Giving Arrest Memo Not Same As Supplying Grounds Of Arrest : Supreme Court Sets Aside Arrest & Remand

 "We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the said arrest memo cannot be construed as grounds of arrest, as no other worthwhile particulars have been furnished to him. This, being a clear non-compliance of the mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined to set aside the impugned judgment, particularly, in light of the judgment rendered by this Court reported as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) - (2024) 8 SCC 254."

In this case, the accused was arrested last December in connection with a first information report registered under Sections 384, 420, 468, 471, 509 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. He was remanded to police custody for 3 days. He challenged his arrest and remand before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which refused to entertain it. Against the January 30 order of the High Court, an appeal was filed. He challenged his arrest and remand on three grounds: non-compliance with Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the opportunity of being heard at the time of remand and the non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.

The Supreme Court considered his criminal appeal only in terms of the last ground.

Case Details: ASHISH KAKKAR v. UT OF CHANDIGARH

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.

Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly

 Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly — Necessity of Proof Beyond Mere Presence — Mere presence at a crime scene, without evidence of an overt act or specific role, is insufficient to convict an individual as a member of an unlawful assembly, especially in cases involving large crowds and public disturbances — Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances

 Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances — Courts may liberally condone delays in appeals, especially by the State, if “sufficient cause” is shown and substantial justice is served, balancing between adherence to limitation and the pursuit of meritorious claims —Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal, emphasizing a liberal approach when substantial justice is at stake, particularly in cases involving government land, while ensuring the State exhibits due diligence in future proceedings.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Registration of FIR

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Registration of FIR — Mandatory under Section 154 of the CrPC if information discloses commission of a cognizable offense; no preliminary inquiry permissible in such cases.

Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971

 Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 113 — Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971 — Possession is prima facie proof of ownership, and the burden of proving otherwise lies on the party denying it, including the government — This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that reversed a Trial Court decree in favor of the appellants, who sought a declaration of title and recovery of possession of land they were dispossessed from by the State of Andhra Pradesh — The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by overlooking the appellants' long possession and failing to properly consider the presumption of ownership arising from possession under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — While acknowledging the State's need for land for public purposes, the Court criticized the high-handed dispossession without due process or compensation — Due to the construction of a DIET building on the land, the Court deemed it impractical to restore possession and directed the State to pay Rs. 70 lakhs as compensation to the appellants — The Court also emphasized the importance of adhering to Section 80 of the CPC regarding notices in suits against the government.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439 — Directions for CBI Investigation in Bail Applications — High Courts cannot issue directions for CBI investigation in bail applications, as it exceeds their jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151

 Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151 — Minor Discrepancies in Witness Statements — Minor and immaterial inconsistencies in witness statements do not harm the prosecution's case, especially when explained by the circumstances of the case

Failure To Acknowledge Section 80 CPC Notice Or Communicate Stand May Lead To Adverse Inference Against Government

 

The Supreme Court on Monday (March 24) expressed concerns about the declining significance of the notices under Section 80 CPC noting that in practice, such notices have often become empty formalities.

The Court observed that the government/public authorities must acknowledge the notice issued under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) in all seriousness, and must not sit over them to force the citizens into the vagaries of litigation. It added that when a notice is sent to the government by a litigant, it serves as an opportunity for the Government or a public officer to assess the legal merits of a claim and potentially settle it if it appears to be just and reasonable.

Further, the Court stated that an adverse inference would be drawn against the government for not acknowledging the notice or informing the litigant about its stand on the issue raised in the notice.

“The purpose of law is the advancement of justice. The least that was required in the present case was for the State Authorities to acknowledge the notice issued by the appellants herein and inform them as regards their stance. We make it abundantly clear that the Public Authorities must take statutory notice issued to them in all seriousness. The Public Authorities must not sit over such notices and force the citizens to the vagaries of litigation. They are expected to let the plaintiff know their stand within the statutory period or in any case before he embarks upon the litigation. In certain cases, courts may be obliged to draw adverse presumption against the Public Authorities for not acknowledging the notice or telling the plaintiff of its stand and in the absence of that, a stand taken during the course of trial may be considered as an afterthought. This is exactly what has happened in the present case.”

Setting aside the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala held in the Appellant's favour holding that the State failed to prove the land was "assigned" to claim resumption under the 1977 Act. The Court noted that the Appellants' possession since 1970, supported by Pattadar Passbook and revenue receipts, raised a presumption of ownership under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 110, Indian Evidence Act), and the State's inaction for decades (1943–1995) undermined its claim.

In addition to the aforesaid, the Court highlighted the lackadaisical approach of the Respondent in not responding to the Section 80 notice sent by the Appellant. It criticized the State for ignoring the appellants' statutory notice, forcing litigation.

The Court emphasized that public authorities must respond to notices to avoid adverse inferences. Because the Respondent failed to respond to the Appellant's notice, he was dragged into the vagaries of litigation, the Court said that the State's silence on the appellants' Section 80 notice weakened its defense.

Since, the Appellants were dispossessed from the Suit property long ago, and a structure was installed by the Respondent on the Suit property, therefore instead of demolishing that part of the construction made over the Suit land, the Court asked them to compensate the appellants in terms of money and ordered a payment of Rs. 70 Lakhs compensation to the Appellant.

Accordingly, the Appeal was allowed.

Case Title: YERIKALA SUNKALAMMA & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE & ORS.