Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971

 Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 113 — Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971 — Possession is prima facie proof of ownership, and the burden of proving otherwise lies on the party denying it, including the government — This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that reversed a Trial Court decree in favor of the appellants, who sought a declaration of title and recovery of possession of land they were dispossessed from by the State of Andhra Pradesh — The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by overlooking the appellants' long possession and failing to properly consider the presumption of ownership arising from possession under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — While acknowledging the State's need for land for public purposes, the Court criticized the high-handed dispossession without due process or compensation — Due to the construction of a DIET building on the land, the Court deemed it impractical to restore possession and directed the State to pay Rs. 70 lakhs as compensation to the appellants — The Court also emphasized the importance of adhering to Section 80 of the CPC regarding notices in suits against the government.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439 — Directions for CBI Investigation in Bail Applications — High Courts cannot issue directions for CBI investigation in bail applications, as it exceeds their jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151

 Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151 — Minor Discrepancies in Witness Statements — Minor and immaterial inconsistencies in witness statements do not harm the prosecution's case, especially when explained by the circumstances of the case

Failure To Acknowledge Section 80 CPC Notice Or Communicate Stand May Lead To Adverse Inference Against Government

 

The Supreme Court on Monday (March 24) expressed concerns about the declining significance of the notices under Section 80 CPC noting that in practice, such notices have often become empty formalities.

The Court observed that the government/public authorities must acknowledge the notice issued under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) in all seriousness, and must not sit over them to force the citizens into the vagaries of litigation. It added that when a notice is sent to the government by a litigant, it serves as an opportunity for the Government or a public officer to assess the legal merits of a claim and potentially settle it if it appears to be just and reasonable.

Further, the Court stated that an adverse inference would be drawn against the government for not acknowledging the notice or informing the litigant about its stand on the issue raised in the notice.

“The purpose of law is the advancement of justice. The least that was required in the present case was for the State Authorities to acknowledge the notice issued by the appellants herein and inform them as regards their stance. We make it abundantly clear that the Public Authorities must take statutory notice issued to them in all seriousness. The Public Authorities must not sit over such notices and force the citizens to the vagaries of litigation. They are expected to let the plaintiff know their stand within the statutory period or in any case before he embarks upon the litigation. In certain cases, courts may be obliged to draw adverse presumption against the Public Authorities for not acknowledging the notice or telling the plaintiff of its stand and in the absence of that, a stand taken during the course of trial may be considered as an afterthought. This is exactly what has happened in the present case.”

Setting aside the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala held in the Appellant's favour holding that the State failed to prove the land was "assigned" to claim resumption under the 1977 Act. The Court noted that the Appellants' possession since 1970, supported by Pattadar Passbook and revenue receipts, raised a presumption of ownership under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 110, Indian Evidence Act), and the State's inaction for decades (1943–1995) undermined its claim.

In addition to the aforesaid, the Court highlighted the lackadaisical approach of the Respondent in not responding to the Section 80 notice sent by the Appellant. It criticized the State for ignoring the appellants' statutory notice, forcing litigation.

The Court emphasized that public authorities must respond to notices to avoid adverse inferences. Because the Respondent failed to respond to the Appellant's notice, he was dragged into the vagaries of litigation, the Court said that the State's silence on the appellants' Section 80 notice weakened its defense.

Since, the Appellants were dispossessed from the Suit property long ago, and a structure was installed by the Respondent on the Suit property, therefore instead of demolishing that part of the construction made over the Suit land, the Court asked them to compensate the appellants in terms of money and ordered a payment of Rs. 70 Lakhs compensation to the Appellant.

Accordingly, the Appeal was allowed.

Case Title: YERIKALA SUNKALAMMA & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE & ORS.

Consumer Can Approach Consumer Forum Even If Agreement Provides For Arbitration

 

The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the arbitration clauses in an agreement would not override the consumer's choice to approach the consumer forum for adjudication of the dispute.

The Court said that a consumer cannot be forced to get the dispute adjudicated through Arbitration just because an arbitration clause is mentioned in an agreement. It added that the consumer has the exclusive right to decide whether to pursue arbitration or approach the Consumer Forum.

The Court noted that the arbitration clause could not be enforced against the consumer, as the choice of forum lies exclusively with the consumer.

"As vivid from Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751 and M Hemalatha Devi (supra), even in a consumer dispute under the Act, or for that matter, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the 'consumer' alone. As the appellant is not a 'consumer' in terms of the Act and the existence of the Tripartite Agreement is doubtful, we need not dwell further hereon."

In M. Hemalatha Devi v. B. Udayasri, the Court had observed :

“The exclusion of a dispute from arbitration may be express or implied, depending again upon the nature of the dispute, and a party to a dispute cannot be compelled to resort to arbitration merely for the reason that it has been provided in the contract, to which it is a signatory. The arbitrability of a dispute has to be examined when one of the parties seeks redressal under a welfare legislation, in spite of being a signatory to an arbitration agreement. “The Consumer Protection Act” is definitely a piece of welfare legislation with the primary purpose of protecting the interest of a consumer. Consumer disputes are assigned by the legislature to public fora, as a measure of public policy. Therefore, by necessary implication such disputes will fall in the category of non-arbitrable disputes, and these disputes should be kept away from a private fora such as “arbitration”, unless both the parties willingly opt for arbitration over the remedy before public fora.”,

M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED VERSUS SNEHASIS NANDA

To Claim Employment In Any Organization, Direct Master-Servant Relationship Must Be Established On Paper

The Supreme Court recently observed that for a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct master-servant relationship must be established on paper.

“For a person to claim employment under any organization, a direct master-servant relationship has to be established on paper. In the present case(s), admittedly, the only document, which the private respondents have in their favour, is showing that they were posted at various places doing different nature of work. This clearly in the considered opinion of the Court would not establish master-servant relationship”,

A bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra rejected the workman's argument that that the supervisory control of appellant on the workman establishes a master-servant relationship.

“Whatever material has been placed and even the best point which was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the private respondents before this Court was that since there was supervisory and jurisdictional control over the private respondents by the appellants, ipso facto, they would become employees of the appellants is noted only to be rejected.”

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that a master-servant relationship must be substantiated through clear documentation.

The Supreme Court stated that if there had been any substantial evidence supporting the respondents' claim of being employees of the appellants, it would have refrained from interfering with the High Court's orders and allowed the Labour Court to reconsider the matter.

However, since the respondents primary defence was rejected, the Court concluded that a remand to the Labour Court would be pointless. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, and set aside the High Court's orders for remanding the case to the Labour Court, noting that no further orders required since the awards had already been quashed.

Case No: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CIVIL)NO. 19648 OF 2023

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 386 and 397 — Appeal against Conviction — Sentence Reduction — High Court may reduce sentence or convert conviction to lesser offence considering accused's age and case circumstances.

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 386 and 397 — Appeal against Conviction — Sentence Reduction — High Court may reduce sentence or convert conviction to lesser offence considering accused's age and case circumstances.

“Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions

 “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions —Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, affirming the High Court's decision that respondents appointed under the "Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana" between 1969 and 1982 are entitled to pensionary benefits — The Court reasoned that government decisions had extended the service rules of the Cane Development Department to these employees, entitling them to similar benefits as permanent government employees, consistent with the Court's earlier judgment in the Vinod Kumar Goel case — The Court rejected arguments regarding delay and the respondents' prior acceptance of Contributory Provident Fund benefits, noting that their claim for pension was raised early and they were willing to deposit the withdrawn amount — The arrears of pension were, however, restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition.

Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission

 Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 — Section 37 — Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 — Rule 2.1.3 — Qualifications for Food Safety Officers — A recruitment notification specifying "a degree" in certain science subjects for the post of Food Safety Officer encompasses postgraduate degrees in those subjects unless explicitly excluded by the relevant statutory rules prescribed by the Central Government — Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission — The Court held that the term "degree" in the recruitment advertisement and the Rules, 2011, includes postgraduate degrees in the listed science subjects (Food Technology, Dairy Technology, Biotechnology, Oil Technology, Agriculture Science, Veterinary Sciences, Biochemistry, Microbiology), noting that the specific mention of a Master's degree in Chemistry sets the minimum qualification for that subject — The Court emphasized that the Central Government has the exclusive power to prescribe qualifications for FSOs under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and that holding a higher degree in a relevant subject does not disqualify a candidate — The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents to allow the appellants to participate in the interview process.