“Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions —Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, affirming the High Court's decision that respondents appointed under the "Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana" between 1969 and 1982 are entitled to pensionary benefits — The Court reasoned that government decisions had extended the service rules of the Cane Development Department to these employees, entitling them to similar benefits as permanent government employees, consistent with the Court's earlier judgment in the Vinod Kumar Goel case — The Court rejected arguments regarding delay and the respondents' prior acceptance of Contributory Provident Fund benefits, noting that their claim for pension was raised early and they were willing to deposit the withdrawn amount — The arrears of pension were, however, restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition.
Sunday, 23 March 2025
Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission
Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 — Section 37 — Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 — Rule 2.1.3 — Qualifications for Food Safety Officers — A recruitment notification specifying "a degree" in certain science subjects for the post of Food Safety Officer encompasses postgraduate degrees in those subjects unless explicitly excluded by the relevant statutory rules prescribed by the Central Government — Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission — The Court held that the term "degree" in the recruitment advertisement and the Rules, 2011, includes postgraduate degrees in the listed science subjects (Food Technology, Dairy Technology, Biotechnology, Oil Technology, Agriculture Science, Veterinary Sciences, Biochemistry, Microbiology), noting that the specific mention of a Master's degree in Chemistry sets the minimum qualification for that subject — The Court emphasized that the Central Government has the exclusive power to prescribe qualifications for FSOs under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and that holding a higher degree in a relevant subject does not disqualify a candidate — The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents to allow the appellants to participate in the interview process.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent, who sold his flat to a borrower financed by the appellant, was not a 'consumer' of the appellant under the Act, 1986, due to the absence of a direct contractual relationship
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Sections 2(1)(d) and 24-A — Contract Act, 1872 — A flat seller who is not a borrower or a party to the home loan agreement lacks privity of contract with the financing company and cannot be considered a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act for claims related to the sale consideration — Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) which had directed the appellant to refund money and pay costs to the respondent (original flat owner) — The Supreme Court held that the respondent, who sold his flat to a borrower financed by the appellant, was not a 'consumer' of the appellant under the Act, 1986, due to the absence of a direct contractual relationship — The Court also noted the doubtful existence of a Tripartite Agreement imposing liability on the appellant towards the respondent, the non-joinder of the borrower as a necessary party, and the issue of limitation in filing the consumer complaint.
M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED
Vs.
SNEHASIS NANDA
A statutory board lacks the authority to unilaterally reverse a government land acquisition for a public purpose through a private agreement.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 4 and 6 — Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1976 — Sections 4 and 6 — Land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vests absolutely in the government upon possession — A statutory body, for whose benefit the land was acquired, cannot enter into a private agreement to return a portion of the land, as this would circumvent the law — Such an agreement is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and constitutes a fraud on the state's sovereign power of eminent domain — An arbitral award upholding such an illegal agreement is against public policy and liable to be set aside.
DELHI AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD, THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN
Vs.
BHAGWAN DEVI (DEAD), THROUGH HER LR.
Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant,
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.
SUDAM PRABHAKAR ACHAT
Vs.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.
Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly — Necessity of Proof Beyond Mere Presence — Mere presence at a crime scene, without evidence of an overt act or specific role, is insufficient to convict an individual as a member of an unlawful assembly, especially in cases involving large crowds and public disturbances — Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.
DHIRUBHAI BHAILALBHAI CHAUHAN AND ANOTHER
Vs.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS
Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal,
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances — Courts may liberally condone delays in appeals, especially by the State, if “sufficient cause” is shown and substantial justice is served, balancing between adherence to limitation and the pursuit of meritorious claims —Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal, emphasizing a liberal approach when substantial justice is at stake, particularly in cases involving government land, while ensuring the State exhibits due diligence in future proceedings.
INDER SINGH
Vs.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Motor Accident Claim Can't Be Rejected Merely Because Vehicle's Make Was Wrongly Described
The Supreme Court observed that discrepancy in the make of the vehicle cannot be a ground to deny a rightful claim when the vehicle's registration number and other key details are consistent and correctly mentioned.
Because of the change of make of the vehicle, i.e., TATA Sumo in place of TATA Spacio, the claim as allowed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was rejected by the High Court upon setting aside the claim awarded by the Tribunal even though the vehicle's registration and other key details remained the same.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and looking to the fact that the registration number of the offending vehicle is KA-31/6059, was found involved in the criminal case which is one and the same, the finding of the High Court cannot be sustained. Even mere misdescription of the make of the vehicle could not have been treated as consistency or a ground to dismiss the claim petition itself, particularly when there is no change in the registration number of the offending vehicle. Therefore, impugned judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.”
PARAMESHWAR SUBRAY HEGDE VERSUS NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR
CBI Files 'Closure Report' In Sushant Singh Rajput Death Case, Rules Out Foul Play
After huge hue and cry and a probe that went on for more than four years, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on Saturday filed a 'closure report' in the Sushant Singh Rajput death case, stating that it did not find any evidence to conclude any 'foul play' in the death of the actor.
According to PTI, the CBI through its officials have submitted its 'closure report' in the death case before a special court in Mumbai, on Saturday. The special court, will not decided whether to accept the report or order further probe.
Reacting to the news, actor Rhea Chakraborty's counsel, senior advocate Satish Maneshinde has expressed displeasure over the 'uncalled for' false narratives on social media and also the electronic media, particularly against his client.
"The CBI has filed a closure report in connection with the Death of Sushant Singh Rajput after almost 4 and a half years. We are Greatful to the CBI for having thoroughly investigated every aspect of the case from all angles and closed the case. The amount of false narrative in the Social Media and Electronic Media was totally uncalled for. Innocent people were hounded and paraded before the Media and investigative authorities. I hope this does not repeat in any case," Maneshinde said.
The senior advocate further beseeched the 'captains' of media to reflect upon what they did.
"Rhea had to undergo untold miseries and was behind bars for 27 days for no fault of hers until Justice Sarang Kotwal of the Bombay High Court, released her on bail. Today I can share that I'm proud to have defended a Fauji Family Pro Bono. This Country is still very safe and every citizen crying for Justice has hope due to our vibrant judiciary," Maneshinde said, and concluded with, "Satya Meva Jayate!"
Notably, the actor was found hanging at his home on June 14, 2020 at Mumbai's plush Bandra area. Initially the case was probed by Mumbai Police, which concluded that it was a case of suicide as it found no evidence to show if anyone 'forcibly entered' his house. The city police in its preliminary probe also found that 'depression' could be a major contributing factor in the suicide. The police also did not found any 'suicide note' from the actor's residence.
Subsequently, the actor's father KK Singh lodged an FIR with the Patna Police in Bihar accusing actor Rhea and others of abetting his son's suicide. The father also alleged cheating, theft and wrongful confinement against Rhea.
In a counter, the actor too lodged an FIR against Sushant's sisters, accusing them of forging a 'prescription' of some scheduled drugs.
Since there were conflicting reports of the Patna and Mumbai Police, the Supreme Court had on August 19, 2020 ordered the CBI to conduct a thorough probe in both the cases. Now, as per the PTI report, the CBI has filed a closure report in both these cases.
Explained | Can FIR Be Registered Against A Sitting Judge? What Is In-House Enquiry Procedure On Complaint Against Judge?
Reports regarding the alleged recovery of unaccounted money from the residence of Justice Yashwant Verma of the Delhi High Court have sent shock waves across the legal fraternity.
While it is understood that the Supreme Court Collegium is considering a proposal to transfer Justice Verma and that the Delhi HC CJ is enquiring into the matter, several concerns are being raised, quite rightly, by the general public.
If a Judge is found to be in alleged possession of unaccounted cash, should not an FIR be first lodged on this issue and a criminal investigation be commenced?
However, the simple answer is that at the first instance, no criminal proceedings can be initiated against a sitting Judge unless the Chief Justice of India (CJI) is consulted, as held by the Supreme Court in its judgment in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991).
Once the Chief Justice of India is satisfied that the allegations are prima facie credible, the CJI has to advise the President of India to allow the police to register an FIR.
"In order to adequately protect a Judge from frivolous prosecution and unnecessary harassment the President will consult the Chief Justice of India who will consider all the materials placed before him and tender his advice to the President for giving sanction to launch prosecution or for filing FIR against the Judge concerned after being satisfied in the matter."
Over the years, this process has come to be known as the 'In-House Procedure,' which is a confidential enquiry for institutional credibility under the charge of the CJI.
The In-House Procedure was first stated in the 1991 judgment where the allegations were against a former Chief Justice of the High Court under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (PC Act).
When the matter reached the Supreme Court, two important issues emerged: Are judges public servants under the PC Act? If they are, then a prior sanction is necessary to launch criminal prosecution against them.
The second question was, who would be the competent authority to give that sanction?
Judges are 'public servants' as per PC Act
The Veeraswami judgment holds that a judge of a High Court or a Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice of either Court, is a 'public servant' under the PC Act. Therefore, a criminal prosecution or FIR can be lodged against the judge for offences under the PC Act.
Sanction is not necessary if the judge no longer holds the office.
Who can remove a judge?
The judgment says the President of India is the competent authority to grant sanction under the PC Act to initiate a criminal prosecution against a sitting judge.
"The President, therefore, being the authority competent to appoint and to remove a Judge, of course in accordance with the procedure envisaged in Article 124, clauses (4) and (5) of the Constitution, may be deemed to be the authority to grant sanction for prosecution of a Judge under the provisions of Section 6(1)(c) in re- spect of the offences provided in section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947."
However, no FIR can be lodged against a judge unless the CJI is "consulted". The judgment reasons that in-house procedure protects a judge from "frivolous prosecution and unnecessary harassment".
"The President shall act in accordance with advice given by the Chief Justice of India."
Is the advice of CJI binding?
The judgment says when the President consults the CJI, the latter has to consider all the "materials" to tender the advice. If the CJI thinks that it is not a fit case for grant of sanction, the President 'shall' not accord sanction.
The judgment observes:
"If the chief Justices of opinion that it is not a fit case for grant of sanction for prosecution of the Judge concerned the President shall not accord sanction to prosecute the Judge; This will save the Judge concerned from unnecessary harassment as well as from frivolous prosecution against him.
Similarly in the case of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the President shall consult such of the Judges of the Supreme Court as he may deem fit and proper and the President shall act in accordance with the advice given to him by the Judge or Judges of the Supreme Court. The purpose of grant of previous sanction before prosecuting a public servant i.e. a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court is to protect the Judge from unnecessary harassment and frivolous prosecution more particularly to save the Judge from the biased prosecution for giving judgment in a case which goes against the Government or its officers though' based on good reasons and rule of law."
What is the 'In-House Enquiry' procedure?
In the 1995 judgment of Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the Supreme Court termed it an "In-House Procedure". It was stated that impeachment is a "drastic: remedy and needs to be only used in serious cases. Therefore, the Court suggested an alternative procedure when a judge of the High Court is involved.
In 2015, in Additional District And Sessions v Registrar General, High Court Of Madhya, the Supreme Court further explained the In-House procedure especially in the context of the role of the Chief Justice of the High Court when the complaint is against a judge of the High Court.
What is the procedure?
The in-house procedure, as evolved through the above-cited judgments, is as follows.
The complaint can either be received by the Chief Justice of the High Court, the CJI or the President. In the first case, the following procedure laid down is to be followed. When it is received by the CJI, a similar procedure is adopted. If the President receives the complaint, he must forward it to the CJI.
1. The Chief Justice of the High Court, after confidential enquiry from independent sources, should ascertain if the complaint raises serious allegations of misconduct or impropriety. The CJ must also ask for a response from the judge concerned.
It should be noted here that as per the 2015 judgment, it is not open for the Chief Justice of the High Court to further constitute any committee to hold an enquiry by recording statements etc. His only determination is, whether a prima facie case is made out requiring a deeper probe.
2. In light of the response received, if the Chief Justice of the High Court thinks the matter requires further action, he should then consult the CJI and place all relevant information before him.
Meanwhile, all other procedures of enquiry against the judge should be suspended.
3. The CJI, on receipt of the information from the Chief Justice of the High Court, the CJI must ask for comments from the Chief Justice of the High Court and a response from the concerned judge through the Chief Justice of the High Court.
It is at this stage before the CJI, that the veracity of the allegations are to be probed.
4. If the CJI is of the opinion that the matter requires further investigation, he shall constitute a three-member Committee consisting of two Chief Justices of the High Courts other than the High Court to which the judge belongs and one High Court judge.
5. The said Committee shall hold an enquiry into the allegation and submit a report to the CJI. The Committee must devise its own procedure but should follow principles of natural justice. A copy of the report has to be sent to the judge concerned.
Where the CJ of the High Court is involved, the Bar must directly bring the matter to the notice of the CJI.
When the enquiry report recommends the removal of the judge
The CJI shall:
1. ask the judge to resign or seek voluntary retirement;
2. If the judge refuses to resign or seek voluntary retirement, the CJI must advise the Chief Justice of the High Court to not allot any judicial work to him. The same shall be put to the notice of the President and the Prime Minister.
In the case of Justice Soumitra Sen, the then-sitting judge of Calcutta High Court, he was advised to resign after an In-House Procedure was followed. Since he showed his unwillingness to resign, the then CJI K.G. Balakrishnan wrote it to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to initiate impeachment proceedings.
When the committee finds substance in allegation but misconduct not serious
In case the Committee finds that there is misconduct but not serious in nature, it shall call the judge and advise him accordingly.
If the allegation is against a Judge of the Supreme Court:
1. If a complaint is against a judge of the Supreme Court, the CJI must first examine it.
2. If CJI finds the complaint serious in nature, he shall ask for a response of the judge.
3. Based on the response and in light of the allegations, if the matter requires a deeper probe, CJI would constitute a Committee of three-judges of the Supreme Court.
4. The committee shall hold enquiry and similar action can be followed as followed in case a complaint is against a judge of the High Court.
There is no specific procedure where the allegation against the CJI is made. However, the pronouncements note that the President will have to consult other judges of the Supreme Court.
Transparency of in-house procedure
In Indira Jaising v. Registrar General, Supreme Court, Senior Advocate Indira Jaising had filed an Article 32 writ seeking public disclosure of the enquiry report made by a Committee constituted by the CJI of two judges of the Supreme Court and a judge of the High Court to enquire into the allegations of sexual harassment against the then sitting judge of Karnataka High Court.
Dismissing the petition, the Court had said: "A report made on such inquiry if given publicity will only lead to more harm than good to the institution as Judges would prefer to face inquiry leading to impeachment. In such a case the only course open to the parties concerned if they have material is to invoke the provisions of Article 124 or Article 217 of the Constitution, as the case may be. It is not appropriate for the petitioner to approach this Court for the relief or direction for release of the Report, for what the Chief Justice of India has done is only to get information from peer Judges of those who are accused and the report made to the Chief Justice of India is wholly confidential."
The said report is only for the purpose of the satisfaction of the CJI that such a report has been made. It is purely preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final, it had observed. Jaisingh had remarked that the decision to not make the inquiry report public is a "scandaL".
Subsequently, the 2015 judgment the Registry of the Supreme Court was directed to upload the procedure on its official website.
Conclusion
While the In-House procedure allows the CJI to make informed decisions, the lack of any written guidelines or mechanism to make the inquiry report public continues to attract scepticism. A fair and transparent procedure would restore the tarnished faith of the judiciary caused by such unfortunate incidents.