Supreme Court Rejects UCO Bank's Plea That Employee Dismissed For Misconduct Wasn't Entitled To Pension Despite 10 Yrs Service

 Supreme Court Rejects UCO Bank's Plea That Employee Dismissed For Misconduct Wasn't Entitled To Pension Despite 10 Yrs Service

The Supreme Court rejected UCO Bank's plea that a bank employee who has completed over ten years of service was not entitled to superannuation benefits when he was dismissed on grounds of misconduct.

The bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan upheld the Punjab & Haryana High Court's decision directing the Appellant-UCO Bank to grant pensionary benefits to the Respondent-employee removed from service for misconduct after completing 10 plus years in the service.

The Case

In 1998, the Respondent was charged with assaulting a bank officer and was dismissed following an inquiry in 1999. In 2000, the appellate authority modified the penalty to removal with terminal benefits, a decision that went unchallenged by the Appellant-Bank and attained finality.

In 2004, the Labour Court reduced the penalty to stoppage of increments and ordered reinstatement with 75% back wages. However, in 2009, the High Court set aside the Labour Court's award, reinstating the removal with terminal benefits.

Subsequently, in 2010, the Respondent opted for a pension under the Bipartite Settlement. The High Court later directed the bank to grant pension benefits, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool, (2014) 2 SCC 715.

In SK Kool's judgment, the Court held that if the bank employee has completed the minimum pensionable years of service (10+ years), he would be entitled to the pensionary benefits even if dismissed on account of misconduct.

Answering in negative, the judgment authored by Justice Bhuyan relying on the case of S.K. Kool, harmonized both the provisions and observed that Regulation 22 cannot override the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court rejected the Appellant's argument regarding the non-application of the SK Kool's judgment in the present case. The Appellant argued that in SK Kool's judgment applies only where the employee opted for pension before removal.

“the decision in S.K. Kool (supra) was rendered in a different factual context. The employee in the said case had opted for pension before the penalty of removal from service was imposed on him. In the present case, respondent never opted for pension. Therefore, S.K. Kool (supra) is clearly distinguishable in so far facts and circumstances of the present case is concerned.”, the court observed

“Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had followed the aforesaid decision of this Court. Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had submitted his option for pension on 05.10.2010. Learned Single Judge also held that objection of the appellant to the claim of pension by the respondent was without any basis in as much as the appellate authority had specifically held that respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered. This order of the appellate authority has attained finality. Therefore, it was held that respondent was entitled to receive pension in view of the order passed by the appellate authority. This view of the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool (supra) is binding on us. Therefore, we do not find any compelling reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”, the court observed.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Case Title: UCO BANK & ANR. VERSUS VIJAY KUMAR HANDA

Even As We Near 80 Yrs Of Independence, Not Enough Public Jobs Generated For Eligible Candidates

 

Even As We Near 80 Yrs Of Independence, Not Enough Public Jobs Generated For Eligible Candidates

The Supreme Court recently highlighted the scarcity of government jobs and the hardships faced by deserving candidates unable to secure employment due to limited opportunities.

“Even as we near 80 (eighty) years of independence, generating enough jobs in the public sector to absorb those eager to enter public service remains an elusive goal. While there is no dearth of eligible candidates in the country waiting in the queue, the quest for public employment is thwarted by a lack of sufficient employment opportunities.”,

“The respondent no.7 was seeking relief from the High Court relying on the offending proviso. In a case where the party aggrieved seeks enforcement of a provision of a rule, which is seemingly unconstitutional, would he raise the plea of its unconstitutionality? It would be imprudent for him to do so and hence, the answer cannot but be in the negative. While considering the plea of the respondent no.7, the Division Bench found the offending proviso to be so obtrusively unconstitutional that notwithstanding absence of a specific challenge thereto, it proceeded to declare the same as void. Although the Division Bench had no occasion to refer to the decisions that we have referred to above, nothing much turns on it. The Division Bench must be presumed to be aware of the law on the subject that appointment cannot be claimed as a hereditary right and, thus, without even a challenge being laid to the offending proviso thought of striking it down. We do not see any illegality in such an approach.”,

“We are minded and do hold that, a writ court, when it finds its conscience to be pricked in a rare and very exceptional case by the patent unconstitutionality of a subordinate legislation connected with the issue it is seized of, may, upon grant of full opportunity to the State to defend the subordinate legislation and after hearing it, grant a declaration as to unconstitutionality and/or invalidity of such legislation. After all, as the sentinel on the qui vive, it is not only the duty of the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of others by the three organs of the State. This power is a plenary power resident in all the Constitutional Courts. Should, in a given case, it be found that there has been an egregious violation of a Fundamental Right as a result of operation of a subordinate legislation and the issue is concluded by a binding decision of this Court, we consider it the duty of the writ courts to deliver justice by declaring the subordinate legislation void to safeguard rights of others who might not still have been affected thereby. We reiterate, it can only be done rarely and in cases which stand out from the ordinary.”,

IBC | Difference Between 'Avoidance Transactions' & 'Fraudulent Or Wrongful Trading'

 IBC | Difference Between 'Avoidance Transactions' & 'Fraudulent Or Wrongful Trading'

The Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd v. 63 Moons Technology explained the key difference between how the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 deals with avoidance transactions and transactions relating to fraudulent or wrongful trading.

Notably, under the IBC 2016, 'avoidance transactions' are specific transactions conducted by a corporate debtor prior to insolvency proceedings that are deemed detrimental to the interests of creditors. These include (1) Preferential transactions, (2) Undervalued transactions, (3) Extortionate Credit transactions; (4) Fraudulent transactions.

 

The bench of Justice Bela Trivedi and Justice SC Sharma noted that there was a fundamental distinction between Avoidance Applications under Chapter III and the Applications in respect of Fraudulent Trading or Wrongful Trading under Chapter VI.

Firstly, the ambit of avoidance applications comes under the duties of the resolution professional (RP)  .The RP can file an application for avoidance of transactions in accordance with Chapter III as part of his/her larger duty to 'preserve and protect the assets of the corporate debtor, including the continued business operations'.

Under S.26 of the IBC, filling of an Avoidance Application under Clause (j) of sub section (2) of Section 25 by the RP will not affect the insolvency proceedings.

Secondly, the aspect of 'Fraudulent trading or wrongful trading' within the corporate debtor entity has been separately dealt with under S. 66 under Chapter 4.

As per S.66(1) the Adjudicating Authority can order individuals who knowingly engaged in fraudulent business activities during the CIRP or Liquidation process to contribute to the assets of the Corporate Debtor (CD), based on an application from the Resolution Professional.

 PIRAMAL CAPITAL AND HOUSING FINANCE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEWAN HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED) v. 63 MOONS TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED & OTHERS |

Wife Can Be Affected By Defamation Of Husband; Apart From Individual Reputations, Spouses Share Common Family Reputation

 Wife Can Be Affected By Defamation Of Husband; Apart From Individual Reputations, Spouses Share Common Family Reputation

In a civil matter, the Supreme Court recently observed orally that while a husband and wife have individual reputations, there is also something called "family reputation" and a wife is likely to be affected by anything that tends to lower her husband's reputation.

A bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh was dealing with an appeal filed by Spunklane Media Private Limited(which owns the news portal 'The News Minute) against an order of the Karnataka High Court. It involved an issue as to whether a wife, by way of subsequent impleadment of her husband (as co-plaintiff), can acquire better title in a suit to restrain media houses from publishing about a case against the husband.

The Court did not interfere with the High Court's order which affirmed the Trial Court's decision allowing the wife to join as a party in her husband's suit against the news portal.

Disposing of the appeal, Justice Kant said,

"A woman, a man...two persons...individually can suffer in terms of reputation. But definitely, [if] they are living together as husband and wife, and if they are a family, when you attack one, definitely, that attack impairs the psychology, the emotions and the social reputation of other family members. And most importantly, the wife will suffer because of husband. Husband will suffer because of wife...This was one of your arguments before the High Court...It would be a very dangerous proposition that living under the same roof, husband has a separate reputation, wife has a separate reputation...they may have separate [reputation] also, but they have a common, integral and integrated reputation also that's known as family reputation, a couple's reputation, a husband-wife's reputation."

SPUNKLANE MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED Versus NIVEDITA SINGH AND ORS., 

'No Religion Permits Such Brutal Tree Felling, Pay Compensation From Festival Offerings'

 'No Religion Permits Such Brutal Tree Felling, Pay Compensation From Festival Offerings'

The Supreme Court on Friday (April 4) pulled up the temple committee of the Thiru Keralapuram Sreekrishnaswamy Temple, located in Peroor Village, Kerala, over three cutting of three Wild Jack Trees, each having a diameter of about 1.5 to 2 meters, on the temple premises.

A bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was dealing with an interlocutory application in a property dispute regarding the temple.

According to a report submitted by the District Collector of Kottayam, the trees were cut at the instance of the temple's Administrative Committee.

During the hearing, Justice Oka remarked, “No religion permits felling of trees in such a brutal manner.”

Justice Oka asked the counsel for the temple committee, “How much compensation per tree will you pay to the forest department and how many trees will you plant?”

In response, the counsel submitted that the tree-cutting was done by the previous committee and informed the Court that the present committee had already planted 100 trees after the Court's earlier status quo order. He further submitted that the committee was ready to plant 100 more trees.

The Court asked the temple committee to specify in an affidavit how many trees it had planted and to indicate the compensation amount it was willing to pay for the trees that were cut.

When the counsel for the temple committee submitted that it was a very small and poor temple and that the people did not have money, particularly because the yearly festival was happening, the Court said that the offerings collected from devotees during the festival could be directed towards compensating the forest department.

Justice Oka said, “In this festival people will be offering something to the god, right? So whatever is offered at this festival can go to the forest department. As simple as that. Give an undertaking saying normally how much amount is received by way of the offerings during the festival. That amount you will pay to the forest department by way of compensation. That will solve the problem. Somebody must plant trees and somebody must pay compensation, and somebody must take responsibility.”

Excess Payments To Employee Can't Be Recovered When There Was No Fraud Or Misrepresentation

 Excess Payments To Employee Can't Be Recovered When There Was No Fraud Or Misrepresentation

The Supreme Court has reiterated that excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable.

A bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra was deciding the appeals filed by persons, who were working as Stenographers and Personal Assistants in the Orissa District Judiciary, against the recoveries of excess payments. Amounts in the range of Rs.20,000 to 40,000 were sought to be recovered from the appellants. The recoveries were ordered nearly three years after their retirement and six years after the payment

"This Court has consistently taken the view that if the excess amount was not paid on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the employee or if such excess payment was made by the employer by applying a wrong principle for calculating the pay/allowance or on the basis of a particular interpretation of rule/order, which is subsequently found to be erroneous, such excess payments of emoluments or allowances are not recoverable. It is held that such relief against the recovery is not because of any right of the employee but in equity, exercising judicial discretion to provide relief to the employee from the hardship that will be caused if the recovery is ordered."

In Thomas Daniel, the Court had held that recoveries would be impermissible in following situations :

(i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service).

(ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

(iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

(v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.

Here, the Court noted that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners in obtaining the excess payment. Also, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them before ordering the recoveries.

"The appellants having superannuated on a ministerial post of Stenographer were admittedly not holding any gazetted post as such applying the principle enunciated by this Court in the above quoted judgment, the recovery is found unsustainable," the Court observed while allowing their appeals.

Case : Jogeswar Sahoo and others vs The District Judge Cuttack and others

**Specific Performance Suit Not Maintainable For Cancelled Sale Agreement Without Seeking Declaration Against Cancellation **

 The Supreme Court held that a suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell, filed after its cancellation, is not maintainable unless it includes a prayer for declaratory relief (under Section 34 Specific Relief Act) challenging the validity of the cancellation.

The Court reasoned that declaratory relief challenging the validity of the cancellation was essential when seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell, as the suit could not be sustained without a valid and subsisting agreement.

“this Court is of the opinion that absent a prayer for declaratory relief that termination/cancellation of the agreement is bad in law, a suit for specific performance is not maintainable.”,

“This Court further finds that the seller had admittedly issued a letter dated 7th February 2008 cancelling the Agreement to Sell dated 25th January 2008, prior to the filing of the subject suit on 5th May 2008. Even though the demand drafts enclosed with the letter dated 07th February, 2008 were subsequently encashed in July, 2008 (After Suit's institution), yet this Court is of the view that it was incumbent upon the Respondent No.1-buyer to seek a declaratory relief that the said cancellation is bad in law and not binding on parties for the reason that existence of a valid agreement is sine qua non for the grant of relief of specific performance.”, the court observed.

Reference was drawn to the case of I.S. Sikandar (Dead) By LRs. v. K. Subramani and Others, (2013) 15 SCC 27, where it was held that in the absence of a prayer for declaratory relief that the termination of the agreement is bad in law, the suit for specific performance of that agreement is not maintainable.

“Since in the present case, the seller had issued a letter dated 07th February, 2008 cancelling the agreement to sell prior to the institution of the suit, the same constitutes a jurisdictional fact as till the said cancellation is set aside, the respondent is not entitled to the relief of specific performance.”, the court observed.

Since the trial court in this case didn't consider the issue of the maintainability of the suit, the Court referring to the recent case of R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. said that it would not trim away the powers of the Appellate Courts/High Court to examine whether the jurisdictional fact did exist for grant of relief as claimed, provided no new facts were required to be pleaded and no new evidence led.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court allowed the appeal holding that the Court below had erred in decreeing the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell despite non-existence of the agreement to sell.

Case Title: SANGITA SINHA VERSUS BHAWANA BHARDWAJ AND ORS.

S. 34(3) Arbitration Act | Application Filed On Next Working Day After 90 Day Period Is Within Limitation

 Affirming the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha rejected the Appellant's argument of interpreting three months under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act as 90 days, instead, it said that the period should be construed as 3 calendar months.

“At this stage, it is necessary to reiterate that the statutory language of Section 34(3) clearly stipulates the limitation period as “three months”, as opposed to the condonable period as “thirty days”. This difference in language unambiguously demonstrates the legislative intent that the limitation period is 3 calendar months as opposed to 90 days. Therefore, we reject the argument taken by the appellant in its written submissions that 3 months must be read as 90 days in the context of Section 34(3).”, the court said.

“In the present case, the respondent received a signed copy of the award on 09.04.2022. Since Section 12(1) applies, this date must be excluded and the 3-month limitation period must be reckoned from 10.04.2022. This expires on 09.07.2022, which happened to be a second Saturday when the court was not working. Hence, the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act will inure to the benefit of the respondent.”, the Court observed.

“Therefore, the respondent's application under Section 34, which was filed on 11.07.2022, i.e., the next working day of the court, must be considered as being filed within the limitation period. Consequently, there was no delay in filing the application and sufficient cause need not be shown for condonation of delay. The High Court therefore rightly allowed the Section 37 appeal and held that the respondent's Section 34 application was filed within the limitation period.”, the court added.

In this context, the Court referred to State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd. where it upheld the application of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, allowing a party to file an application to set aside an arbitral award on the next working day if the initial three-month period expires on a court holiday.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Case Title: M/S R. K. TRANSPORT COMPANY VERSUS M/S BHARAT ALUMINUM COMPANY LTD. (BALCO)

Supreme Court Directs CEC To Probe Violations Of Forest & Wildlife Laws In Tamil Nadu's Agasthyamalai Landscape

Concerned over encroachments and depleting forest cover in Tamil Nadu's Agasthyamalai landscape, the Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to survey the area and report violations of laws like the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

"Needless to say, that the forests form the lungs of the ecosystem, and any depletion/destruction of forest areas has a direct impact on the entire environment. The world at large is facing the calamities caused by the climate change, and the primary culprit behind this is the depleting forest cover owing to a myriad of issues including rapid urbanization, unchecked industrialization, encroachments, etc.", the Court observed while directing a survey of encroachment on forest land.

"India has a forest cover of about 7,15,343 sq. km as per 'India State of Forest Report 2023', which is about 21.76% (approx.) of the total landmass of the country. Nepal has 44.74% (approx.), Bhutan has 72% (approx.), and Sri Lanka has 29% (approx.) forest cover. Hence, clearly the forest cover in India is not adequate and needs to be enhanced. A recent report, submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, in proceedings before the National Green Tribunal indicates that almost 13000 sq. kms. area of forests is under encroachment. This Court has time and again taken up this issue and passed mandatory directions to remove the encroachments from the forest areas and to curb any attempt to reduce the forest cover in the country.",

“In view of the submissions noted above and as an interim measure, to initiate the process of restoration of the pristine forest areas and to protect the tiger habitats/wildlife reserves/sanctuaries falling under the Agasthyamalai landscape, we hereby direct the CEC to conduct an extensive survey of the entire Agasthyamalai landscape, which would include Periyar Tiger Reserve, Srivilliputhur Grizzled Squirrel Wildlife Sanctuary, Meghamalai and Thirunelveli Wildlife Sanctuaries. The CEC shall indicate in its report all instances of non-forestry activities going on in these areas contrary to the statutory provisions viz, the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, etc.”,

“The CEC shall also recommend measures for restoration of (a) the reserved forests, (b) the tiger habitats, and (c) elephant corridors and (d) other wildlife reserves (sanctuaries) in and around the Agsthyamalai landscape, including the abovementioned sanctuaries/reserves. For this purpose, the CEC may employ all scientific procedures including Remote Sensing Satellite Imagery, Geo Mapping, etc., so that the process of survey can be expedited.”,

A. JOHN KENNEDY ETC. VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS ETC.

Teacher In-Service As On Aug 10, 2017 With 18-Month D.El.Ed. From NIOS Before Apr 1, 2019 'At Par' With 2-Yr Diploma Holder

Dealing with the issue of eligibility for teacher recruitment process in West Bengal, the Supreme Court today held that any teacher who was in-service as on 10.08.2017 and who acquired the Diploma In Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) qualification through National Institute of Open Schooling's (NIOS) 18-months programme prior to 01.04.2019 is a valid diploma holder and at par with a teacher who completed the 2 years D. El. Ed. programme.

"such of the teachers who were in employment as on 10th August 2017 and who completed the 18 months D. El. Ed. (ODL) programme through NIOS before 1st April 2019 shall be considered as valid diploma holders for the purpose of applying in other institutions and/or for promotional avenues",

"Having availed of the one-time scheme, such of the teachers even though they only undertook the 18 months D. El. Ed. programme through NIOS they should be considered at par with a 2 years D. El. Ed., if they completed their 18 months programme through NIOS prior to 1st April 2019."

The bench of Justices Gavai and Masih made reference to another order passed by the Court, dated 10.12.2024, which disposed of certain review petitions and miscellaneous applications filed in connection with Jaiveer Singh. This order clarified that teachers who acquired the 18 months D. El. Ed. through NIOS and who were in employment as on 10.08.2017 would be treated as a valid diploma holder for the purpose of applying in other institutions or for promotional avenues. It further mentioned that the clarification would be effective from the date of pronouncement of the judgment in Jaiveer Singh (ie 28.11.2023).

With regard to the decision of the Single Bench of the High Court (which was upheld by the Division Bench), it was opined that though reliance was placed on Jaiveer Singh, the bench came to the wrong conclusion inasmuch as it put a blanket ban on all teachers holding an 18 months D. El. Ed. through NIOS.

"the judgment of this Court in the case of Jaiveer Singh unequivocally held that the entire scheme emanating from the NCTE Recognition Order dated 22nd September 2017 was for the purpose of providing a window to the in-service teachers inasmuch as unless they would have acquired requisite qualifications prior to 1st April 2019, they would not have continued to remain in service and would have faced dismissal from service."

In closing, the appeal was allowed and the impugned decisions of the High Court set aside. The respondent-authorities were directed to consider candidature of such appellants who were in-service as on 10.08.2017. On verification, those who are found to satisfy the eligibility criteria, shall be appointed within a period of 3 months, the Court further said.

KOUSIK DAS & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS., SLP(C) No. 19139 of 2024