Supreme Court of India Judgements: March 2025

Monday, 31 March 2025

Punjab Municipal Elections : Supreme Court Appoints Former P&H HC Judge To Enquire Into Candidates' Allegations Of Nomination Paper-Snatching, Etc

The Supreme Court recently constituted a Fact Finding Commission and appointed a former Punjab and Haryana High Court judge to enquire into issues raised by candidates of Punjab municipal elections regarding conduct of the polls.

Without expressing any opinion on merits, a bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh passed the order appointing Justice Nirmaljit Kaur (former High Court judge) to perform the stipulated task, preferably on day-today basis, and submit a report.

"Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances, both sides have fairly agreed to deviate from the settled prescribed procedure so that a Fact-Finding Commission can be constituted limited to the sub-judice constituencies. Liberty to submit claims shall be limited to those who have either approached the High Court or this Court by way of special leave petitions/intervenor applications", the order observed.

"It goes without saying that the appointment of the Fact Finding Commission will not be a precedent",

Supreme Court Mandates Preliminary Inquiry Before FIR On Certain Offences Related To Speech & Expressions

With the aim of curbing frivolous FIRs against speeches, writings and artistic expressions, the Supreme Court on Friday mandated that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted before lodging the FIR, if the offences alleged are punishable with imprisonment between three to seven years.

The Court held so after referring to Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

Section 173(3) provides that for offences punishable with imprisonment between three to seven years, the police may conduct a preliminary enquiry within 14 days to establish a prima facie case, with prior approval from a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP).

The Court noted that there are certain offences dealing with speech and expressions, which are recognised as reasonable restrictions as per Article 19(2) of the Constitution. If there is an allegation regarding the commission of such an offence, and if it is punishable by 3-7 years, then the police must conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR. The Court adopted this interpretation to safeguard the fundamental right to free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

A bench comprising Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed :

“Therefore, when an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected. Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.”

The Court held so after referring to Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

A bench comprising Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed :

“Therefore, when an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected. Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.”

"The police officer to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made out. Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence. The same is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of the BNS. Therefore, to ascertain whether the information received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words. This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173."

Court explains changes from S.154 CrPC

Section 173(1) of the BNS mandates the registration of an FIR if the information received discloses a cognizable offence. The court noted that provision is largely similar to Section 154 of the CrPC, which was in force before the introduction of the BNS. Under this section, the police are duty-bound to register an FIR upon receiving credible information about a cognizable offence.

However, the Court emphasized the distinction introduced by Section 173(3) of the BNS. Unlike the CrPC, the BNS includes a specific provision allowing for a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR in certain circumstances.

“sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of the CrPC. It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter.”

The Court reasoned that the purpose of this provision is to act as a safeguard against the misuse of the legal process.

“Therefore, in a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, even if the information pertaining to the commission of any cognizable offence is received, an inquiry can be conducted to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists for proceeding in the matter. The intention appears to be to prevent the registration of FIRs in frivolous cases where punishment is up to 7 years, even if the information discloses the commission of the cognizable offence.”

The Court also elaborated on the distinction between a preliminary inquiry under Section 173(3) and the assessment required under Section 154 of the CrPC. It referred to the guidelines laid down in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. (2014) case, as per which a preliminary inquiry is permissible only when the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but suggests the need for further inquiry to determine the nature of the offence. However, under the BNS, the inquiry under Section 173(3) extends further, allowing the police to evaluate whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the registration of an FIR, the Court said.

In the facts of the present case, the Court opined that offences alleged against Pratapgarhi were not made out even without taking recourse to Section 173)(3) of the BNSS.

Case Title – Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat

Supreme Court Directs Customs Authorities To Upgrade Lab Facilities For Proper Testing Of Disputed Articles On All Parameters

In a key decision, the Supreme Court today overturned the confiscation of imported goods labelled as "Base Oil SN 50," which customs authorities had classified as High-Speed Diesel (HSD), which only the State entities can import.

The Court found that the Customs Department failed to provide conclusive evidence proving the goods were High-Speed Diesel (HSD), due to inadequate laboratory testing and conflicting expert opinions.

In this regard, the bench comprising Justices BV Nagarathna and N Kotiswar Singh criticized inadequate lab testing facilities, which led to the release of confiscated goods because the customs authorities tested only 8–14 out of 21 IS 1460:2005 (HSD) parameters—insufficient to classify the goods as HSD.

Therefore, the Court directed the Respondents to upgrade lab facilities within six months to ensure full IS-standard testing and prevent future disputes.

"The genesis of the prolonged litigation lies in the non- availability of adequate facilities for testing all the parameters provided under Bureau of Indian Standard Specifications. Such a dispute could have been avoided had the testing facilities for all the parameters been available.

Since the Authorities themselves had laid down the specific parameters for classification of goods, as in the present case by referring to classification under IS 1460:2005, it is incumbent upon the Authorities to ensure that necessary facilities are made available for testing of any disputed article on all these parameters as otherwise, laying down such parameters would be meaningless.

“Hence, to avoid these difficulties, doubts and uncertainties in future, the respondents are directed to ensure that proper facilities are made available in the appropriate laboratories for undertaking tests for all these parameters or at least for those parameters which the Authorities consider are of essential character to satisfy the “most akin” test without which the article in issue cannot be properly classified. Accordingly, we direct the respondents to take necessary steps in this regard within a period of six months for proper testing in all the parameters in future.”,

S.200 CrPC/S.227 BNSS | Supreme Court Asks Magistrates To Ascertain Truth Of Complaints Before Summoning Accused

The Court stated that the recording of the compainant's statement on oath was not an empty formality; Magistrates must put questions to elicit the truth.

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (March 26) quashed a complaint filed for the offence of cheque dishonour under the Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) after noting that the complainant suppressed material facts and abused the judicial process by withholding loan documents.

The appellant allegedly took loan from the Respondent-Cooperative Society and issued blank cheques as security.

In 2016, the respondent deposited the second security cheque (₹27.27 lakh), which also bounced. A legal notice was sent (11.11.2016), but the appellant denied liability, demanding loan documents to verify the debt.

In her reply to the demand notice, the appellant requested the loan documents, but the respondent did not provide them. Despite this, the respondent filed a complaint in December 2016, suppressing these letters. The Magistrate issued a process (summons) in March 2017.

The Court observed that criminal law cannot be set in motion by suppressing material facts.

“While filing a complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.”

Setting aside the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Oka emphasized that the law cannot be set into motion by issuing a process on a complaint without satisfying that there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. The Court underscored the Magistrate's duty to apply its mind before setting criminal law into motion.

“Recording the complainant's statement on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality. The object of recording the complainant's statement and witnesses, if any, is to ascertain the truth. The learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth. The examination is necessary to enable the Court to satisfy itself whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. After considering the complaint, the documents produced along with the complaint, and the statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any, the learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC. The corresponding provision under the BNSS is Section 227. Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter. The accused faces serious consequences in the sense that he has to defend himself in the trial.",

“Thus, this was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint.”, the court noted.

It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court.”, the court observed.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the pending complaint case against the Appellant.

Case Title: REKHA SHARAD USHIR versus SAPTASHRUNGI MAHILA NAGARI SAHKARI PATSANSTA LTD.

Police Constitutionally Bound To Protect Freedom Of Expression; State Should Sensitize Officers On Constitutional Ideals

The Supreme Court on Friday (March 28) emphasized that police officers, as part of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution, have a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals.

Referring to Article 51A(a), which mandates citizens to abide by the Constitution and respect its institutions, the Court observed that officers must uphold the fundamental rights of individuals, particularly the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

“The police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. The philosophy of the Constitution and its ideals can be found in the preamble itself. The preamble lays down that the people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and to secure all its citizens liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Therefore, liberty of thoughts and expression is one of the ideals of our Constitution.”

The Court observed, “Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and expression. The police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens.”

It noted that despite the Constitution being in force for over 75 years, police officers were often not sufficiently sensitized to their constitutional responsibilities. The Court urged the State to conduct massive training programs to ensure officers are aware of their obligations under the Constitution.

“The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution. If the police officers are not aware of these obligations, the State must ensure that they are educated and sensitized by starting massive training programs.”

“If an option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a) even though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted. If, in such cases, the option under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is not exercised, it will defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a)”, the Court held.

The Court emphasized that, even while fulfilling obligation under Section 173(1) of the BNSS to register an FIR if a cognizable offence is disclosed, police officers must be mindful of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and the exceptions outlined in Article 19(2).

“Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2) of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution.”

Under Article 19(2), the State can impose reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) in the interests of public order, decency, morality, or other specified grounds. However, the Court cautioned that such restrictions must remain reasonable and cannot be arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.

The Court further observed that while Article 19(2) allows certain laws to limit the right to free speech, those laws cannot overshadow the primary right enshrined in Article 19(1)(a). The substantive right to free expression must be protected unless the restrictions meet the criteria of reasonableness as laid down under Article 19(2).

Case Title – Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat

'Instigation Must Have Close Proximity To Suicide', Supreme Court Quashes Abetment To Suicide Case Against Business Partners

Observing that there must be a close proximity between the positive act of instigation by the accused person and the commission of suicide by the victim, the Supreme Court on Thursday (March 27) upheld the quashing of an abetment to suicide case against the business partner of the deceased, who committed suicide alleging harassment from his business partner.

“We are, therefore, of the considered view that even taking the allegations at its face value, it cannot be said that the allegations would amount to instigating the deceased to commit suicide. In any case, there is no reasonable nexus between the period to which the allegations pertain and the date of death. In that view of the matter, we do not find that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings under Section 306 of IPC.”,

“The learned Single Judge of the High Court, in our view, while quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC, has acted in a casual and cursory manner. If the learned Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that even investigation papers as collected by the investigating agency did not constitute an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC, then the least that was expected of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was to give reasons as to why the material collected by the investigating agency which has been placed before the learned Single Judge of the High Court was not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC.”, the Court observed.

“In absence of any reason given, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC.”, the court added.

Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed.

Case Title: R. SHASHIREKHA VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS

'Prior Enmity Can Indicate Motive But Also Raise Possibility Of False Accusation' : Supreme Court Acquits Man In 30-Year-Old Murder Case

The Supreme Court (March 27) observed that when a criminal act is committed based on prior enmity with the victim, then the possibility of false accusations cannot be ruled out. Though hostility between parties can establish a motive for a crime, it also raises the possibility of false accusations driven by personal grudges.

“It is a settled law that enmity is a double-edged weapon. On one hand, it provides motive, on the other hand it also does not rule out the possibility of false implication. From the nature of the evidence placed on record by the prosecution, the possibility of the present appellant being falsely implicated on account of previous enmity cannot be ruled out. In our opinion, therefore, the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt”,

Further, the Court cited other factors which cast doubt over the prosecution's case such as contradictions in witness statements and an unexplained 45-day delay in recording key witness testimonies, which weakened the prosecution's case.

“The following factors cast a serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution witnesses:

(i) The witnesses who were carrying the deceased Guddu to the hospital not having bloodstains on their clothes;

(ii) The witnesses not informing either the Police Station or the police constable who was standing at a distance of about 50 steps from the place of incident;

(iii) The contradictions in the evidence of witnesses with regard to presence of each other at the place of incident;

(iv) The witnesses not informing the cause of death of the deceased Guddu in the MLC papers, though according to them they were aware about the person who had inflicted the injury on the deceased; and

(v) Recording of the statement of the witnesses after a long gap after the date of incident when the said witnesses were very much available.”

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the Appellant of all the charges leveled against him.

Case Title: ASLAM ALIAS IMRAN VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Art 311 Doesn't Mean Only Appointing Authority Can Initiate Disciplinary Action Against Govt Servant

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. Referring to Article 311(1) of the Constitution, the Court clarified that while the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action.

Overturning the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Datta noted that the court erred in applying the rulings in BV Gopinath and Promod Kumar, IAS. It clarified that these judgments were based on central laws, which differ from Jharkhand's Civil Service Rules governing the state.

The Court found that the Jharkhand's Rules didn't mandate charge-sheet approval by the Chief Minister, and only states that the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated by any superior authority. Moreover, the Chief Minister's approval of the draft charge-sheet (submitted alongside the proposal) sufficed as compliance, hence the court noted that no separate approval of CM was needed.

“As noted above, in the present case, the draft charge-sheet was there on record when the Chief Minister accorded his approval and there appears to be no valid reason as to why approval of the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent would not be regarded as grant of approval to the draft charge-sheet too. We are unhesitatingly of the view that according approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, in this case, did amount to approval of the draft charge-sheet.”, the court said.

Since the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Commissioner (superior authority), and the dismissal was upheld by the State Cabinet being approved by the Governor, therefore the Court found no reason for the High Court to interfere with the dismissal just because the charge sheet was issued without the Chief Minister's approval.

“We repeat, the entire proposal of initiating disciplinary proceedings inclusive of the draft charge-sheet, to suspend the respondent pending such proceedings and the names of the officers who would conduct the inquiry and present the case of the department in such inquiry having been approved by the Chief Minister, the Single Judge seems to have occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice in interfering with the order of dismissal on the wholly untenable ground of lack of approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister; and the Division Bench, by failing to right the wrong, equally contributed to the failure of justice.”, the court observed.

Constitutional Safeguard Under Article 311(1) Does Not Mandate Issuance Of Charge-sheet By Appointing Authority

The Court noted that an argument was made by the Respondent claiming protection under Article 311(1) stating that the safeguards enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution be scrupulously followed prior to ordering his dismissal including drawing up a charge-sheet in the manner required by the relevant law.

However, the Court noted that the constitutional safeguard under Article 311(1) only ensures that dismissal is by an appointing authority, not that charge sheets must be issued by the appointing authority or the disciplinary proceedings be initiated by them.

"If one looks at Article 311(1), the sole safeguard that it provides to any member, inter alia, of a civil service of a State or the holder of a civil post under the State is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed (emphasis supplied). Clause (1) does not on its own terms require that the disciplinary proceedings should also be initiated by the appointing authority."

The Court clarified that disciplinary proceedings may be initiated by any superior authority, not solely by the appointing authority unless explicitly required by the rules.

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. VS. RUKMA KESH MISHRA

Giving Arrest Memo Not Same As Supplying Grounds Of Arrest : Supreme Court Sets Aside Arrest & Remand

"We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the said arrest memo cannot be construed as grounds of arrest, as no other worthwhile particulars have been furnished to him. This, being a clear non-compliance of the mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined to set aside the impugned judgment, particularly, in light of the judgment rendered by this Court reported as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) - (2024) 8 SCC 254."

In this case, the accused was arrested last December in connection with a first information report registered under Sections 384, 420, 468, 471, 509 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. He was remanded to police custody for 3 days. He challenged his arrest and remand before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which refused to entertain it. Against the January 30 order of the High Court, an appeal was filed. He challenged his arrest and remand on three grounds: non-compliance with Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the opportunity of being heard at the time of remand and the non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.

The Supreme Court considered his criminal appeal only in terms of the last ground.

Case Details: ASHISH KAKKAR v. UT OF CHANDIGARH

Tuesday, 25 March 2025

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.

Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly

Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly — Necessity of Proof Beyond Mere Presence — Mere presence at a crime scene, without evidence of an overt act or specific role, is insufficient to convict an individual as a member of an unlawful assembly, especially in cases involving large crowds and public disturbances — Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances — Courts may liberally condone delays in appeals, especially by the State, if “sufficient cause” is shown and substantial justice is served, balancing between adherence to limitation and the pursuit of meritorious claims —Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal, emphasizing a liberal approach when substantial justice is at stake, particularly in cases involving government land, while ensuring the State exhibits due diligence in future proceedings.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Registration of FIR

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Registration of FIR — Mandatory under Section 154 of the CrPC if information discloses commission of a cognizable offense; no preliminary inquiry permissible in such cases.

Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971

Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 113 — Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971 — Possession is prima facie proof of ownership, and the burden of proving otherwise lies on the party denying it, including the government — This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that reversed a Trial Court decree in favor of the appellants, who sought a declaration of title and recovery of possession of land they were dispossessed from by the State of Andhra Pradesh — The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by overlooking the appellants' long possession and failing to properly consider the presumption of ownership arising from possession under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — While acknowledging the State's need for land for public purposes, the Court criticized the high-handed dispossession without due process or compensation — Due to the construction of a DIET building on the land, the Court deemed it impractical to restore possession and directed the State to pay Rs. 70 lakhs as compensation to the appellants — The Court also emphasized the importance of adhering to Section 80 of the CPC regarding notices in suits against the government.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439 — Directions for CBI Investigation in Bail Applications — High Courts cannot issue directions for CBI investigation in bail applications, as it exceeds their jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151 — Minor Discrepancies in Witness Statements — Minor and immaterial inconsistencies in witness statements do not harm the prosecution's case, especially when explained by the circumstances of the case

Failure To Acknowledge Section 80 CPC Notice Or Communicate Stand May Lead To Adverse Inference Against Government

The Supreme Court on Monday (March 24) expressed concerns about the declining significance of the notices under Section 80 CPC noting that in practice, such notices have often become empty formalities.

The Court observed that the government/public authorities must acknowledge the notice issued under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) in all seriousness, and must not sit over them to force the citizens into the vagaries of litigation. It added that when a notice is sent to the government by a litigant, it serves as an opportunity for the Government or a public officer to assess the legal merits of a claim and potentially settle it if it appears to be just and reasonable.

Further, the Court stated that an adverse inference would be drawn against the government for not acknowledging the notice or informing the litigant about its stand on the issue raised in the notice.

“The purpose of law is the advancement of justice. The least that was required in the present case was for the State Authorities to acknowledge the notice issued by the appellants herein and inform them as regards their stance. We make it abundantly clear that the Public Authorities must take statutory notice issued to them in all seriousness. The Public Authorities must not sit over such notices and force the citizens to the vagaries of litigation. They are expected to let the plaintiff know their stand within the statutory period or in any case before he embarks upon the litigation. In certain cases, courts may be obliged to draw adverse presumption against the Public Authorities for not acknowledging the notice or telling the plaintiff of its stand and in the absence of that, a stand taken during the course of trial may be considered as an afterthought. This is exactly what has happened in the present case.”

Setting aside the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala held in the Appellant's favour holding that the State failed to prove the land was "assigned" to claim resumption under the 1977 Act. The Court noted that the Appellants' possession since 1970, supported by Pattadar Passbook and revenue receipts, raised a presumption of ownership under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 110, Indian Evidence Act), and the State's inaction for decades (1943–1995) undermined its claim.

In addition to the aforesaid, the Court highlighted the lackadaisical approach of the Respondent in not responding to the Section 80 notice sent by the Appellant. It criticized the State for ignoring the appellants' statutory notice, forcing litigation.

The Court emphasized that public authorities must respond to notices to avoid adverse inferences. Because the Respondent failed to respond to the Appellant's notice, he was dragged into the vagaries of litigation, the Court said that the State's silence on the appellants' Section 80 notice weakened its defense.

Since, the Appellants were dispossessed from the Suit property long ago, and a structure was installed by the Respondent on the Suit property, therefore instead of demolishing that part of the construction made over the Suit land, the Court asked them to compensate the appellants in terms of money and ordered a payment of Rs. 70 Lakhs compensation to the Appellant.

Accordingly, the Appeal was allowed.

Case Title: YERIKALA SUNKALAMMA & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE & ORS.

Consumer Can Approach Consumer Forum Even If Agreement Provides For Arbitration

The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the arbitration clauses in an agreement would not override the consumer's choice to approach the consumer forum for adjudication of the dispute.

The Court said that a consumer cannot be forced to get the dispute adjudicated through Arbitration just because an arbitration clause is mentioned in an agreement. It added that the consumer has the exclusive right to decide whether to pursue arbitration or approach the Consumer Forum.

The Court noted that the arbitration clause could not be enforced against the consumer, as the choice of forum lies exclusively with the consumer.

"As vivid from Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751 and M Hemalatha Devi (supra), even in a consumer dispute under the Act, or for that matter, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the 'consumer' alone. As the appellant is not a 'consumer' in terms of the Act and the existence of the Tripartite Agreement is doubtful, we need not dwell further hereon."

In M. Hemalatha Devi v. B. Udayasri, the Court had observed :

“The exclusion of a dispute from arbitration may be express or implied, depending again upon the nature of the dispute, and a party to a dispute cannot be compelled to resort to arbitration merely for the reason that it has been provided in the contract, to which it is a signatory. The arbitrability of a dispute has to be examined when one of the parties seeks redressal under a welfare legislation, in spite of being a signatory to an arbitration agreement. “The Consumer Protection Act” is definitely a piece of welfare legislation with the primary purpose of protecting the interest of a consumer. Consumer disputes are assigned by the legislature to public fora, as a measure of public policy. Therefore, by necessary implication such disputes will fall in the category of non-arbitrable disputes, and these disputes should be kept away from a private fora such as “arbitration”, unless both the parties willingly opt for arbitration over the remedy before public fora.”,

M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED VERSUS SNEHASIS NANDA

To Claim Employment In Any Organization, Direct Master-Servant Relationship Must Be Established On Paper

The Supreme Court recently observed that for a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct master-servant relationship must be established on paper.

“For a person to claim employment under any organization, a direct master-servant relationship has to be established on paper. In the present case(s), admittedly, the only document, which the private respondents have in their favour, is showing that they were posted at various places doing different nature of work. This clearly in the considered opinion of the Court would not establish master-servant relationship”,

A bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra rejected the workman's argument that that the supervisory control of appellant on the workman establishes a master-servant relationship.

“Whatever material has been placed and even the best point which was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the private respondents before this Court was that since there was supervisory and jurisdictional control over the private respondents by the appellants, ipso facto, they would become employees of the appellants is noted only to be rejected.”

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that a master-servant relationship must be substantiated through clear documentation.

The Supreme Court stated that if there had been any substantial evidence supporting the respondents' claim of being employees of the appellants, it would have refrained from interfering with the High Court's orders and allowed the Labour Court to reconsider the matter.

However, since the respondents primary defence was rejected, the Court concluded that a remand to the Labour Court would be pointless. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, and set aside the High Court's orders for remanding the case to the Labour Court, noting that no further orders required since the awards had already been quashed.

Case No: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CIVIL)NO. 19648 OF 2023

Sunday, 23 March 2025

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 386 and 397 — Appeal against Conviction — Sentence Reduction — High Court may reduce sentence or convert conviction to lesser offence considering accused's age and case circumstances.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 386 and 397 — Appeal against Conviction — Sentence Reduction — High Court may reduce sentence or convert conviction to lesser offence considering accused's age and case circumstances.

“Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions

“Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions —Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, affirming the High Court's decision that respondents appointed under the "Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana" between 1969 and 1982 are entitled to pensionary benefits — The Court reasoned that government decisions had extended the service rules of the Cane Development Department to these employees, entitling them to similar benefits as permanent government employees, consistent with the Court's earlier judgment in the Vinod Kumar Goel case — The Court rejected arguments regarding delay and the respondents' prior acceptance of Contributory Provident Fund benefits, noting that their claim for pension was raised early and they were willing to deposit the withdrawn amount — The arrears of pension were, however, restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition.

Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 — Section 37 — Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 — Rule 2.1.3 — Qualifications for Food Safety Officers — A recruitment notification specifying "a degree" in certain science subjects for the post of Food Safety Officer encompasses postgraduate degrees in those subjects unless explicitly excluded by the relevant statutory rules prescribed by the Central Government — Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission — The Court held that the term "degree" in the recruitment advertisement and the Rules, 2011, includes postgraduate degrees in the listed science subjects (Food Technology, Dairy Technology, Biotechnology, Oil Technology, Agriculture Science, Veterinary Sciences, Biochemistry, Microbiology), noting that the specific mention of a Master's degree in Chemistry sets the minimum qualification for that subject — The Court emphasized that the Central Government has the exclusive power to prescribe qualifications for FSOs under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and that holding a higher degree in a relevant subject does not disqualify a candidate — The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents to allow the appellants to participate in the interview process.

The Supreme Court held that the respondent, who sold his flat to a borrower financed by the appellant, was not a 'consumer' of the appellant under the Act, 1986, due to the absence of a direct contractual relationship

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Sections 2(1)(d) and 24-A — Contract Act, 1872 — A flat seller who is not a borrower or a party to the home loan agreement lacks privity of contract with the financing company and cannot be considered a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act for claims related to the sale consideration — Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) which had directed the appellant to refund money and pay costs to the respondent (original flat owner) — The Supreme Court held that the respondent, who sold his flat to a borrower financed by the appellant, was not a 'consumer' of the appellant under the Act, 1986, due to the absence of a direct contractual relationship — The Court also noted the doubtful existence of a Tripartite Agreement imposing liability on the appellant towards the respondent, the non-joinder of the borrower as a necessary party, and the issue of limitation in filing the consumer complaint.

M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED

Vs.

SNEHASIS NANDA

A statutory board lacks the authority to unilaterally reverse a government land acquisition for a public purpose through a private agreement.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 4 and 6 — Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1976 — Sections 4 and 6 — Land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vests absolutely in the government upon possession — A statutory body, for whose benefit the land was acquired, cannot enter into a private agreement to return a portion of the land, as this would circumvent the law — Such an agreement is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and constitutes a fraud on the state's sovereign power of eminent domain — An arbitral award upholding such an illegal agreement is against public policy and liable to be set aside.

DELHI AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD, THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN

Vs.

BHAGWAN DEVI (DEAD), THROUGH HER LR.

Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant,

SUDAM PRABHAKAR ACHAT

Vs.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.

DHIRUBHAI BHAILALBHAI CHAUHAN AND ANOTHER

Vs.

STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS

Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal,

INDER SINGH

Vs.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Motor Accident Claim Can't Be Rejected Merely Because Vehicle's Make Was Wrongly Described

The Supreme Court observed that discrepancy in the make of the vehicle cannot be a ground to deny a rightful claim when the vehicle's registration number and other key details are consistent and correctly mentioned.

Because of the change of make of the vehicle, i.e., TATA Sumo in place of TATA Spacio, the claim as allowed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was rejected by the High Court upon setting aside the claim awarded by the Tribunal even though the vehicle's registration and other key details remained the same.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties and looking to the fact that the registration number of the offending vehicle is KA-31/6059, was found involved in the criminal case which is one and the same, the finding of the High Court cannot be sustained. Even mere misdescription of the make of the vehicle could not have been treated as consistency or a ground to dismiss the claim petition itself, particularly when there is no change in the registration number of the offending vehicle. Therefore, impugned judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.”

PARAMESHWAR SUBRAY HEGDE VERSUS NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR

CBI Files 'Closure Report' In Sushant Singh Rajput Death Case, Rules Out Foul Play

After huge hue and cry and a probe that went on for more than four years, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on Saturday filed a 'closure report' in the Sushant Singh Rajput death case, stating that it did not find any evidence to conclude any 'foul play' in the death of the actor.

According to PTI, the CBI through its officials have submitted its 'closure report' in the death case before a special court in Mumbai, on Saturday. The special court, will not decided whether to accept the report or order further probe.

Reacting to the news, actor Rhea Chakraborty's counsel, senior advocate Satish Maneshinde has expressed displeasure over the 'uncalled for' false narratives on social media and also the electronic media, particularly against his client.

"The CBI has filed a closure report in connection with the Death of Sushant Singh Rajput after almost 4 and a half years. We are Greatful to the CBI for having thoroughly investigated every aspect of the case from all angles and closed the case. The amount of false narrative in the Social Media and Electronic Media was totally uncalled for. Innocent people were hounded and paraded before the Media and investigative authorities. I hope this does not repeat in any case," Maneshinde said.

The senior advocate further beseeched the 'captains' of media to reflect upon what they did.

"Rhea had to undergo untold miseries and was behind bars for 27 days for no fault of hers until Justice Sarang Kotwal of the Bombay High Court, released her on bail. Today I can share that I'm proud to have defended a Fauji Family Pro Bono. This Country is still very safe and every citizen crying for Justice has hope due to our vibrant judiciary," Maneshinde said, and concluded with, "Satya Meva Jayate!"

Notably, the actor was found hanging at his home on June 14, 2020 at Mumbai's plush Bandra area. Initially the case was probed by Mumbai Police, which concluded that it was a case of suicide as it found no evidence to show if anyone 'forcibly entered' his house. The city police in its preliminary probe also found that 'depression' could be a major contributing factor in the suicide. The police also did not found any 'suicide note' from the actor's residence.

Subsequently, the actor's father KK Singh lodged an FIR with the Patna Police in Bihar accusing actor Rhea and others of abetting his son's suicide. The father also alleged cheating, theft and wrongful confinement against Rhea.

In a counter, the actor too lodged an FIR against Sushant's sisters, accusing them of forging a 'prescription' of some scheduled drugs.

Since there were conflicting reports of the Patna and Mumbai Police, the Supreme Court had on August 19, 2020 ordered the CBI to conduct a thorough probe in both the cases. Now, as per the PTI report, the CBI has filed a closure report in both these cases.

Explained | Can FIR Be Registered Against A Sitting Judge? What Is In-House Enquiry Procedure On Complaint Against Judge?

Reports regarding the alleged recovery of unaccounted money from the residence of Justice Yashwant Verma of the Delhi High Court have sent shock waves across the legal fraternity.

While it is understood that the Supreme Court Collegium is considering a proposal to transfer Justice Verma and that the Delhi HC CJ is enquiring into the matter, several concerns are being raised, quite rightly, by the general public.

If a Judge is found to be in alleged possession of unaccounted cash, should not an FIR be first lodged on this issue and a criminal investigation be commenced?

However, the simple answer is that at the first instance, no criminal proceedings can be initiated against a sitting Judge unless the Chief Justice of India (CJI) is consulted, as held by the Supreme Court in its judgment in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991).

Once the Chief Justice of India is satisfied that the allegations are prima facie credible, the CJI has to advise the President of India to allow the police to register an FIR.

"In order to adequately protect a Judge from frivolous prosecution and unnecessary harassment the President will consult the Chief Justice of India who will consider all the materials placed before him and tender his advice to the President for giving sanction to launch prosecution or for filing FIR against the Judge concerned after being satisfied in the matter."

Over the years, this process has come to be known as the 'In-House Procedure,' which is a confidential enquiry for institutional credibility under the charge of the CJI.

The In-House Procedure was first stated in the 1991 judgment where the allegations were against a former Chief Justice of the High Court under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (PC Act).

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, two important issues emerged: Are judges public servants under the PC Act? If they are, then a prior sanction is necessary to launch criminal prosecution against them.

The second question was, who would be the competent authority to give that sanction?

Judges are 'public servants' as per PC Act

The Veeraswami judgment holds that a judge of a High Court or a Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice of either Court, is a 'public servant' under the PC Act. Therefore, a criminal prosecution or FIR can be lodged against the judge for offences under the PC Act.

Sanction is not necessary if the judge no longer holds the office.

Who can remove a judge?

The judgment says the President of India is the competent authority to grant sanction under the PC Act to initiate a criminal prosecution against a sitting judge.

"The President, therefore, being the authority competent to appoint and to remove a Judge, of course in accordance with the procedure envisaged in Article 124, clauses (4) and (5) of the Constitution, may be deemed to be the authority to grant sanction for prosecution of a Judge under the provisions of Section 6(1)(c) in re- spect of the offences provided in section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947."

However, no FIR can be lodged against a judge unless the CJI is "consulted". The judgment reasons that in-house procedure protects a judge from "frivolous prosecution and unnecessary harassment".

"The President shall act in accordance with advice given by the Chief Justice of India."

Is the advice of CJI binding?

The judgment says when the President consults the CJI, the latter has to consider all the "materials" to tender the advice. If the CJI thinks that it is not a fit case for grant of sanction, the President 'shall' not accord sanction.

The judgment observes:

"If the chief Justices of opinion that it is not a fit case for grant of sanction for prosecution of the Judge concerned the President shall not accord sanction to prosecute the Judge; This will save the Judge concerned from unnecessary harassment as well as from frivolous prosecution against him.

Similarly in the case of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the President shall consult such of the Judges of the Supreme Court as he may deem fit and proper and the President shall act in accordance with the advice given to him by the Judge or Judges of the Supreme Court. The purpose of grant of previous sanction before prosecuting a public servant i.e. a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court is to protect the Judge from unnecessary harassment and frivolous prosecution more particularly to save the Judge from the biased prosecution for giving judgment in a case which goes against the Government or its officers though' based on good reasons and rule of law."

What is the 'In-House Enquiry' procedure?

In the 1995 judgment of Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the Supreme Court termed it an "In-House Procedure". It was stated that impeachment is a "drastic: remedy and needs to be only used in serious cases. Therefore, the Court suggested an alternative procedure when a judge of the High Court is involved.

In 2015, in Additional District And Sessions v Registrar General, High Court Of Madhya, the Supreme Court further explained the In-House procedure especially in the context of the role of the Chief Justice of the High Court when the complaint is against a judge of the High Court.

What is the procedure?

The in-house procedure, as evolved through the above-cited judgments, is as follows.

The complaint can either be received by the Chief Justice of the High Court, the CJI or the President. In the first case, the following procedure laid down is to be followed. When it is received by the CJI, a similar procedure is adopted. If the President receives the complaint, he must forward it to the CJI.

1. The Chief Justice of the High Court, after confidential enquiry from independent sources, should ascertain if the complaint raises serious allegations of misconduct or impropriety. The CJ must also ask for a response from the judge concerned.

It should be noted here that as per the 2015 judgment, it is not open for the Chief Justice of the High Court to further constitute any committee to hold an enquiry by recording statements etc. His only determination is, whether a prima facie case is made out requiring a deeper probe.

2. In light of the response received, if the Chief Justice of the High Court thinks the matter requires further action, he should then consult the CJI and place all relevant information before him.

Meanwhile, all other procedures of enquiry against the judge should be suspended.

3. The CJI, on receipt of the information from the Chief Justice of the High Court, the CJI must ask for comments from the Chief Justice of the High Court and a response from the concerned judge through the Chief Justice of the High Court.

It is at this stage before the CJI, that the veracity of the allegations are to be probed.

4. If the CJI is of the opinion that the matter requires further investigation, he shall constitute a three-member Committee consisting of two Chief Justices of the High Courts other than the High Court to which the judge belongs and one High Court judge.

5. The said Committee shall hold an enquiry into the allegation and submit a report to the CJI. The Committee must devise its own procedure but should follow principles of natural justice. A copy of the report has to be sent to the judge concerned.

Where the CJ of the High Court is involved, the Bar must directly bring the matter to the notice of the CJI.

When the enquiry report recommends the removal of the judge

The CJI shall:

1. ask the judge to resign or seek voluntary retirement;

2. If the judge refuses to resign or seek voluntary retirement, the CJI must advise the Chief Justice of the High Court to not allot any judicial work to him. The same shall be put to the notice of the President and the Prime Minister.

In the case of Justice Soumitra Sen, the then-sitting judge of Calcutta High Court, he was advised to resign after an In-House Procedure was followed. Since he showed his unwillingness to resign, the then CJI K.G. Balakrishnan wrote it to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to initiate impeachment proceedings.

When the committee finds substance in allegation but misconduct not serious

In case the Committee finds that there is misconduct but not serious in nature, it shall call the judge and advise him accordingly.

If the allegation is against a Judge of the Supreme Court:

1. If a complaint is against a judge of the Supreme Court, the CJI must first examine it.

2. If CJI finds the complaint serious in nature, he shall ask for a response of the judge.

3. Based on the response and in light of the allegations, if the matter requires a deeper probe, CJI would constitute a Committee of three-judges of the Supreme Court.

4. The committee shall hold enquiry and similar action can be followed as followed in case a complaint is against a judge of the High Court.

There is no specific procedure where the allegation against the CJI is made. However, the pronouncements note that the President will have to consult other judges of the Supreme Court.

Transparency of in-house procedure

In Indira Jaising v. Registrar General, Supreme Court, Senior Advocate Indira Jaising had filed an Article 32 writ seeking public disclosure of the enquiry report made by a Committee constituted by the CJI of two judges of the Supreme Court and a judge of the High Court to enquire into the allegations of sexual harassment against the then sitting judge of Karnataka High Court.

Dismissing the petition, the Court had said: "A report made on such inquiry if given publicity will only lead to more harm than good to the institution as Judges would prefer to face inquiry leading to impeachment. In such a case the only course open to the parties concerned if they have material is to invoke the provisions of Article 124 or Article 217 of the Constitution, as the case may be. It is not appropriate for the petitioner to approach this Court for the relief or direction for release of the Report, for what the Chief Justice of India has done is only to get information from peer Judges of those who are accused and the report made to the Chief Justice of India is wholly confidential."

The said report is only for the purpose of the satisfaction of the CJI that such a report has been made. It is purely preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final, it had observed. Jaisingh had remarked that the decision to not make the inquiry report public is a "scandaL".

Subsequently, the 2015 judgment the Registry of the Supreme Court was directed to upload the procedure on its official website.

Conclusion

While the In-House procedure allows the CJI to make informed decisions, the lack of any written guidelines or mechanism to make the inquiry report public continues to attract scepticism. A fair and transparent procedure would restore the tarnished faith of the judiciary caused by such unfortunate incidents.

Supreme Court Publishes Video & Pictures On Cash At Justice Yashwant Varma's House; Makes Report Of Delhi HC CJ Public

23 Mar 2025 12:02 AM

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In an unprecedented move, the Supreme Court on Saturday uploaded on its website the reports and documents, including photos and video, with respect to the allegations of the discovery of unaccounted currencies at the home of Justice Yashwant Varma, sitting judge of the Delhi High Court.

The inquiry report of the Delhi High Court Chief Justice and the response of Justice Varma have been made public.

Significantly, the Supreme Court also publicised the videos and photographs shared by the Delhi Police regarding the firefighting operation in Justice Varma's residence on March 14, when he was not present in his home.

The video appended to the report clearly shows sacks containing cash currencies, some of which are burnt. The video can be seen here.

Report submitted by Delhi HC CJ Upadhyay

The report submitted by the Chief Justice states that the incident happened on March 14 in a storeroom where access to any person other than those residing in the official bungalow of Justice Varma is not there. Chief Justice Upadhyay was informed by the Commissioner of Police Delhi in the evening around 4:50 pm on March 15 about the fire which happened at Justice Varma's bungalow on March 14 at 11.30 PM. Thereafter, the Chief Justice instructed the Registrar-cum-Secretary to visit the spot of the incident in person and prepare a report. The Registrar visited the spot, after informing the PS to Justice Varma. Justice Varma was also there

Justice Upadhyay learnt from the Delhi Police Commissioner that the PCR call regarding the fire was made by the Personal Secretary to Justice Varma after the PS was told by Justice Varma's servants about the fire.

Justice Upadhyay after apprising about the incident to CJI on March 16, contacted Justice Varma the next day. Justice Varma responded by stating that the room was accessible to the servants, gardeners and sometimes even the CPWD personnel. When Chief Justice showed him the Whatsapp pictures sent by the Commissioner of Police, Justice Varma expressed some "apprehension about some conspiracy against him".

The Commissioner of Police in his report dated 16.3.2025 has reported that as per the guard posted at the residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, the debris and other partially burnt articles were removed from the room where the fire had broken out in the morning of 15.3.2025.

Chief Justice Upadhyay stated in his report to the Chief Justice of India that the matter required deeper probe. "The enquiry conducted by me, prima facie, does not reveal possibility of entry or access to the room by any person other than those residing in the bungalow, the servants, the gardeners and CPWD personnels, if any. Accordingly, I am of the prima facie opinion that the entire matter warrants a deeper probe," CJ Upadhyay said.

On receiving the report, CJI Sanjiv Khanna on March 21 asked Chief Justice Upadhyay to seek a response from Justice Varma on the presence of "unaccounted cash" the "source" of the money and the person who removed the "burnt cash" on the morning of March 15. Additionally, Justice Varma was asked not to dispose of his phone or to delete any any mobile number, or message or data from his mobile phone.

Justice Varma denies allegations

The Supreme Court also published the response given by Justice Varma.

He denied the allegations including that the room where the fire broke was a room in his official residence. As per his response, it is a storeroom that is disconnected from the main residence contrary to what is projected by TOI's report. He has also unequivocally denied any cash ever being placed in the storeroom.

"I state unequivocally that no cash was ever placed in that storeroom either by me or any of my family members and strongly denounce the suggestion that the alleged cash belonged to us. The very idea or suggestion that this cash was kept or stored by us is totally preposterous. The suggestion that one would store cash in an open, freely accessible and commonly used storeroom near the staff quarters or in an outhouse verges on the incredible and incredulous. It is a room which is completely disassociated from my living areas and a boundary wall demarcates my living area from that outhouse. I only wish that the media had conducted some enquiry before I came to be indicted and defamed in the press," Justice Varma has said in his response.

Justice Varma said that when the fire broke out, he and his wife were not there at the home, and only his daughter and aged mother were there. He said that this room was generally utilised by all and sundry to store articles such as unused furniture, bottles, crockery, mattresses, used carpets, old speakers, garden implements as well as CPWD material. This room is unlocked and accessible both from the official front gate as well as the backdoor of the staff quarters.

Justice Varma raised suspicions about the alleged cash currencies being absent on the morning of March 15. He pointed out that even when the PS of the Chief Justice visited the spot on March 15, no cash was found.

He stated that this was part of a conspiracy to frame him. He pointed out that certain unfounded allegations were circulated against him in social media in December 2024 as well.

"At the cost of repetition, I unequivocally state that neither I nor any of my family members had stored or kept any cash or currency in that storeroom at any point of time. Our cash withdrawals, made from time to time, are all documented and always through regular banking channels, the use of UPI applications and cards. Insofar as the allegation of the recovery of cash, I once again make it clear that no one from my house ever reported seeing any currency in burnt form in the room. In fact, this gets further corroborated from there being no cash or currency which we saw when the site was restored to us after the fire personnel and the police had left the scene quite apart from we being not apprised of any recovery or seizure which was made on the spot. This may also be viewed in light of the statement of the Chief of the Fire Service which I have gathered from news reports."

After examining the report of the Delhi HC CJ and the response of Justice Varma, CJI Sanjiv Khanna constituted a three-member committee to conduct in-house inquiry into the matter.

The members of the Committee are - Justice Sheel Nagu, Chief Justice of the Punjab & Haryana High Court; Justice GS Sandhawalia, Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh; and Justice Anu Sivaraman, Judge of the High Court of Karnataka.

Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has also been asked not to assign any judicial work to Justice Yashwant Varma.

1990 Kashmir University VC Murder Case | 'TADA Procedural Safeguards Violated' : Supreme Court Dismisses CBI Appeals Against Acquittals

"Kartar Singh (supra) says that confession should be recorded in a free atmosphere. Recording of confessional statements in a heavily guarded BSF camp or in a JIC where the atmosphere for an accused would generally be daunting and overbearing cannot be said to be in a free atmosphere. It has come on record that the confessional statements so recorded were not accepted by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate whereafter those were sent directly to the Special Court which again is an infraction of the statute."

The Court lamented that the "the procedural safeguards were given a complete go-bye."

The Court noted that the Special Court had stopped short of observing that it was a case of abuse of power and authority, and that the procedural safeguards were completely disregarded.

The Court also added that the failure to recover the murder weapon (AK-47 rifle) seriously damaged the prosecution's case, weakening forensic evidence. The forensic witness had testified that he had not seen the AK-47 rifle from which the cartridges were fired.

The Court underlined that witnesses could not identify the accused, making their testimony unreliable. The witnesses described the kidnappers as young men with moustaches but could not identify them.

State (CBI) Vs Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz & Ors

Candidates Can't Be Rejected Solely Because They Had Higher Degrees Than Prescribed Qualification

The word 'Degree' can mean means 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' or 'Doctorate Degree',

The Supreme Court observed that a candidate possessing a higher degree of qualification cannot be rejected solely because a lower degree of qualification is required for a particular post.

The bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the case where the Appellants, who are post-graduates in Microbiology, Food Science, and Technology, and applied for the post of Food Safety Officer (“FSO”) were disqualified during the recruitment process on the grounds that their qualifications did not meet the criteria specified in the advertisement.

The appellants challenged their disqualification before the Jharkhand High Court. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court ruled against the appellants, holding that the advertisement required a Bachelor's degree in the specified subjects and that a Master's degree in Microbiology or Food Science did not qualify. The recruitment advertisement mentioned that the candidate having a master's degree in relevant subjects (other than Chemistry) would be excluded from the selection process.

“The term 'degree' is defined under Section 22(3) the UGC Act, which states that the 'degree' means the 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and the 'Doctorate Degree'. Thus, wherever the word 'degree' is used, unless a specific exclusion is provided, the same would include within its scope and ambit all three, 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and a 'Doctorate Degree'.”,

“we have no hesitation in concluding that if a candidate, having undertaken a degree course in “Chemistry” subject, desires to apply for the post of FSO, he must possess a master's degree in that subject. However, if a candidate has taken college education in the subjects of food technology; dairy technology; biotechnology; oil technology; agricultural science; veterinary science; biochemistry or microbiology, then such a candidate would be qualified for the FSO post, if he holds any one of the degrees, i.e., either graduation, post-graduation or doctorate degree in any of these subjects. There is no logic or rationale behind excluding the candidates having master's or a doctorate degree in these subjects from staking a claim to the post of FSO because such an interpretation would be totally unjust, arbitrary and unconstitutional.”,

CHANDRA SHEKHAR SINGH AND OTHERS VERSUS THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS

Saturday, 22 March 2025

S.53A Transfer Of Property Act Protection Not Available If Person Entered Into Agreement Knowing About Pending Litigation

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”), for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation.

The Court approved the view of the High Court that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act will not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case as the appellant had knowledge about the pendency of the suit when he had entered into an agreement with the father of the respondent Nos. 1 to 8.

The Court held that Section 53A TPA cannot be invoked by a transferee to obstruct or resist the claims of decree holders who have legally acquired rights over the suit property. It emphasized that a transferee who enters into a sale agreement during pending litigation, despite lacking a valid claim, cannot use this provision to override the decree holders' rights.

“the Courts have uniformly held that the limited rights of the transferee pendent lite on the principle of lis pendens. Such limited rights cannot be stretched to obstruct and resist the full claim of the decree holders to execute the decree in their favour. In fact, the Courts have deprecated such obstruction.”, the court observed.

Friday, 21 March 2025

Not 'Consumer' Without Privity Of Contract : Supreme Court Rejects Flat Seller's Consumer Complaint Against Financier Of Buyer

he Supreme Court on Thursday (March 20) ruled that to qualify as a "consumer" under the Consumer Protection Act, there must be a direct contractual relationship between the parties.

The Court held that the respondent did not qualify as a "consumer" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as there was no privity of contract between the respondent and the Appellant. The respondent was not a party to the Home Loan Agreement between the Appellant and the buyer.

“we find that the appellant, assuming any liability in this regard existed at all, taking the respondent's case at the highest, could not have been saddled with having to pay more than what was envisaged under the Home Loan Agreement between the borrower and the appellant. In any event, the appellant's liability under the Agreement for sale was restricted only to satisfying the dues of the complainant-respondent with ICICI Bank which sum was in fact quantified at Rs.17,87,763/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Eighty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty-Three) and, in any view of the matter, could not have exceeded Rs.23,40,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Three Lakhs Forty Thousand). Thus, the NCDRC could not have, under any circumstance, taken a view that the appellant was liable to pay Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-One Lakhs) both to ICICI Bank as well as to the complainant-respondent, who was not a party to the ultimate sanction of the loan by the Home Loan Agreement, which was between the appellant and the borrower.”, the court observed.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the NCDRC's order was set aside.

Case Title: M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED VERSUS SNEHASIS NANDA

Supreme Court Initiates In-House Procedure Against Delhi HC Judge Over Recovery Of Cash At Residence

Supreme Court Initiates In-House Procedure Against Delhi HC Judge Over Recovery Of Cash At Residence

After an extraordinary meeting, the Supreme Court Collegium recommended the transfer of Justice Yashwant Verma, Judge of the Delhi High Court, following reports regarding the discovery of huge amounts of unaccounted cash in his official residence.

Justice Verma is recommended to be transferred to the Allahabad High Court, his parent High Court.

It is understood from those privy to the development that the transfer is not the final step and is only a preliminary action, with the authorities considering further actions as per the law. An in-house procedure against the Judge has been initiated.

As per the in-house enquiry procedure adopted by the Supreme Court, when there are allegations against a High Court Judge, the Chief Justice of India, after a preliminary enquiry, forms a committee of three Supreme Court judges to enquire into the matter after seeking the response of the Judge in question. Based on the report of the in-house panel, further action can be taken. It is understood that the CJI has initiated the preliminary enquiry into the matter.

A High Court Judge can be removed from office only through an impeachment motion passed by the Parliament. No judge has been impeached in India's history. Though some faced proceedings, they resigned before completion.

As per a report in the Times of India, the cash was found when a fire brigade reached Justice Verma's residence to douse a fire. Justice Varma was not in his residence then. When the fire personnel found the hoards of currency, they took pictures and videos of it and alerted their seniors. Ultimately, the matter was reported to the higher-ups in the government, who in turn informed the Chief Justice of India. This led to CJI Sanjiv Khanna convening an extraordinary meeting of the Supreme Court Collegium on Thursday evening to discuss the matter.

Prioritise Criminal Appeals Of Elderly Accused On Bail, Especially When Crime Is Old

The Supreme Court has advised the High Courts to give adequate priority to criminal appeals, where the accused are on bail. If the accused persons have remained on bail, especially in cases involving life sentences, and the appeal is ultimately dismissed after several years, then sending the accused back to prison might be difficult, particularly when they have attained old age.

The Court noted that generally, the High Courts prioritise appeals where the accused are in prison. However, there should be a balance struck so as to give adequate priority to the appeals where the accused are on bail, especially when the accused are aged and a long time has passed since the crime.

In the post-script to the judgment, the Court observed :

"In all the major High Courts in our country, there is a huge pendency of criminal appeals against conviction and acquittal. Considering the pendency of very old criminal appeals, priority is usually given to the hearing of the appeals where the accused are in prison. The appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail take a backseat. However, a right balance has to be struck by taking up for hearing even some of the old criminal appeals against conviction where accused are on bail. The old age of the accused and the long lapse of time from the commission of the offence can always be a ground available to give some priority to the appeals against conviction of the accused on bail. If the appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail and especially where a life sentence has been imposed are heard after a decade or more from its filing, if the appeal is dismissed, the question arises of sending the accused back to jail after a long period of more than a decade. Therefore, it is desirable that certain categories of appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail should be given priority."

Case : State of Madhya Pradesh vs Shyamlal and others

Saturday, 15 March 2025

In rape cases, the prosecutrix's testimony can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence, and delay in filing a complaint or lack of major injury marks in medical evidence does not necessarily negate the prosecution's case.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 — Reliability of Prosecutrix's Testimony in Rape Cases — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a rape case can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence, emphasizing the importance of considering the broader probabilities of the case.

State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217, Relied On.

Impact of Delay in Filing Complaint and Medical Evidence in Rape Cases — The Court noted that delay in lodging a complaint can be sufficiently explained and may not be fatal to the prosecution's case — Additionally, the absence of major injury marks in medical evidence does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape.

Defence of False Implication and Character Assassination in Rape Cases — The Court rejected the defence of false implication and the attempt to discredit the prosecutrix based on her mother's alleged character, emphasizing that the accused's guilt is determined independently of such factors.

LOK MAL @ LOKU Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

BNSS/CrPC Provisions On Rights Of Arrested Persons Applicable To GST & Customs Acts : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) on the rights of accused persons are equally applicable to the arrests made both under the Customs Act and the GST Act.

Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors.

S.437(6) CrPC/S.480(6) BNSS | Be Liberal While Deciding Bail When Magistrate Trial Hasn't Concluded In 60 Days

The Supreme Court yesterday (on February 18), observed that courts should adopt a liberal approach while dealing with applications under Section 437(6) of CrPC in cases where there is no chance of evidence tampering, absconding, or accused delaying the trial.

For context, Section 437(6) of CrPC, provides that bail ought to be generally granted where the trial in a case triable by the Magistrate is not concluded within a period of 60 days after the first date fixed for the prosecution evidence, unless the Magistrate, for reasons recorded, decides otherwise. The counter-part of Section 437(6) in the BNSS is Section 480(6).

Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh.

BNSS Allows Supply Of Chargesheet & Case Documents To Victims Free Of Cost : Supreme Court Disposes Of Plea

The Supreme Court today disposed of a matter seeking directions to authorities for free supply of chargesheets to complainants/victims and issuance of notice to them at pre-trial stage.

It observed that while the first issue stood resolved in terms of Section 230 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), on the second issue, the Court, under writ jurisdiction, could not direct the legislature to enact law in a particular manner.

Case Title: Vivek Kumar Gaurav v. Union of India

S.156(3) CrPC v S.175(3) BNSS | BNSS Mandates Magistrate To Hear Police Officer On Refusal To Register FIR, Ensures Reasoned Order: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently criticized the routine use of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order police investigations, even in simple cases where the court could proceed directly to trial, stressing that magistrates should act judicially, not mechanically as a mere post office.

The Court also highlighted the changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in Section 175 (corresponding to Section 156 of the Cr.P.C.), noting that Section 174(4) of BNSS is a new addition providing additional safeguards for public servants before an FIR can be registered against them. These safeguards include requiring a report from their superior officer detailing the facts and circumstances of the incident and considering the accused public servant's account of the situation that led to the alleged incident.

OM PRAKASH AMBADKAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.