the High Court was not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC.”, the Court observed.

“In absence of any reason given, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC.”, the court added.

Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed.

Case Title: R. SHASHIREKHA VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS

'Prior Enmity Can Indicate Motive But Also Raise Possibility Of False Accusation' : Supreme Court Acquits Man In 30-Year-Old Murder Case

 The Supreme Court (March 27) observed that when a criminal act is committed based on prior enmity with the victim, then the possibility of false accusations cannot be ruled out. Though hostility between parties can establish a motive for a crime, it also raises the possibility of false accusations driven by personal grudges.

“It is a settled law that enmity is a double-edged weapon. On one hand, it provides motive, on the other hand it also does not rule out the possibility of false implication. From the nature of the evidence placed on record by the prosecution, the possibility of the present appellant being falsely implicated on account of previous enmity cannot be ruled out. In our opinion, therefore, the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt”, 

Further, the Court cited other factors which cast doubt over the prosecution's case such as contradictions in witness statements and an unexplained 45-day delay in recording key witness testimonies, which weakened the prosecution's case.

“The following factors cast a serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution witnesses:

(i) The witnesses who were carrying the deceased Guddu to the hospital not having bloodstains on their clothes;

(ii) The witnesses not informing either the Police Station or the police constable who was standing at a distance of about 50 steps from the place of incident;

(iii) The contradictions in the evidence of witnesses with regard to presence of each other at the place of incident;

(iv) The witnesses not informing the cause of death of the deceased Guddu in the MLC papers, though according to them they were aware about the person who had inflicted the injury on the deceased; and

(v) Recording of the statement of the witnesses after a long gap after the date of incident when the said witnesses were very much available.”

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the Appellant of all the charges leveled against him.

Case Title: ASLAM ALIAS IMRAN VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Giving Arrest Memo Not Same As Supplying Grounds Of Arrest : Supreme Court Sets Aside Arrest & Remand

 "We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the said arrest memo cannot be construed as grounds of arrest, as no other worthwhile particulars have been furnished to him. This, being a clear non-compliance of the mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined to set aside the impugned judgment, particularly, in light of the judgment rendered by this Court reported as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) - (2024) 8 SCC 254."

In this case, the accused was arrested last December in connection with a first information report registered under Sections 384, 420, 468, 471, 509 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. He was remanded to police custody for 3 days. He challenged his arrest and remand before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which refused to entertain it. Against the January 30 order of the High Court, an appeal was filed. He challenged his arrest and remand on three grounds: non-compliance with Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the opportunity of being heard at the time of remand and the non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.

The Supreme Court considered his criminal appeal only in terms of the last ground.

Case Details: ASHISH KAKKAR v. UT OF CHANDIGARH

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant,

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.

SUDAM PRABHAKAR ACHAT

Vs.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

In rape cases, the prosecutrix's testimony can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence, and delay in filing a complaint or lack of major injury marks in medical evidence does not necessarily negate the prosecution's case.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 — Reliability of Prosecutrix's Testimony in Rape Cases — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a rape case can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence, emphasizing the importance of considering the broader probabilities of the case.

State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217, Relied On.

Impact of Delay in Filing Complaint and Medical Evidence in Rape Cases — The Court noted that delay in lodging a complaint can be sufficiently explained and may not be fatal to the prosecution's case — Additionally, the absence of major injury marks in medical evidence does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape.

Defence of False Implication and Character Assassination in Rape Cases — The Court rejected the defence of false implication and the attempt to discredit the prosecutrix based on her mother's alleged character, emphasizing that the accused's guilt is determined independently of such factors.

LOK MAL @ LOKU Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Supreme Court Discharges Employers In Culpable Homicide Case Over Electrocution Death Of Workers Engaged For Decoration

The Supreme Court recently discharged two persons accused of not providing safety equipment (e.g., helmets, safety belts, rubber shoes) to their employees, leading to their deaths due to electrocution while working on a signboard by using an iron ladder.

An FIR was registered against the Appellants under Sections 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and 304A (causing death by negligence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Trial Court and High Court rejected the appellants' (employers) discharge application, holding that there was sufficient material to proceed with the trial under Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

The Court held that the appellants lacked requisite knowledge or intention to cause death.

“the two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death. It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A IPC.”,

S.306 IPC | Suicide Note Alone Insufficient For Conviction Unless Its Proved There Was Incitement By Accused Proximate To Death

 The Supreme Court on Wednesday (March 5) set aside the conviction of a man accused of committing an offence of abetment of suicide by blackmailing the deceased using compromising photographs and videos.

The Court observed that for invoking the offence of abetment to suicide under Section 306 of IPC, the prosecution must prove instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid with a clear mens rea to abet suicide. Mere harassment or differences are not sufficient unless there is a proximate act leading to suicide, the court said.

 

"Abetment to commit suicide involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in the doing of a thing. Without a positive proximate act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Besides, in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence,"

Quashing--Civil Liability--Buyer Company refused to accept goods being defective--FIR u/s 420 IPC lodged--No misrepresentation made at time of contract--No case of criminal liability--FIR quashed.

sclaw.in

Acid burns--Reduction in sentence--Victim suffered severe burn injuries on head, face and chest--High Court reduced the sentence to already undergone--Order of High Court aside--Sentence could not be reduced in such a heinous crime.

sclaw.in