S. 45 Evidence Act | Opinion Of Handwriting Expert Must Be Treated With Caution

 The Supreme Court observed that while expert evidence may not always require corroboration, courts must exercise caution when relying on expert testimony particularly the handwriting expert due to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting.

The bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the case where the Appellant challenged his conviction under Sections 120B (criminal conspiracy), 468 (forgery for the purpose of cheating), and 471 (using a forged document as genuine) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case involved the fabrication of a mark sheet used for admission to an MBBS course.

 

The prosecution relied on the testimony of a handwriting expert to prove that the handwriting on the postal cover matched the appellant's. However, the original postal cover was never exhibited as evidence, and the prosecution failed to prove its existence.

The Appellant challenged his conviction, arguing that the expert's evidence report cannot be relied upon in the absence of the original postal cover.

 

Finding merit in the Appellant's contention, the judgment authored by Justice Mehta noted that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the disputed postal cover, which was central to the case.

The court cited the landmark case of Murari Lal v. State of M.P. (1980) 1 SCC 704, which established principles for assessing expert evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. It held that while expert testimony is not inherently unreliable, it must be carefully scrutinized, with the reasoning behind the opinion thoroughly examined. Further, it held that corroboration may be necessary depending on the case, but there is no strict rule requiring expert evidence to always be corroborated.

S.306 IPC | Suicide Note Alone Insufficient For Conviction Unless Its Proved There Was Incitement By Accused Proximate To Death

 The Supreme Court on Wednesday (March 5) set aside the conviction of a man accused of committing an offence of abetment of suicide by blackmailing the deceased using compromising photographs and videos.

The Court observed that for invoking the offence of abetment to suicide under Section 306 of IPC, the prosecution must prove instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid with a clear mens rea to abet suicide. Mere harassment or differences are not sufficient unless there is a proximate act leading to suicide, the court said.

 

"Abetment to commit suicide involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in the doing of a thing. Without a positive proximate act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Besides, in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence,"

NI Act Allows Filing Of Cheque Dishonour Complaint At Place Of Payee Bank; Accused Can't Seek Transfer Citing Inconvenience

The Supreme Court today (March 6) ruled that a cheque dishonor complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”), should be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the branch of the bank where the payee maintains an account i.e., where the cheque is presented for collection.

Taking reference to Section 142(2) introduced via the 2015 amendment to the NI Act, the Court clarified that the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the cheque dishonor complaint lies with the court where the branch of the bank (where the payee maintains the account) is located. The 2015 amendment was brought in by the Parliament to address the confusion created by the Supreme Court's judgment in Dasrath Rupsingh Rathod v State of Maharashtra (2014) which held that the jurisdiction for cases under Section 138 is determined by the place of the bank where the cheque was drawn.

“A conjoint reading of Section 142(2)(a) along with the explanation thereof, makes the position emphatically clear that, when a cheque is delivered or issued to a person with liberty to present the cheque for collection at any branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered or issued to the branch of the bank, in which, the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, and the court of the place where such cheque was presented for collection, will have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint alleging the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In that view of the position of law, the word 'delivered' used in Section 142(2)(a) of the N.I. Act has no significance. What is of significance is the expression 'for collection through an account'. That is to say, delivery of the cheque takes place where the cheque was issued and presentation of the cheque will be through the account of the payee or holder in due course, and the said place is decisive to determine the question of jurisdiction.”, 

No Illegality In Considering S.319 CrPC Application After Trial Based On HC's Revision Order

 

  

In a key ruling on Section 319 of Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court on Thursday (March 6) held that while the power to summon an additional accused must be exercised before the trial concludes, if a pre-trial application for summoning is rejected and the High Court, in revision, sets aside the rejection and orders reconsideration, the application cannot be dismissed solely because it was heard after the trial ends. The Court ruled that it relates back to the original pre-trial rejection order.

“What can be discerned from the aforesaid is that if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction either setting aside or modifying the order of the Trial Court for the purpose of Section 319, the same would relate back to the original order passed by the Trial Court and substitute it to the extent of modification.”

“an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would relate back to the order of the Trial Court. In the present case, the Trial Court in its discretion rejected the second application filed under Section 319 before the conclusion of trial vide order dated 19.07.2010. The High Court, more than ten years after the conclusion of trial, set aside the said order and directed the Trial Court to reconsider the application under Section 319 afresh. In our considered view, such order passed by the High Court on the second application under Section 319 travels back to 19.07.2010 i.e., the date when the Trial Court rejected the said application. The effect of the order of the High Court relating back to the original order of the Trial Court is that the Trial Court cannot be considered functus officio as regards considering the application under Section 319 after the conclusion of the trial. We say so because the Trial Court, in considering the application under Section 319 after the conclusion of the trial, is merely giving effect to a revisionary order directing it to freshly consider the application which it had originally rejected.

Advocate Cannot Give Undertaking To Court Without Client's Explicit Authority

The Supreme Court recently held that given the fiduciary relationship between an advocate and a client, an advocate cannot provide an undertaking without explicit authorization from the client.

“a lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter. It is also clear that the lawyer is to respect the decision-making right of the client. It flows from this that any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client.”, the court observed.

The bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Sanjay Karol heard the case where the Appellant, who were guilty of disobeying the court's injunction order, gave an undertaking in 2007 before the trial court through his lawyer stating that they would not alienate the suit property. The trial court, recording the appellant's undertaking, had extended the order on several occasions.

However, disobeying the undertaking submitted before the Court, the Appellant had alienated the suit property to some other person.

When the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC was filed by the respondent in 2011 complaining about the Appellant's disobedience of the Court's order passed under Rules 1 & 2, the Appellant stated that they haven't authorized their lawyer to filed an undertaking which stated they would not alienate the suit's property.

Being aggrieved by the High Court's decision holding them guilty of contempt prompted the Appellants to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Every Document Pertaining To An Election Is Important, All Efforts Should Be Made To Preserve Them

Every vote has its own value, irrespective of its effect in the final outcome and its sanctity should be protected, the Court said.

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Each and every document pertaining to an election is important and all efforts should be made to preserve the same, observed the Supreme Court in a recent judgment.

The Court made this observation in the context of an election of a Gram Pradhan in a village in Uttar Pradesh, which was held in 2021. There were disputes regarding the final count of votes polled and the Presiding Officers' records were missing. Therefore, the Court observed that the final counts was in the realm of questionability.

The diary of the Presiding Officer of the polling booths, which is an essential document recording the casting of votes, could not be found despite a concerted effort, the Court noted.

While ordering a recount, a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice NK Singh observed :

"The candidates in the election wanting to keep an eye on voting during the day and inspect records of the same is something which cannot be denied to them. If the Presiding Officers' records are missing and cannot be verified, it can be found that the final conclusion is within the realm of questionability. Each and every document pertaining to an election is important and all efforts should be made to preserve the same."

Supreme Court Flags Delay In Amending Calcutta High Court Rule Requiring Division Bench Instead Of Single Judge For Certain Bail Cases

 

The Supreme Court recently raised concerns over the delay in amending the Calcutta High Court Rules on the aspect of the strength of the bench hearing bail applications, pointing out that the proposal to amend the Rule has been pending for 12 years.

The issue relates to the proviso to Rule 9(2) of the High Court Appellate Side Rules, which requires certain bail applications to be heard by a Division Bench instead of a Single Judge.

A bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan noted that although the Full Court had on February 20, 2025, decided to amend the Rule, it had only referred the matter to the Rule Committee for drafting the amendment instead of directly implementing the change.

“Though it was resolved that proviso to sub-rule 2 of 1 Rule 9 of the Rules of the Chapter II of the High Court Appellate Side Rules should be suitably amended, instead of passing a resolution of amendment, now the issue has been referred to the Rule Committee for preparing a draft of amendment. We may note here that the proposal to amend the said Rule is 12 years old as can be seen from paragraph 5 of the report”, the Court observed.

The Court had earlier questioned why the Calcutta High Court was assigning regular and anticipatory bail applications to Division Benches when all other High Courts had Single Judge hear such matters. It sought an explanation from the High Court and asked for data on bail applications filed in 2024 and their pendency.

From the compliance report submitted by the Registrar General-in-Charge of the Calcutta High Court, the Supreme Court noted that in 2024, more than 11,000 bail applications—both regular and anticipatory—were filed before the High Court.

Chhattisgarh Liquor Scam | Supreme Court Grants Bail To Former Excise Official, But Defers His Release Till April 10

 

The Supreme Court has granted bail to Arun Pati Tripathi, a former Special Secretary of the Chhattisgarh Excise Department, in a cheating and corruption case linked to the alleged Chhattisgarh liquor scam. However, the Court directed that he shall be released on April 10, 2025, to ensure that the ongoing investigation is not affected.

A bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan noted that Tripathi has been in custody for approximately 11 months and observed that there is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future. The Court considered the state's contention that the investigation is still ongoing and, therefore, granted time until April 10 for his release.

Apart from the terms and conditions to be fixed by the sessions court, the Supreme Court imposed additional conditions on his bail:

1. He must surrender his passport to the investigating officer.

2. He must report to the investigating officer every day at 10:00 a.m. until the charge sheet is filed.

The Court directed that he be produced before the appropriate sessions court on April 10, 2025, where the final bail order will be passed.

In the same proceedings, the Supreme Court also granted bail to three other accused in related cases arising out of the alleged Chhattisgarh Liquor Scam:

The Court noted that the investigation against Anurag Dwivedi is complete and directed that he be produced before the sessions court within ten days. The sessions court shall grant him bail with stringent conditions, including surrendering his passport and cooperating with the investigation.

Dilip Pandey, who has been in custody for approximately eight months, was granted bail under conditions similar to those imposed on Tripathi. His release has also been set for April 10, 2025.

The Supreme Court also granted bail to Deepak Duary, noting that the investigation against him is complete. The Court directed that he be produced before the sessions court within ten days, which will set appropriate bail conditions, including the surrender of his passport and cooperation with the investigation.

Refusal Of Alleged Rape Victim To Allow Medical Examination Raises Negative Inference Against Her

 The Supreme Court has reiterated that adverse inference can be drawn against a woman, who is alleged to be a victim in a rape case, if she refuses medical examination.

"It is a well-settled proposition of law that non- allowance of medical examination by an alleged rape- victim raises negative inferences against them," the Court observed, referring to Dola v. State of Odisha, (2018) 18 SCC 695.

The FIR in the case was lodged by the father of the alleged victim in 2007. It was alleged that the accused came to their house, when the parents were away, and committed forceful sexual intercourse with their daughter.

The prosecutrix was medically examined at Regional Hospital, Hamirpur, where she was found to be of unsound mind as she did not cooperate in her medical examination. As the factum of sexual intercourse could not be ascertained, the prosecutrix was further referred to the RPMC Hospital at Tanda (Dharamshala) for the opinion of their Gynecologist and Psychiatrist. However, the father of the prosecutrix did not allow for any medical examination to happen.

In this case, the mother of the girl turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case at all. The father also made evasive statements. The Court also noted that the prosecutrix and her parents themselves never fully co-operated with the medical staff, thereby adversely impacting the credibility of their version of events.

 The High Court, while discussing the prosecutrix's testimony, came to the invariable conclusion that she was not mentally unsound – given that she was able to clearly comprehend the question and answer during the cross-examination.

The Court also cited the limited jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal.

Section 47 CPC Applications Raising Property Rights After Passing Of Decree To Be Treated As Application Under Order 21 Rule 97

 The Supreme Court recently observed that an application filed under Section 47 of CPC relating to the determination of questions related to the execution of the decree would be deemed as an application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 if it raises questions of right, title, or interest in the property.

The Court clarified that while applications under Section 47 of the CPC and Order 21 Rule 97 address distinct proceedings— with the former concerning execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree and the latter dealing with resistance or obstruction to possession, including by third parties— an application under Section 47 filed by a judgment debtor or an aggrieved third party will be treated as one under Order 21 Rule 97 if it raises questions of right, title, or interest in the property. In such cases, the executing court must adjudicate these questions under Order 21 Rule 101.

The Court reasoned that since the application under Section 47 CPC raises objections concerning rights in the property, which the executing court cannot determine after the decree has been passed, reclassifying it as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC would empower the executing court to adjudicate such issues. This approach aligns with the legal principle that the executing court cannot question the validity of the decree or go beyond its scope.

“In such circumstances referred to above the application of the respondents No. 1 and 2 under Section 47 of the CPC bearing R.E.A. No. 163 of 2011 was in substance an application for determination of their possessory rights under Order XXI Rule 97.”,