Art 311 Doesn't Mean Only Appointing Authority Can Initiate Disciplinary Action Against Govt Servant

 The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. Referring to Article 311(1) of the Constitution, the Court clarified that while the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action.

Overturning the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Datta noted that the court erred in applying the rulings in BV Gopinath and Promod Kumar, IAS. It clarified that these judgments were based on central laws, which differ from Jharkhand's Civil Service Rules governing the state.

The Court found that the Jharkhand's Rules didn't mandate charge-sheet approval by the Chief Minister, and only states that the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated by any superior authority. Moreover, the Chief Minister's approval of the draft charge-sheet (submitted alongside the proposal) sufficed as compliance, hence the court noted that no separate approval of CM was needed.

“As noted above, in the present case, the draft charge-sheet was there on record when the Chief Minister accorded his approval and there appears to be no valid reason as to why approval of the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent would not be regarded as grant of approval to the draft charge-sheet too. We are unhesitatingly of the view that according approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, in this case, did amount to approval of the draft charge-sheet.”, the court said.

Since the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Commissioner (superior authority), and the dismissal was upheld by the State Cabinet being approved by the Governor, therefore the Court found no reason for the High Court to interfere with the dismissal just because the charge sheet was issued without the Chief Minister's approval.

“We repeat, the entire proposal of initiating disciplinary proceedings inclusive of the draft charge-sheet, to suspend the respondent pending such proceedings and the names of the officers who would conduct the inquiry and present the case of the department in such inquiry having been approved by the Chief Minister, the Single Judge seems to have occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice in interfering with the order of dismissal on the wholly untenable ground of lack of approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister; and the Division Bench, by failing to right the wrong, equally contributed to the failure of justice.”, the court observed.

Constitutional Safeguard Under Article 311(1) Does Not Mandate Issuance Of Charge-sheet By Appointing Authority

The Court noted that an argument was made by the Respondent claiming protection under Article 311(1) stating that the safeguards enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution be scrupulously followed prior to ordering his dismissal including drawing up a charge-sheet in the manner required by the relevant law.

However, the Court noted that the constitutional safeguard under Article 311(1) only ensures that dismissal is by an appointing authority, not that charge sheets must be issued by the appointing authority or the disciplinary proceedings be initiated by them.

"If one looks at Article 311(1), the sole safeguard that it provides to any member, inter alia, of a civil service of a State or the holder of a civil post under the State is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed (emphasis supplied). Clause (1) does not on its own terms require that the disciplinary proceedings should also be initiated by the appointing authority."

The Court clarified that disciplinary proceedings may be initiated by any superior authority, not solely by the appointing authority unless explicitly required by the rules.

 THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. VS. RUKMA KESH MISHRA

Giving Arrest Memo Not Same As Supplying Grounds Of Arrest : Supreme Court Sets Aside Arrest & Remand

 "We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the said arrest memo cannot be construed as grounds of arrest, as no other worthwhile particulars have been furnished to him. This, being a clear non-compliance of the mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined to set aside the impugned judgment, particularly, in light of the judgment rendered by this Court reported as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) - (2024) 8 SCC 254."

In this case, the accused was arrested last December in connection with a first information report registered under Sections 384, 420, 468, 471, 509 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. He was remanded to police custody for 3 days. He challenged his arrest and remand before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which refused to entertain it. Against the January 30 order of the High Court, an appeal was filed. He challenged his arrest and remand on three grounds: non-compliance with Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the opportunity of being heard at the time of remand and the non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.

The Supreme Court considered his criminal appeal only in terms of the last ground.

Case Details: ASHISH KAKKAR v. UT OF CHANDIGARH

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302 and 304 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction under Section 302 requires proof of premeditation or intention to kill; absence of such elements may lead to reduced charges, such as under Section 304 IPC, with sentencing considerations potentially based on time already served — Supreme Court partly allows an appeal, converting a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304, considering the lack of premeditation and the time already served by the appellant, and directs release if not required in any other case.

Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly

 Penal Code (IPC), 1860 — Sections 143, 147 and 149 — Conviction for Unlawful Assembly — Necessity of Proof Beyond Mere Presence — Mere presence at a crime scene, without evidence of an overt act or specific role, is insufficient to convict an individual as a member of an unlawful assembly, especially in cases involving large crowds and public disturbances — Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's conviction of six individuals for rioting and related offences, restoring their acquittal, as their mere presence at the crime scene amidst a large crowd was insufficient to prove membership in an unlawful assembly without evidence of specific roles or overt acts.

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances

 Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Extension of period of limitation in certain circumstances — Courts may liberally condone delays in appeals, especially by the State, if “sufficient cause” is shown and substantial justice is served, balancing between adherence to limitation and the pursuit of meritorious claims —Supreme Court upholds the condonation of a 1537-day delay in the State's second appeal, emphasizing a liberal approach when substantial justice is at stake, particularly in cases involving government land, while ensuring the State exhibits due diligence in future proceedings.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Registration of FIR

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Registration of FIR — Mandatory under Section 154 of the CrPC if information discloses commission of a cognizable offense; no preliminary inquiry permissible in such cases.

Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971

 Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 113 — Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971 — Possession is prima facie proof of ownership, and the burden of proving otherwise lies on the party denying it, including the government — This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that reversed a Trial Court decree in favor of the appellants, who sought a declaration of title and recovery of possession of land they were dispossessed from by the State of Andhra Pradesh — The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by overlooking the appellants' long possession and failing to properly consider the presumption of ownership arising from possession under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — While acknowledging the State's need for land for public purposes, the Court criticized the high-handed dispossession without due process or compensation — Due to the construction of a DIET building on the land, the Court deemed it impractical to restore possession and directed the State to pay Rs. 70 lakhs as compensation to the appellants — The Court also emphasized the importance of adhering to Section 80 of the CPC regarding notices in suits against the government.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 161 and 439 — Directions for CBI Investigation in Bail Applications — High Courts cannot issue directions for CBI investigation in bail applications, as it exceeds their jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 90 and 376 — Promise of Marriage and Consent — A promise of marriage made after the act of intercourse does not constitute inducement for consent, and repeated willing accompaniment to hotel rooms undermines allegations of coercion

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151

 Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 151 — Minor Discrepancies in Witness Statements — Minor and immaterial inconsistencies in witness statements do not harm the prosecution's case, especially when explained by the circumstances of the case