Prioritise Criminal Appeals Of Elderly Accused On Bail, Especially When Crime Is Old

 

The Supreme Court has advised the High Courts to give adequate priority to criminal appeals, where the accused are on bail. If the accused persons have remained on bail, especially in cases involving life sentences, and the appeal is ultimately dismissed after several years, then sending the accused back to prison might be difficult, particularly when they have attained old age.

The Court noted that generally, the High Courts prioritise appeals where the accused are in prison. However, there should be a balance struck so as to give adequate priority to the appeals where the accused are on bail, especially when the accused are aged and a long time has passed since the crime.

In the post-script to the judgment, the Court observed :

"In all the major High Courts in our country, there is a huge pendency of criminal appeals against conviction and acquittal. Considering the pendency of very old criminal appeals, priority is usually given to the hearing of the appeals where the accused are in prison. The appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail take a backseat. However, a right balance has to be struck by taking up for hearing even some of the old criminal appeals against conviction where accused are on bail. The old age of the accused and the long lapse of time from the commission of the offence can always be a ground available to give some priority to the appeals against conviction of the accused on bail. If the appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail and especially where a life sentence has been imposed are heard after a decade or more from its filing, if the appeal is dismissed, the question arises of sending the accused back to jail after a long period of more than a decade. Therefore, it is desirable that certain categories of appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail should be given priority."

Case : State of Madhya Pradesh vs Shyamlal and others

In rape cases, the prosecutrix's testimony can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence, and delay in filing a complaint or lack of major injury marks in medical evidence does not necessarily negate the prosecution's case.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 — Reliability of Prosecutrix's Testimony in Rape Cases — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a rape case can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence, emphasizing the importance of considering the broader probabilities of the case.

State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217, Relied On.

Impact of Delay in Filing Complaint and Medical Evidence in Rape Cases — The Court noted that delay in lodging a complaint can be sufficiently explained and may not be fatal to the prosecution's case — Additionally, the absence of major injury marks in medical evidence does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape.

Defence of False Implication and Character Assassination in Rape Cases — The Court rejected the defence of false implication and the attempt to discredit the prosecutrix based on her mother's alleged character, emphasizing that the accused's guilt is determined independently of such factors.

LOK MAL @ LOKU Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

BNSS/CrPC Provisions On Rights Of Arrested Persons Applicable To GST & Customs Acts : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) on the rights of accused persons are equally applicable to the arrests made both under the Customs Act and the GST Act.

Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Ors.

S.437(6) CrPC/S.480(6) BNSS | Be Liberal While Deciding Bail When Magistrate Trial Hasn't Concluded In 60 Days

 The Supreme Court yesterday (on February 18), observed that courts should adopt a liberal approach while dealing with applications under Section 437(6) of CrPC in cases where there is no chance of evidence tampering, absconding, or accused delaying the trial.

 For context, Section 437(6) of CrPC, provides that bail ought to be generally granted where the trial in a case triable by the Magistrate is not concluded within a period of 60 days after the first date fixed for the prosecution evidence, unless the Magistrate, for reasons recorded, decides otherwise. The counter-part of Section 437(6) in the BNSS is Section 480(6).

 Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh.

BNSS Allows Supply Of Chargesheet & Case Documents To Victims Free Of Cost : Supreme Court Disposes Of Plea

 

The Supreme Court today disposed of a  matter seeking directions to authorities for free supply of chargesheets to complainants/victims and issuance of notice to them at pre-trial stage.

It observed that while the first issue stood resolved in terms of Section 230 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), on the second issue, the Court, under writ jurisdiction, could not direct the legislature to enact law in a particular manner.

Case Title: Vivek Kumar Gaurav v. Union of India

S.156(3) CrPC v S.175(3) BNSS | BNSS Mandates Magistrate To Hear Police Officer On Refusal To Register FIR, Ensures Reasoned Order: Supreme Court

 

The Supreme Court recently criticized the routine use of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order police investigations, even in simple cases where the court could proceed directly to trial, stressing that magistrates should act judicially, not mechanically as a mere post office.

 

The Court also highlighted the changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in Section 175 (corresponding to Section 156 of the Cr.P.C.), noting that Section 174(4) of BNSS is a new addition providing additional safeguards for public servants before an FIR can be registered against them. These safeguards include requiring a report from their superior officer detailing the facts and circumstances of the incident and considering the accused public servant's account of the situation that led to the alleged incident.

OM PRAKASH AMBADKAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

'Shocking' : Supreme Court Slams J&K Admin For 16 Years' Refusal To Comply With HC Order On Regularisation Of Daily Wager

The Supreme Court of India made a scathing observation regarding the 16-year long delay by the UT of J&K in complying with the High Court's order, which directed the government to consider the case of the respondent daily wagers for regularization as per specific Government Order SRO 64 of 1994.

IN 2007, J&K High Court had passed the directions to appellants to consider the case of the respondent at par with other daily wage workers, who had received the benefits of regularization under SRO 64 of 1994 back in 2006.

A bench comprising Justice Surya Kant and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh observed that, “What concerns us is not the delay of decades alone, but also the incontrovertible fact that the poor respondents, being daily wage workers, have been repeatedly harassed by the petitioners by passing cryptic orders, thereby overlooking the true import and spirit of the order of the learned Single Judge.”

The court further stated, “We consider the instant case fit for imposing exemplary costs on the delinquent officers, besides also recommending strong disciplinary actions against them.”

Supreme Court Discharges Employers In Culpable Homicide Case Over Electrocution Death Of Workers Engaged For Decoration

The Supreme Court recently discharged two persons accused of not providing safety equipment (e.g., helmets, safety belts, rubber shoes) to their employees, leading to their deaths due to electrocution while working on a signboard by using an iron ladder.

An FIR was registered against the Appellants under Sections 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and 304A (causing death by negligence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Trial Court and High Court rejected the appellants' (employers) discharge application, holding that there was sufficient material to proceed with the trial under Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

The Court held that the appellants lacked requisite knowledge or intention to cause death.

“the two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death. It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A IPC.”,

Supreme Court Exempts Wife From Paying Stamp Duty For Flat Acquired As Part Of Compromise In Divorce Case

 Supreme Court Exempts Wife From Paying Stamp Duty For Flat Acquired As Part Of Compromise In Divorce Case

The Supreme Court recently exempted a wife, who received a flat as part of a compromise with her husband in a matrimonial dispute, from the payment of stamp duty under the Registration Act, 1908 (“Act”).

During the mediation proceedings, a dispute arose between the parties regarding their respective rights over a flat in Bombay, as both claimed to have contributed to its purchase. Consequently, a settlement was reached wherein the petitioner-husband agreed to relinquish his rights over the flat in favor of the respondent-wife, who, in return, agreed to forgo any claim for alimony.

Now, the question that appeared for the Court's consideration was whether the exclusive title of the flat in question can be transferred in the name of the respondent-wife without requiring her to pay the stamp duty.

Answering affirmatively, the Court, relying on the recent case of Mukesh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2024) said that since the flat was the subject matter of the compromise and formed part of the proceedings before the Court, the transfer would be exempt from stamp duty under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act.

“Manifestly, the flat-in-question is the subject matter of the compromise and as a consequence, it forms part of the proceedings before this Court. Hence, the exclusion provided by Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 will apply and the registration of the flat-in-question in the exclusive name of the respondent-wife would be exempted from the payment of stamp duty.”,

ARUN RAMESHCHAND ARYA VERSUS PARUL SINGH

'Agreement To Lease Didn't Create Leasehold Rights Without Execution'

 

While interpreting the clauses in an agreement to lease entered into between the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and a party, the Supreme Court noted that the agreement to lease did not create leasehold rights unless the lease deed was executed and registered.

The bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was deciding Delhi Development Authority's (DDA) appeal against the High Court's ruling, which had affirmed the auction sale of the suit property.

“Thus, the scenario which emerges is that the first respondent(SGG Towers) is not entitled to either ownership or leasehold rights in respect of the said plot. The first respondent cannot claim to be a lessee as the lease in terms of the lease agreement was never executed.”, the court observed.

The auction sale to the first respondent was conducted on an as it is basis, meaning the purchaser acquired only whatever rights M/s Mehta Constructions had (which were none).

The Court clarified that since the agreement to lease (which was never executed) in favor of M/s Mehta Constructions was on an "as it is basis”, the subsequent transferee, i.e., the first respondent (S.G.G. Towers), could only acquire the rights that M/s Mehta Constructions held.

"The first respondent will get only those rights which M/s Mehta Constructions had under the lease agreement, provided the rights can be claimed at this stage. In fact, in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court had observed that the auction would not amount to sale of the said plot. The impugned judgment leaves the remedy of the appellant open to proceed against the concerned parties. These findings have been accepted by the first respondent."

With these observations, the Court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the first respondent, S.G.G. Towers, had no rights over the plot. It further held that the DDA is free to pursue remedies for possession recovery and unearned income against the first respondent. Additionally, the Court stated that if S.G.G. Towers seeks to regularize the transaction, it may apply to the DDA for approval, subject to the payment of unearned income.

“Thus, the scenario which emerges is that the first respondent is not entitled to either ownership or leasehold rights in respect of the said plot. The first respondent cannot claim to be a lessee as the lease in terms of the lease agreement was never executed. At the same time, if according to the case of the appellant, M/s Mehta Constructions had committed breach of the lease agreement, notwithstanding the impugned orders, it will be always open for the appellant to adopt appropriate remedy for recovery of possession and/or recovery of unearned income against the first respondent.”, the court held.

Case Title: Delhi Development Authority Versus S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd. & Ors.