Consumer Can Approach Consumer Forum Even If Agreement Provides For Arbitration

 

The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the arbitration clauses in an agreement would not override the consumer's choice to approach the consumer forum for adjudication of the dispute.

The Court said that a consumer cannot be forced to get the dispute adjudicated through Arbitration just because an arbitration clause is mentioned in an agreement. It added that the consumer has the exclusive right to decide whether to pursue arbitration or approach the Consumer Forum.

The Court noted that the arbitration clause could not be enforced against the consumer, as the choice of forum lies exclusively with the consumer.

"As vivid from Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751 and M Hemalatha Devi (supra), even in a consumer dispute under the Act, or for that matter, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the 'consumer' alone. As the appellant is not a 'consumer' in terms of the Act and the existence of the Tripartite Agreement is doubtful, we need not dwell further hereon."

In M. Hemalatha Devi v. B. Udayasri, the Court had observed :

“The exclusion of a dispute from arbitration may be express or implied, depending again upon the nature of the dispute, and a party to a dispute cannot be compelled to resort to arbitration merely for the reason that it has been provided in the contract, to which it is a signatory. The arbitrability of a dispute has to be examined when one of the parties seeks redressal under a welfare legislation, in spite of being a signatory to an arbitration agreement. “The Consumer Protection Act” is definitely a piece of welfare legislation with the primary purpose of protecting the interest of a consumer. Consumer disputes are assigned by the legislature to public fora, as a measure of public policy. Therefore, by necessary implication such disputes will fall in the category of non-arbitrable disputes, and these disputes should be kept away from a private fora such as “arbitration”, unless both the parties willingly opt for arbitration over the remedy before public fora.”,

M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED VERSUS SNEHASIS NANDA

To Claim Employment In Any Organization, Direct Master-Servant Relationship Must Be Established On Paper

The Supreme Court recently observed that for a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct master-servant relationship must be established on paper.

“For a person to claim employment under any organization, a direct master-servant relationship has to be established on paper. In the present case(s), admittedly, the only document, which the private respondents have in their favour, is showing that they were posted at various places doing different nature of work. This clearly in the considered opinion of the Court would not establish master-servant relationship”,

A bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra rejected the workman's argument that that the supervisory control of appellant on the workman establishes a master-servant relationship.

“Whatever material has been placed and even the best point which was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the private respondents before this Court was that since there was supervisory and jurisdictional control over the private respondents by the appellants, ipso facto, they would become employees of the appellants is noted only to be rejected.”

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that a master-servant relationship must be substantiated through clear documentation.

The Supreme Court stated that if there had been any substantial evidence supporting the respondents' claim of being employees of the appellants, it would have refrained from interfering with the High Court's orders and allowed the Labour Court to reconsider the matter.

However, since the respondents primary defence was rejected, the Court concluded that a remand to the Labour Court would be pointless. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, and set aside the High Court's orders for remanding the case to the Labour Court, noting that no further orders required since the awards had already been quashed.

Case No: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CIVIL)NO. 19648 OF 2023

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 386 and 397 — Appeal against Conviction — Sentence Reduction — High Court may reduce sentence or convert conviction to lesser offence considering accused's age and case circumstances.

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 386 and 397 — Appeal against Conviction — Sentence Reduction — High Court may reduce sentence or convert conviction to lesser offence considering accused's age and case circumstances.

“Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions

 “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” — Employees appointed under the “Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana” are entitled to pensionary benefits if the service rules applicable to equivalent posts in the Cane Development Department have been extended to them by government decisions —Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, affirming the High Court's decision that respondents appointed under the "Antar Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojana" between 1969 and 1982 are entitled to pensionary benefits — The Court reasoned that government decisions had extended the service rules of the Cane Development Department to these employees, entitling them to similar benefits as permanent government employees, consistent with the Court's earlier judgment in the Vinod Kumar Goel case — The Court rejected arguments regarding delay and the respondents' prior acceptance of Contributory Provident Fund benefits, noting that their claim for pension was raised early and they were willing to deposit the withdrawn amount — The arrears of pension were, however, restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition.

Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission

 Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 — Section 37 — Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 — Rule 2.1.3 — Qualifications for Food Safety Officers — A recruitment notification specifying "a degree" in certain science subjects for the post of Food Safety Officer encompasses postgraduate degrees in those subjects unless explicitly excluded by the relevant statutory rules prescribed by the Central Government — Supreme Court allowed an appeal by candidates holding Master's degrees in Microbiology and Food Science and Technology who were disqualified for the post of Food Safety Officer by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission — The Court held that the term "degree" in the recruitment advertisement and the Rules, 2011, includes postgraduate degrees in the listed science subjects (Food Technology, Dairy Technology, Biotechnology, Oil Technology, Agriculture Science, Veterinary Sciences, Biochemistry, Microbiology), noting that the specific mention of a Master's degree in Chemistry sets the minimum qualification for that subject — The Court emphasized that the Central Government has the exclusive power to prescribe qualifications for FSOs under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and that holding a higher degree in a relevant subject does not disqualify a candidate — The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents to allow the appellants to participate in the interview process.

The Supreme Court held that the respondent, who sold his flat to a borrower financed by the appellant, was not a 'consumer' of the appellant under the Act, 1986, due to the absence of a direct contractual relationship

 Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Sections 2(1)(d) and 24-A — Contract Act, 1872 — A flat seller who is not a borrower or a party to the home loan agreement lacks privity of contract with the financing company and cannot be considered a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act for claims related to the sale consideration — Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) which had directed the appellant to refund money and pay costs to the respondent (original flat owner) — The Supreme Court held that the respondent, who sold his flat to a borrower financed by the appellant, was not a 'consumer' of the appellant under the Act, 1986, due to the absence of a direct contractual relationship — The Court also noted the doubtful existence of a Tripartite Agreement imposing liability on the appellant towards the respondent, the non-joinder of the borrower as a necessary party, and the issue of limitation in filing the consumer complaint.

M/S CITICORP FINANCE (INDIA) LIMITED

Vs.

SNEHASIS NANDA

A statutory board lacks the authority to unilaterally reverse a government land acquisition for a public purpose through a private agreement.

 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 4 and 6 — Delhi Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1976 — Sections 4 and 6 — Land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vests absolutely in the government upon possession — A statutory body, for whose benefit the land was acquired, cannot enter into a private agreement to return a portion of the land, as this would circumvent the law — Such an agreement is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and constitutes a fraud on the state's sovereign power of eminent domain — An arbitral award upholding such an illegal agreement is against public policy and liable to be set aside.

DELHI AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD, THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN

Vs.

BHAGWAN DEVI (DEAD), THROUGH HER LR.

Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant,

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.

SUDAM PRABHAKAR ACHAT

Vs.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.

 Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly — Necessity of Proof Beyond Mere Presence — Mere presence at a crime scene, without evidence of an overt act or specific role, is insufficient to convict an individual as a member of an unlawful assembly, especially in cases involving large crowds and public disturbances — Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.

DHIRUBHAI BHAILALBHAI CHAUHAN AND ANOTHER

Vs.

STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS

Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal,

 Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances — Courts may liberally condone delays in appeals, especially by the State, if “sufficient cause” is shown and substantial justice is served, balancing between adherence to limitation and the pursuit of meritorious claims —Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal, emphasizing a liberal approach when substantial justice is at stake, particularly in cases involving government land, while ensuring the State exhibits due diligence in future proceedings.

INDER SINGH

Vs.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH