Showing posts with label Service Matters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Service Matters. Show all posts

Tuesday, 15 April 2025

Education Law — Teacher Qualification — Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) — NIOS 18-Month ODL Programme — Purpose and Scope

 KOUSIK DAS AND OTHERS


Vs.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

( Before : B.R. Gavai and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No….of 2025 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No. 19139 of 2024)

Decided on : 04-04-2025

 Education Law — Teacher Qualification — Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) — NIOS 18-Month ODL Programme — Purpose and Scope — The 18-month Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) programme conducted by the National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS) through Open Distance Learning (ODL) mode, pursuant to the NCTE Recognition Order dated 22.09.2017, was a specific, one-time measure necessitated by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 — This programme was designed exclusively to enable untrained elementary teachers, who were already in service as on 10.08.2017, to acquire the minimum required qualification by the statutory deadline of 31.03.2019, thereby safeguarding their continued employment.

Monday, 14 April 2025

Service Law — Recruitment — Eligibility Qualification — Interpretation of Rules — West Bengal School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016, Rule 6(2)

 SOUMEN PAUL AND OTHERS

Vs.

SHRABANI NAYEK AND OTHERS

( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No….of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12660 of 2023 with Civil Appeal No….of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (C) No….of 2025 Arising Out of Diary No. 25090 of 2023 with Civil Appeal No…..of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 25324 of 2023

Decided on : 04-04-2025

Rule 6(2) WB Primary Teacher Rules incorporates prevailing NCTE norms, not fixing a qualification acquisition cut-off date.

 Service Law — Recruitment — Eligibility Qualification — Interpretation of Rules — West Bengal School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016, Rule 6(2) — Rule 6(2) of the West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016 (as amended on 22.12.2020), which requires candidates to possess the minimum educational and training qualification prescribed by the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) "prevailing as on date of publication of recruitment notification," primarily functions to incorporate the NCTE qualifications applicable at the time of recruitment — It does not, by its text or intendment, establish a rigid cut-off date by which such qualification must be possessed by the candidate — An interpretation treating the phrase "prevailing as on date" as fixing a cut-off for obtaining the qualification is erroneous, particularly when the recruiting body itself did not espouse such an interpretation.

Saturday, 12 April 2025

Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020

 PRABHJOT KAUR

Vs.

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No(s)……of 2025 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17747 of 2023]

Decided on : 09-04-2025

Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020 — Reservation for Women — Horizontal Reservation — Implementation via advertisement — Where an advertisement was issued subsequent to the notification of the 2020 Rules providing 33% horizontal reservation for women, and specified certain posts (like DSP ‘SC Sports’) as reserved for women (‘SC Sports (Women)’), this reservation specification within the advertisement, implementing the mandate of the 2020 Rules, is valid for that recruitment process, unless the advertisement itself is successfully challenged or withdrawn.

Thursday, 10 April 2025

Service Law — Recruitment — Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Reservation — OBC

 Service Law — Recruitment — Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Reservation — OBC-NCL/MBC-NCL/EWS — Cut-off Date for Eligibility — Certificate Validity — The eligibility of a candidate claiming reservation benefits under categories like Other Backward Classes (Non-Creamy Layer) [OBC-NCL], Most Backward Classes (Non-Creamy Layer) [MBC-NCL], or Economically Weaker Section [EWS], whose status is dynamic and dependent on current socio-economic criteria, must be established as existing on the cut-off date for the recruitment process — In the absence of a specific date mentioned in the recruitment advertisement or rules, the last date for submission of applications (31.08.2021 herein) is the determinative cut-off date — Candidates must possess a category certificate valid as per the applicable rules and government circulars as of this cut-off date to be considered eligible under the reserved category

SAKSHI ARHA

Vs.

THE RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AND OTHERS

Sunday, 6 April 2025

Supreme Court Rejects UCO Bank's Plea That Employee Dismissed For Misconduct Wasn't Entitled To Pension Despite 10 Yrs Service

 Supreme Court Rejects UCO Bank's Plea That Employee Dismissed For Misconduct Wasn't Entitled To Pension Despite 10 Yrs Service

The Supreme Court rejected UCO Bank's plea that a bank employee who has completed over ten years of service was not entitled to superannuation benefits when he was dismissed on grounds of misconduct.

The bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan upheld the Punjab & Haryana High Court's decision directing the Appellant-UCO Bank to grant pensionary benefits to the Respondent-employee removed from service for misconduct after completing 10 plus years in the service.

The Case

In 1998, the Respondent was charged with assaulting a bank officer and was dismissed following an inquiry in 1999. In 2000, the appellate authority modified the penalty to removal with terminal benefits, a decision that went unchallenged by the Appellant-Bank and attained finality.

In 2004, the Labour Court reduced the penalty to stoppage of increments and ordered reinstatement with 75% back wages. However, in 2009, the High Court set aside the Labour Court's award, reinstating the removal with terminal benefits.

Subsequently, in 2010, the Respondent opted for a pension under the Bipartite Settlement. The High Court later directed the bank to grant pension benefits, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool, (2014) 2 SCC 715.

In SK Kool's judgment, the Court held that if the bank employee has completed the minimum pensionable years of service (10+ years), he would be entitled to the pensionary benefits even if dismissed on account of misconduct.

Answering in negative, the judgment authored by Justice Bhuyan relying on the case of S.K. Kool, harmonized both the provisions and observed that Regulation 22 cannot override the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court rejected the Appellant's argument regarding the non-application of the SK Kool's judgment in the present case. The Appellant argued that in SK Kool's judgment applies only where the employee opted for pension before removal.

“the decision in S.K. Kool (supra) was rendered in a different factual context. The employee in the said case had opted for pension before the penalty of removal from service was imposed on him. In the present case, respondent never opted for pension. Therefore, S.K. Kool (supra) is clearly distinguishable in so far facts and circumstances of the present case is concerned.”, the court observed

“Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had followed the aforesaid decision of this Court. Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had submitted his option for pension on 05.10.2010. Learned Single Judge also held that objection of the appellant to the claim of pension by the respondent was without any basis in as much as the appellate authority had specifically held that respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered. This order of the appellate authority has attained finality. Therefore, it was held that respondent was entitled to receive pension in view of the order passed by the appellate authority. This view of the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool (supra) is binding on us. Therefore, we do not find any compelling reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”, the court observed.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Case Title: UCO BANK & ANR. VERSUS VIJAY KUMAR HANDA

Excess Payments To Employee Can't Be Recovered When There Was No Fraud Or Misrepresentation

 Excess Payments To Employee Can't Be Recovered When There Was No Fraud Or Misrepresentation

The Supreme Court has reiterated that excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable.

A bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra was deciding the appeals filed by persons, who were working as Stenographers and Personal Assistants in the Orissa District Judiciary, against the recoveries of excess payments. Amounts in the range of Rs.20,000 to 40,000 were sought to be recovered from the appellants. The recoveries were ordered nearly three years after their retirement and six years after the payment

"This Court has consistently taken the view that if the excess amount was not paid on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the employee or if such excess payment was made by the employer by applying a wrong principle for calculating the pay/allowance or on the basis of a particular interpretation of rule/order, which is subsequently found to be erroneous, such excess payments of emoluments or allowances are not recoverable. It is held that such relief against the recovery is not because of any right of the employee but in equity, exercising judicial discretion to provide relief to the employee from the hardship that will be caused if the recovery is ordered."

In Thomas Daniel, the Court had held that recoveries would be impermissible in following situations :

(i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service).

(ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

(iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

(v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.

Here, the Court noted that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners in obtaining the excess payment. Also, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them before ordering the recoveries.

"The appellants having superannuated on a ministerial post of Stenographer were admittedly not holding any gazetted post as such applying the principle enunciated by this Court in the above quoted judgment, the recovery is found unsustainable," the Court observed while allowing their appeals.

Case : Jogeswar Sahoo and others vs The District Judge Cuttack and others

Saturday, 5 April 2025

Teacher In-Service As On Aug 10, 2017 With 18-Month D.El.Ed. From NIOS Before Apr 1, 2019 'At Par' With 2-Yr Diploma Holder


Dealing with the issue of eligibility for teacher recruitment process in West Bengal, the Supreme Court today held that any teacher who was in-service as on 10.08.2017 and who acquired the Diploma In Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) qualification through National Institute of Open Schooling's (NIOS) 18-months programme prior to 01.04.2019 is a valid diploma holder and at par with a teacher who completed the 2 years D. El. Ed. programme.

"such of the teachers who were in employment as on 10th August 2017 and who completed the 18 months D. El. Ed. (ODL) programme through NIOS before 1st April 2019 shall be considered as valid diploma holders for the purpose of applying in other institutions and/or for promotional avenues",

"Having availed of the one-time scheme, such of the teachers even though they only undertook the 18 months D. El. Ed. programme through NIOS they should be considered at par with a 2 years D. El. Ed., if they completed their 18 months programme through NIOS prior to 1st April 2019."

The bench of Justices Gavai and Masih made reference to another order passed by the Court, dated 10.12.2024, which disposed of certain review petitions and miscellaneous applications filed in connection with Jaiveer Singh. This order clarified that teachers who acquired the 18 months D. El. Ed. through NIOS and who were in employment as on 10.08.2017 would be treated as a valid diploma holder for the purpose of applying in other institutions or for promotional avenues. It further mentioned that the clarification would be effective from the date of pronouncement of the judgment in Jaiveer Singh (ie 28.11.2023).

With regard to the decision of the Single Bench of the High Court (which was upheld by the Division Bench), it was opined that though reliance was placed on Jaiveer Singh, the bench came to the wrong conclusion inasmuch as it put a blanket ban on all teachers holding an 18 months D. El. Ed. through NIOS.

"the judgment of this Court in the case of Jaiveer Singh unequivocally held that the entire scheme emanating from the NCTE Recognition Order dated 22nd September 2017 was for the purpose of providing a window to the in-service teachers inasmuch as unless they would have acquired requisite qualifications prior to 1st April 2019, they would not have continued to remain in service and would have faced dismissal from service."

In closing, the appeal was allowed and the impugned decisions of the High Court set aside. The respondent-authorities were directed to consider candidature of such appellants who were in-service as on 10.08.2017. On verification, those who are found to satisfy the eligibility criteria, shall be appointed within a period of 3 months, the Court further said.

KOUSIK DAS & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS., SLP(C) No. 19139 of 2024

Sunday, 23 March 2025

“Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions

 “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions —Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, affirming the High Court's decision that respondents appointed under the "Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana" between 1969 and 1982 are entitled to pensionary benefits — The Court reasoned that government decisions had extended the service rules of the Cane Development Department to these employees, entitling them to similar benefits as permanent government employees, consistent with the Court's earlier judgment in the Vinod Kumar Goel case — The Court rejected arguments regarding delay and the respondents' prior acceptance of Contributory Provident Fund benefits, noting that their claim for pension was raised early and they were willing to deposit the withdrawn amount — The arrears of pension were, however, restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition.

Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission

 Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 — Section 37 — Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 — Rule 2.1.3 — Qualifications for Food Safety Officers — A recruitment notification specifying "a degree" in certain science subjects for the post of Food Safety Officer encompasses postgraduate degrees in those subjects unless explicitly excluded by the relevant statutory rules prescribed by the Central Government — Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission — The Court held that the term "degree" in the recruitment advertisement and the Rules, 2011, includes postgraduate degrees in the listed science subjects (Food Technology, Dairy Technology, Biotechnology, Oil Technology, Agriculture Science, Veterinary Sciences, Biochemistry, Microbiology), noting that the specific mention of a Master's degree in Chemistry sets the minimum qualification for that subject — The Court emphasized that the Central Government has the exclusive power to prescribe qualifications for FSOs under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and that holding a higher degree in a relevant subject does not disqualify a candidate — The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents to allow the appellants to participate in the interview process.

Candidates Can't Be Rejected Solely Because They Had Higher Degrees Than Prescribed Qualification

 The word 'Degree' can mean means 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' or 'Doctorate Degree',

The Supreme Court observed that a candidate possessing a higher degree of qualification cannot be rejected solely because a lower degree of qualification is required for a particular post.

The bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the case where the Appellants, who are post-graduates in Microbiology, Food Science, and Technology, and applied for the post of Food Safety Officer (“FSO”) were disqualified during the recruitment process on the grounds that their qualifications did not meet the criteria specified in the advertisement.

The appellants challenged their disqualification before the Jharkhand High Court. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court ruled against the appellants, holding that the advertisement required a Bachelor's degree in the specified subjects and that a Master's degree in Microbiology or Food Science did not qualify. The recruitment advertisement mentioned that the candidate having a master's degree in relevant subjects (other than Chemistry) would be excluded from the selection process.

“The term 'degree' is defined under Section 22(3) the UGC Act, which states that the 'degree' means the 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and the 'Doctorate Degree'. Thus, wherever the word 'degree' is used, unless a specific exclusion is provided, the same would include within its scope and ambit all three, 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and a 'Doctorate Degree'.”

“we have no hesitation in concluding that if a candidate, having undertaken a degree course in “Chemistry” subject, desires to apply for the post of FSO, he must possess a master's degree in that subject. However, if a candidate has taken college education in the subjects of food technology; dairy technology; biotechnology; oil technology; agricultural science; veterinary science; biochemistry or microbiology, then such a candidate would be qualified for the FSO post, if he holds any one of the degrees, i.e., either graduation, post-graduation or doctorate degree in any of these subjects. There is no logic or rationale behind excluding the candidates having master's or a doctorate degree in these subjects from staking a claim to the post of FSO because such an interpretation would be totally unjust, arbitrary and unconstitutional.

CHANDRA SHEKHAR SINGH AND OTHERS VERSUS THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS

Saturday, 15 March 2025

When Selection Is Based Entirely On Interview Marks, It's Reasonable To Presume Existence Of Arbitrariness & Favouritism

 

The Court opined that it was desirable to have a selection process based on a written exam and rules.

The Supreme Court recently upheld the 2016 decision of the then BJP government of Assam to cancel a select list for the recruitment process of 104 Constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) notified in 2014 by the then Indian National Congress government.

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan found that the cancellation was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate, given the anomalies in the recruitment process identified by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, including skewed district representation and reservation policy violations.

The Court further highlighted that the recruitment was based on interviews without any written exam and was not governed by any Rules.

Last but not the least, having regard to present times when corruption has been held to be a walk of life by certain responsible citizens of the country, it would have been desirable if the process of recruitment of 104 Constables were conducted after framing of recruitment rules and also prescribing a written examination to keep the process absolutely above board”, the Court observed.

The Court observed –

the Government itself felt that the selection being entirely based on interview, the same admitted an element of arbitrariness and that the assessment of candidates being based merely on the basis of marks at the interview, was reasonable for drawing a presumption of being misused for favouritism and could well be regarded as suffering from the vice of arbitrariness. In such circumstances, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, for a court to law to substitute its decision for the one taken by the Government reasoning that the selection has not been challenged by any unsuccessful candidate.”

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.