Sunday, 20 April 2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 499, Exception 9 & Section 500 — Defamation — Imputation in Good Faith for Protection of Interests

 SHAHED KAMAL AND OTHERS

Vs.

M/S A. SURTI DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER

( Before : K. V. Viswanathan and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 2033 of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9942 of 2024)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 499, Exception 9 & Section 500 — Defamation — Imputation in Good Faith for Protection of Interests — Exception 9 to S. 499 IPC engrafts the principle of qualified privilege, stating it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided it is made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good — Good faith requires due care and attention but, unlike Exception 1, does not mandate proving the absolute truth of the imputation — In a business relationship like that between homebuyers and a developer, airing specific, fact-based grievances via a banner, using mild and temperate language without malice, to protect their collective interests, falls squarely within this exception. (Relied on: Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590; Harbhajan Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 118; Kuruppanna Goundan vs. Kuppuswami Mudaliar, 1935 MWN 365; Queen-Empress vs. E.M. Slater, (1891) ILR 15 Bom 351; Valmiki Faleiro v. Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1584)

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 — Section 2(17) — ‘Principal Employer’ — Scope and Determination

 AJAY RAJ SHETTY

Vs.

DIRECTOR AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ….of 2025 [@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3743 of 2024]

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 — Section 2(17) — ‘Principal Employer’ — Scope and Determination — The definition of ‘principal employer’ under Section 2(17) is wide and includes not only the owner or occupier of a factory (or head of department in government establishments) but also the managing agent or any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment — Designation is immaterial if the person functions as a managing agent or supervises/controls the establishment — Where concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court, based on company records (which were not controverted by the appellant with evidence like appointment letter/payslips), established that the appellant was functioning as General Manager/Principal Employer/Managing Agent, he falls within the ambit of S. 2(17) and is liable for offences under the Act. (Distinguished: Employees’ State Insurance Corpn., Chandigarh v Gurdial Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1741; J K Industries Limited v Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Habitual Offender/Criminal Antecedents — Consideration of Nature of Current Offence

 ANKIT MISHRA

Vs.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No(s). ....of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 14566 of 2024)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Habitual Offender/Criminal Antecedents — Consideration of Nature of Current Offence — While the criminal antecedents and alleged status of an accused as a habitual offender are extremely relevant factors that ordinarily weigh against the grant of anticipatory bail, the High Court’s discretion in granting such bail may not warrant interference if (i) the High Court has demonstrably considered the criminal history, and (ii) the specific offences alleged in the present FIR are not heinous in nature — The consideration might differ if the present allegation involved a heinous offence. (Distinguished from principles in Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508)

Circumstantial Evidence — Murder (Filicide) vs. Suicide

 SUBHASH AGGARWAL

Vs.

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ….of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1069 of 2025)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Murder (Filicide) vs. Suicide — In cases based on circumstantial evidence where the question is whether the death was homicidal (filicide) or suicidal, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances that points exclusively to the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence — Conviction upheld where circumstances, including (i) gunshot residue (GSR) found on the accused father’s dominant (right) hand, (ii) the accused being the first to discover the body and propounding a false theory of suicide (by screwdriver), (iii) absence of blood on the alleged suicide weapon (screwdriver), (iv) medical and ballistic evidence indicating a close-range (but not contact) gunshot wound inconsistent with typical suicide patterns (location on chest, weapon not found in hand), (v) false and contradictory explanations by the accused under S. 313 Cr.P.C. regarding the weapon and GSR, formed a complete chain pointing solely to the accused’s guilt. (Relied on: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Ingredients — Nature of Injury vs. Intention/Knowledge

 STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Vs.

SHAMSHER SINGH

( Before : Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 2015

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Ingredients — Nature of Injury vs. Intention/Knowledge — To attract S. 307 IPC, the crucial element is the intention or knowledge to cause death with which the act is done, irrespective of the nature or severity of the injury actually caused. S. 307 uses the word ‘hurt’, not ‘grievous hurt’ or ‘life-threatening hurt’ — Therefore, an accused cannot be acquitted merely because the injury inflicted was not grievous or dangerous to life, if the evidence establishes that the act was done with the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death. (Relied on: State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kanha @ Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605; State of M.P. vs. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554)

A notice invoking arbitration under S. 21 is mandatory (unless otherwise agreed by parties) as its receipt fixes the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings, which is crucial for determining limitation (S. 43), applicable law

 ADAVYA PROJECTS PVT. LTD.

Vs.

M/S VISHAL STRUCTURALS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS

( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 5297 of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 25746 of 2024

Decided on : 17-04-2025

  Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 21 — Notice Invoking Arbitration — Mandatory Nature and Effect of Non-Service — A notice invoking arbitration under S. 21 is mandatory (unless otherwise agreed by parties) as its receipt fixes the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings, which is crucial for determining limitation (S. 43), applicable law (including amendments to the Act), and fulfilling a prerequisite for filing a S. 11 application — However, the non-service of a S. 21 notice on a person does not, by itself, preclude the arbitral tribunal from impleading that person if they are found to be a party to the arbitration agreement — The primary purpose of S. 21 relates to commencement and time-related aspects, while other functions like informing about claims or potential arbitrators are incidental. (Relied on: Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 288; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, (2012) 12 SCC 581; BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738. Partially agreed with, but distinguished on conclusion: Alupro Building Systems Pvt Ltd. v. Ozone Overseas Pvt Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7228)

Divergent Opinions

 N. ESWARANATHAN

Vs.

STATE REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

SLP (Criminal) Diary No(s). 55057 of 2024

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Divergent Opinions — Where there is a divergence of opinion between judges on a Bench regarding the acceptance of an apology tendered by advocates for misconduct and the appropriate consequential orders, the matter should be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Wednesday, 16 April 2025

 PINKI

Vs.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2025 (Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4658 of 2025) with Criminal Appeal No. 1928 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 592 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1929 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 590 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1930 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4660 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1931 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4661 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1932 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4662 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1933 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4664 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1934 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4665 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1935 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4666 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1936 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4667 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1937 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4668 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1938 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4670 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1939 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4671 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1940 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4672 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1941 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4673 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1942 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4674 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1943 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4675 of 2025) and Criminal Appeal No. 1944 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4676 of 2025)

Decided on : 15-04-2025

  Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 — Bail — Cancellation of Bail — Factors for Consideration — Child Trafficking — Appeals preferred by victims (kith and kin of trafficked children) assailing High Court orders granting bail to accused involved in a large-scale, organized, interstate child trafficking racket — The offences alleged involve kidnapping, buying, and selling of minor children primarily from impoverished backgrounds, punishable under Ss. 363, 311 & 370(5) IPC — High Court granted bail citing factors such as accused not being named in FIR, disclosure of name by co-accused, non-recovery of victim from the specific accused, grant of bail to similarly situated co-accused, and the principle of ‘bail is rule, jail is exception’ — Such exercise of discretion by the High Court, in cases involving grave offences like organized child trafficking with interstate ramifications, requires deeper scrutiny concerning the serious nature of the crime, modus operandi, societal impact, and potential threat posed by accused if released — The High Court’s approach found to be callous, overlooking critical aspects including the organized nature of the crime and the subsequent absconding of several accused post-bail, thereby jeopardizing the trial.

Tuesday, 15 April 2025

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c) — Specific Performance — Readiness and Willingness — Effect of Accepting Refund

 SANGITA SINHA

Vs.

BHAWANA BHARDWAJ AND OTHERS

( Before : Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 4972 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.28460 of 2024)

Decided on : 04-04-2025

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c) — Specific Performance — Readiness and Willingness — Effect of Accepting Refund — A buyer's continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of an Agreement to Sell, a prerequisite for seeking specific performance, is negated by their conduct of accepting and encashing a substantial portion of the refunded earnest money/advance consideration sent by the seller along with a cancellation notice, especially when such encashment occurs during the pendency of the specific performance suit — Such conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to proceed with the contract.

Education Law — Teacher Qualification — Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) — NIOS 18-Month ODL Programme — Purpose and Scope

 KOUSIK DAS AND OTHERS


Vs.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

( Before : B.R. Gavai and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No….of 2025 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No. 19139 of 2024)

Decided on : 04-04-2025

 Education Law — Teacher Qualification — Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) — NIOS 18-Month ODL Programme — Purpose and Scope — The 18-month Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) programme conducted by the National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS) through Open Distance Learning (ODL) mode, pursuant to the NCTE Recognition Order dated 22.09.2017, was a specific, one-time measure necessitated by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 — This programme was designed exclusively to enable untrained elementary teachers, who were already in service as on 10.08.2017, to acquire the minimum required qualification by the statutory deadline of 31.03.2019, thereby safeguarding their continued employment.

Monday, 14 April 2025

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 61(2) — Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 12 — Appeal to NCLAT — Limitation Period

 A RAJENDRA

Vs.

GONUGUNTA MADHUSUDHAN RAO AND OTHERS

( Before : Abhay S. Oka, Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal Nos.11070 - 11071 of 2024 (@ Diary No. 10029 of 2024)

Decided on : 04-04-2025

 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 61(2) — Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 12 — Appeal to NCLAT — Limitation Period — Commencement and Calculation — The statutory limitation period for filing an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is thirty days, commencing from the date of pronouncement of the order by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) — The NCLAT possesses discretion to condone delay for a further period not exceeding fifteen days, upon satisfaction of sufficient cause — The scheme of Section 61 IBC does not postpone the commencement of limitation until a certified copy is made available, distinguishing it from provisions like Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Service Law — Recruitment — Eligibility Qualification — Interpretation of Rules — West Bengal School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016, Rule 6(2)

 SOUMEN PAUL AND OTHERS

Vs.

SHRABANI NAYEK AND OTHERS

( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No….of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12660 of 2023 with Civil Appeal No….of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (C) No….of 2025 Arising Out of Diary No. 25090 of 2023 with Civil Appeal No…..of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 25324 of 2023

Decided on : 04-04-2025

Rule 6(2) WB Primary Teacher Rules incorporates prevailing NCTE norms, not fixing a qualification acquisition cut-off date.

 Service Law — Recruitment — Eligibility Qualification — Interpretation of Rules — West Bengal School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016, Rule 6(2) — Rule 6(2) of the West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016 (as amended on 22.12.2020), which requires candidates to possess the minimum educational and training qualification prescribed by the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) "prevailing as on date of publication of recruitment notification," primarily functions to incorporate the NCTE qualifications applicable at the time of recruitment — It does not, by its text or intendment, establish a rigid cut-off date by which such qualification must be possessed by the candidate — An interpretation treating the phrase "prevailing as on date" as fixing a cut-off for obtaining the qualification is erroneous, particularly when the recruiting body itself did not espouse such an interpretation.

Under WBPT Act, non-spouse heir tenancy expires after 5 years. Admitting facts proving expiry justifies O.12 R.6 eviction decree. Party cannot approbate/reprobate Act's applicability.

 RAJIV GHOSH

Vs.

SATYA NARYAN JAISWAL

( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. )

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9975 of 2025 (Diary No. 8323 of 2025)

Decided on : 07-04-2025


West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 — Section 2(g) — Inherited Tenancy — Limitation — The definition of "tenant" under S. 2(g) extends tenancy rights to specified heirs (including son/daughter) of a deceased tenant for a maximum period of five years from the date of the tenant's death (or the Act's commencement, whichever is later), provided they were ordinarily living with and dependent on the tenant and meet other conditions — This five-year limitation does not apply to the dependent spouse — After the expiry of this statutory period, such heirs (other than the protected spouse) cease to be tenants under the Act.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 498A & 306 — Cruelty & Abetment of Suicide —

 JAGDISH GOND

Vs.

THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND OTHERS

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No.2605 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 498A & 306 — Cruelty & Abetment of Suicide — Allegations supporting charges under Sections 498A and 306 IPC must be specific and substantiated — Vague complaints about the deceased being lazy or sick, without evidence of physical violence or persistent harassment meeting the threshold of cruelty likely to drive suicide, are insufficient for conviction under these sections.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Insufficient Allegations

 UNION TERRITORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Vs.

BRIJ BHUSHAN

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.12026 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Insufficient Allegations — An FIR registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act and S. 120-B IPC concerning a decades-old land transaction was rightly quashed under S. 482 Cr.P.C. against the Managing Director of the beneficiary cooperative society where the allegations amounted merely to a “bland allegation of connivance” with state officials, without specifying his role in the alleged criminal conspiracy or corruption, and where no personal benefit was alleged to have accrued to him.

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — False Promise of Marriage

 JASPAL SINGH KAURAL

Vs.

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANOTHER

( Before : B. V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No…of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4007 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — False Promise of Marriage — For consent to sexual intercourse to be vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising from a promise to marry, the promise must be false ab initio, made without any intention of being adhered to, and must have a direct nexus to the complainant’s decision Where the complainant was aware that the accused was married at the inception of the relationship, and the relationship was prolonged (spanning several years, even after both parties obtained divorces from their respective spouses), the consent given by a mature complainant is deemed reasoned and conscious, negating the element of “misconception of fact” — A subsequent breach of promise does not automatically convert the initial consent into one obtained by deceit under S. 375 IPC.

Sunday, 13 April 2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — Misconception of Fact — Promise to Marry

 BISWAJYOTI CHATTERJEE

Vs.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER

( Before : B. V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No….of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4261 of 2024

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Rape — Consent — Misconception of Fact — Promise to Marry — Consent to sexual intercourse given by a mature individual, fully aware from the outset that the promisor is already married (though separated), cannot be deemed to be vitiated by a “misconception of fact” under Section 375 IPC merely based on a promise to marry after obtaining a divorce — Such knowledge precludes the necessary “misconception” and indicates a reasoned decision to engage in the relationship, especially when the relationship is prolonged and consensual.

 K. GOPI

Vs.

THE SUB-REGISTRAR AND OTHERS

( Before : Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 3954 of 2025

Decided on : 07-04-2025

A. Registration Act, 1908 — Tamil Nadu Registration Rules — Rule 55A(i) — Validity — Ultra Vires — Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules, which empowers a registering officer to refuse registration of a document relating to immovable property unless the presentant produces the previous original title deed of the executant or other specified proof of the executant's right/title, is declared ultra vires the Registration Act, 1908 — The Rule imposes a condition for registration (proof of executant's title) and confers a power (to refuse registration based on lack of title proof) which are inconsistent with the provisions and scheme of the parent Act.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Claim Petitions — Standard of Proof

 KUNCHAM LAVANYA AND OTHERS

Vs.

BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No….. of 2025 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No….of 2025 @ Diary No. 44210 of 2019]

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Claim Petitions — Standard of Proof — In motor accident claim proceedings, the standard of proof required to establish the involvement of a vehicle and negligence is based on the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required in criminal cases.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Pleading and Evidence — Rejoinder — A respondent/complainant cannot introduce new factual evidence, such as a surveyor's report assessing quantum of loss, for the first time in a rejoinder

 UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER

Vs.

M/S. PARK LEATHER INDUSTRIES LTD.

( Before : Sanjay Kumar and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 913 of 2023

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Pleading and Evidence — Rejoinder — A respondent/complainant cannot introduce new factual evidence, such as a surveyor's report assessing quantum of loss, for the first time in a rejoinder and expect the opposing party (appellant/opposite party) to have denied it in their earlier written statement/reply — The adjudicatory body cannot base its findings on the premise that the opposing party failed to deny evidence that was not before it when its pleadings were filed.

Insurance Law — Marine Insurance — Special Condition

 SOHOM SHIPPING PVT. LTD.

Vs.

M/S. THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER

( Before : B. V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 2323 of 2021

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Insurance Law — Marine Insurance — Special Condition — “Voyage should commence & complete before monsoon sets in” — Implied Waiver / Non-Materiality — Where a marine insurance policy covers a voyage (Mumbai to Kolkata) for a specific period (16.05.2013 to 15.06.2013) which overlaps with the officially defined monsoon/foul weather season (commencing 1st May East Coast / 1st June West Coast), a special condition requiring the voyage to both commence and complete before the monsoon sets in is deemed non-material or impliedly waived by the insurer — This is because: (i) the insurer, knowing the voyage details and policy period, knew or ought to have known the voyage would occur during the monsoon; and (ii) strict interpretation leads to absurdity, potentially rendering the insurance cover illusory if a peril prevents timely completion.

Saturday, 12 April 2025

Res Judicata / Constructive Res Judicata — Applicability to SEBI Proceedings — The principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, based on public policy ensuring finality, apply to proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and its Whole-Time Members (WTMs)

 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA

Vs.

RAM KISHORI GUPTA AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 7941 of 2019 with Civil Appeal Nos. 1649-1652 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No..........of 2025 (@ Diary No. 42829 OF 2019)

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Res Judicata / Constructive Res Judicata — Applicability to SEBI Proceedings — The principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, based on public policy ensuring finality, apply to proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and its Whole-Time Members (WTMs) — SEBI cannot pass multiple final orders imposing penalties on the same cause of action against the same parties based on the same show-cause notice, particularly after an earlier order (imposing debarment) has attained finality and been fully acted upon — Reopening the matter years later to impose additional penalties (like disgorgement) without just cause is impermissible.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Pleading and Evidence — Rejoinder — A respondent/complainant cannot introduce new factual evidence, such as a surveyor's report assessing quantum of loss

 UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER

Vs.

M/S. PARK LEATHER INDUSTRIES LTD.

( Before : Sanjay Kumar and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 913 of 2023

Decided on : 07-04-2025

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Pleading and Evidence — Rejoinder — A respondent/complainant cannot introduce new factual evidence, such as a surveyor's report assessing quantum of loss, for the first time in a rejoinder and expect the opposing party (appellant/opposite party) to have denied it in their earlier written statement/reply — The adjudicatory body cannot base its findings on the premise that the opposing party failed to deny evidence that was not before it when its pleadings were filed.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Deductibility — Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006

 NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.

Vs.

SMT. SUNITA SHARMA AND OTHERS

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No........of 2025 [@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.9515 of 2020]

Decided on : 08-04-2025

Financial assistance equivalent to 'pay/allowances' under Haryana Compassionate Assistance Rules must be deducted from MV Act compensation for loss of income to prevent double recovery.

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Deductibility — Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 — Financial assistance received or receivable by dependents of a deceased government employee under the Haryana Rules of 2006, specifically under the head equivalent to ‘pay and other allowances’ last drawn by the deceased, must be deducted/excluded while computing compensation for loss of income/dependency under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — This is to avoid double payment towards the same component of loss.

Contract Act, 1872 — S. 28 — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 20 — Contractual Clauses — Exclusive Jurisdiction — Validity —

 RAKESH KUMAR VERMA

Vs.

HDFC BANK LTD.

( Before : Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 2282 of 2025 with Civil Appeal No. 2286 of 2025

Decided on : 08-04-2025

An exclusive jurisdiction clause in a private employment contract, designating a competent court, is valid and enforceable, ousting jurisdiction of other courts, despite potential unequal bargaining power.

A. Contract Act, 1872 — S. 28 — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 20 — Contractual Clauses — Exclusive Jurisdiction — Validity — Parties to a contract, including an employment contract, are free to agree on conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon a specific court, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of other courts which might otherwise be competent under S. 20, CPC — Such a clause is valid and enforceable provided that: (i) it does not absolutely restrict a party from enforcing rights through usual legal proceedings (thus not violating S.28, Contract Act), (ii) the chosen court possesses inherent jurisdiction under the CPC or relevant statute and (iii) the agreement clearly expresses the intention, explicitly or implicitly (applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius), to exclude the jurisdiction of other competent courts.

Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 — Sections 11 & 165(6)(ii) — Revenue Officers — Collector — Competence of Additional Collector

 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Vs.

DINESH KUMAR AND OTHERS

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No......of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No.10111 of 2024)

Decided on : 08-04-2025

An Additional Collector empowered under the M.P. Land Revenue Code can validly permit tribal land transfer under S.165(6)(ii) (outside notified areas) after due consideration, rendering subsequent suo motu revision setting aside such permission erroneous.

A. Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 — Sections 11 & 165(6)(ii) — Revenue Officers — Collector — Competence of Additional Collector — An Additional Collector is competent and possesses the requisite jurisdiction to grant permission for the transfer of land belonging to a member of an indigenous tribe under Section 165(6)(ii), where Section 11 includes 'Additional Collectors' within the class of 'Collector', and a specific, pre-existing work allocation order issued by the Collector empowers the concerned Additional Collector to exercise the powers of the Collector under the Code.

B. Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 — Section 165(6)(i) & (ii) — Transfer of Land Belonging to Indigenous Tribes — Applicable Provision — Notified Area — The absolute prohibition on transfer under Section 165(6)(i) applies only to lands situated in areas specifically notified by the State Government as predominantly inhabited by indigenous tribes — Where the land in question is admittedly located outside such a notified area, the transfer is governed by Section 165(6)(ii), which permits transfer with the prior written permission of a revenue officer not below the rank of Collector.

Anticipatory Bail — Nature and Scope

 SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE


Vs.

ADITYA SARDA

( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No….of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 13956 of 2023) with Criminal Appeal No……of 2025 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 14033 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 15318 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 15322 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13960 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 15326 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 15333 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 14128 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13965 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13975 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13983 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13976 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13971 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) Nos.13973-13974 of 2023), Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 15311 of 2023) and Criminal Appeal No……of (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13978 of 2023)

Decided on : 09-04-2025

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Nature and Scope — Power to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438 is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases, not as a matter of routine — Its object is to protect individuals from harassment or humiliation, but this must be balanced against the larger societal interest in maintaining law and order and ensuring the proper course of justice. [Paras 18, 21]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Economic Offences — Economic offences constitute a class apart, affecting the economic fabric of society and posing serious threats to the nation's financial health — A stricter approach is warranted, and anticipatory bail should be granted with great caution, considering the nature and gravity of the accusation, deep-rooted conspiracies, potential loss of public funds, and the accused's conduct.

Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 — Sections 7(c), 13(1) & 13(7) — Input Tax Credit (ITC) — Entitlement

 NEHA ENTERPRISES

Vs.

COMMISSIONER, COMMERCIAL TAX, LUCKNOW, UTTAR PRADESH

( Before : Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N Bhatti, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 6553 of 2016

Decided on : 09-04-2025

Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 — Sections 7(c), 13(1) & 13(7) — Input Tax Credit (ITC) — Entitlement — Sales exempt under S. 7(c) — Where a dealer makes sales to manufacturer-exporters against Form-E, which are exempt from tax under S. 7(c) pursuant to notifications (dated 24.02.2010 and 25.03.2010), the dealer is not entitled to claim ITC on the purchase tax paid on such goods — The specific prohibition contained in S. 13(7)(i) explicitly disallows ITC facility in respect of purchases where the sale of such goods by the dealer is exempt under S. 7(c), thereby overriding the general entitlement provision in S. 13(1)

While limitation is generally a mixed question of fact and law, it can be treated as a pure question of law where the suit is filed after an inordinate delay

 Limitation Act, 1963 — Question of Limitation — Nature (Fact/Law/Mixed) — While limitation is generally a mixed question of fact and law, it can be treated as a pure question of law where the suit is filed after an inordinate delay without adequate explanation in the pleadings, or where the facts establishing the bar are evident from the record — In such cases, the court must address it under its S. 3 duty.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 100 & Order 41, Rules 23, 23A and 25 — Remand by High Court in Second Appeal — Justification

 R. NAGARAJ (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ANOTHER


Vs.

RAJMANI AND OTHERS

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 100 & Order 41, Rules 23, 23A and 25 — Remand by High Court in Second Appeal — Justification — Remand in second appeal should only be ordered when specific conditions under Order 41 are met or when absolutely necessary — Remanding a case solely for framing an issue (like limitation) and fresh trial is unwarranted and impermissible, particularly when the High Court possesses sufficient material on record to decide the substantial question of law itself, and where concurrent findings on the issue already exist from the courts below — Such remand unnecessarily prolongs litigation contrary to judicial efficiency.

Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020

 PRABHJOT KAUR

Vs.

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No(s)……of 2025 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17747 of 2023]

Decided on : 09-04-2025

Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020 — Reservation for Women — Horizontal Reservation — Implementation via advertisement — Where an advertisement was issued subsequent to the notification of the 2020 Rules providing 33% horizontal reservation for women, and specified certain posts (like DSP ‘SC Sports’) as reserved for women (‘SC Sports (Women)’), this reservation specification within the advertisement, implementing the mandate of the 2020 Rules, is valid for that recruitment process, unless the advertisement itself is successfully challenged or withdrawn.

Thursday, 10 April 2025

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(r) & (s) — “Public View” Requirement

 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(r) & (s) — “Public View” Requirement — For an offence under Section 3(1)(r) (intentional insult/intimidation) or Section 3(1)(s) (abuse by caste name) of the SC/ST Act, the act must occur “within public view” — Where a key prosecution witness (PW-1, complainant’s husband) explicitly states in evidence that only immediate family members were present during the alleged incident and no other member of the public was present, the essential ingredient of “public view” is not established, and conviction under these clauses cannot be sustained.

HUTU ANSARI @ FUTU ANSAR AND OTHERS

Vs.

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 17 (Second Proviso) & Section 13(1)(b)

 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 17 (Second Proviso) & Section 13(1)(b) — Investigation of Disproportionate Assets — Order of Superintendent of Police — Preliminary Enquiry — The second proviso to Section 17 mandates that an investigation into an offence under Section 13(1)(b) (disproportionate assets) requires an order from a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police (SP) — However, this provision does not explicitly require the SP to conduct a separate preliminary enquiry before issuing such an order — While a preliminary enquiry in corruption cases is desirable (Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1), it is not mandatory.

STATE OF KARNATAKA

Vs.

SRI CHANNAKESHAVA.H.D. AND ANOTHER

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92 — Interpretation of Written Agreements (Deeds)

 Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92 — Interpretation of Written Agreements (Deeds) — Exclusion of Oral Evidence — The terms of a written contract, grant, or disposition of property must primarily be ascertained from the document itself — Oral evidence contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from the terms of such a written instrument is inadmissible between the parties, unless the situation falls within the specific exceptions provided in the Provisos to S. 92 (such as fraud, mistake, illegality, want of execution, separate oral agreement on a silent matter, condition precedent, subsequent modification, usage/custom, or relating language to existing facts) — Evidence to show that there was no agreement at all is admissible, but not evidence to vary the terms of an admitted agreement.

ANNAYA KOCHA SHETTY (DEAD) THROUGH LRS

Vs.

LAXMIBAI NARAYAN SATOSE SINCE DECEASED THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

Service Law — Recruitment — Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Reservation — OBC

 Service Law — Recruitment — Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Reservation — OBC-NCL/MBC-NCL/EWS — Cut-off Date for Eligibility — Certificate Validity — The eligibility of a candidate claiming reservation benefits under categories like Other Backward Classes (Non-Creamy Layer) [OBC-NCL], Most Backward Classes (Non-Creamy Layer) [MBC-NCL], or Economically Weaker Section [EWS], whose status is dynamic and dependent on current socio-economic criteria, must be established as existing on the cut-off date for the recruitment process — In the absence of a specific date mentioned in the recruitment advertisement or rules, the last date for submission of applications (31.08.2021 herein) is the determinative cut-off date — Candidates must possess a category certificate valid as per the applicable rules and government circulars as of this cut-off date to be considered eligible under the reserved category

SAKSHI ARHA

Vs.

THE RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT AND OTHERS

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 149 (pre-amendment 2019

 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 149 (pre-amendment 2019) — Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 — R. 9 — Driving Licence — Endorsement for Hazardous Goods — Breach of Policy Condition — Pay and Recover — The absence of a specific endorsement on the driver's transport vehicle licence, certifying completion of the training course prescribed under Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, for driving a goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous goods, constitutes a fundamental breach of the insurance policy conditions when the driver operates such a vehicle — This breach justifies an order directing the insurer to pay the compensation to third-party claimants and recover the same from the insured owner, particularly where the accident resulted from the driver's rash and negligent driving

M/S. CHATHA SERVICE STATION

Vs.

LALMATI DEVI AND OTHERS

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR/Chargesheet

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR/Chargesheet — Scope of Power — The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly and with caution — The court cannot embark upon an inquiry into the reliability, genuineness, or veracity of the allegations made in the FIR or chargesheet, nor conduct a ‘mini-trial’ — The allegations must be taken at face value to determine if they prima facie constitute an offence and make out a case against the accused.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Deductibilit

 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Deductibility — Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 — Financial assistance received or receivable by dependents of a deceased government employee under the Haryana Rules of 2006, specifically under the head equivalent to ‘pay and other allowances’ last drawn by the deceased, must be deducted/excluded while computing compensation for loss of income/dependency under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — This is to avoid double payment towards the same component of loss.

Only Bombay HC Should Hear Cases Related To New Bombay HC Land : Supreme Court Transfers Cases From Other Courts

 Only Bombay HC Should Hear Cases Related To New Bombay HC Land : Supreme Court Transfers Cases From Other Courts

In the suo moto case involving the issue of additional land allotment for Bombay High Court's new complex, the Supreme Court was informed today that out of an area of 4.09 acres, which was to be handed over by March 31, 1.94 acres has been handed over and the remaining (2.15 acres) shall be transferred by April 30.

A bench of Justices BR Gavai and AG Masih heard the matter and posted it to July, while appreciating the efforts made by the state government towards expediting handing over of the possession of the land for construction of the new building.

Considering that there may be multiple proceedings over the remaining tranche of land, thus protracting transfer of its possession, the bench further directed consolidation of all proceedings related to the subject matter before the Bombay High Court.

"[Dr. Saraf] submits that out of an area of 4.09 acres, the possession of which was to be handed over for the construction of the High Court, an area of 1.94 has already been handed over. He submits that insofar as the remaining area of 2.15 acres is concerned, since there are a large number of slums [...], efforts have been taken by the Slums Rehabilitation Authority...he submits that by April end, the state would be in a position to allot vacant possession of the said land also for the construction of the High Court.

...It is informed that there are 21 [cases] pending before the High Court with respect to the subject matter. We therefore request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to assign all the matters which are already pending with regard to the said issue and which may be filed in future to one and the same bench so that they can be decided expeditiously. we further direct that no other court, except the High Court, shall entertain any other proceedings with regard to any issue pertaining to the [...] construction of the High Court. In the event any such proceedings are pending before any of the Courts or Tribunals, the same are directed to be transferred to the High Court",

 IN RE: HERITAGE BUILDING OF THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT AND ALLOTMENT OF ADDITIONAL LANDS FOR THE HIGH COURT

No Bail For Offence Under S.447 Companies Act 2013 Without Fulfilling Twin Conditions

 No Bail For Offence Under S.447 Companies Act 2013 Without Fulfilling Twin Conditions

The Supreme Court held that bail, including anticipatory bail, cannot be granted for an offence under Section 447 (punishment for fraud) of the Companies Act 2013 unless twin conditions are satisfied.

Section 212(6) (investigation into affairs of Company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office) of the Companies Act states that the offences covered under Section 447 are cognisable in nature and no person can be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions, that are: (1)that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; (2)where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.

The Supreme Court while cancelling their bail, noted that the High Court, in its impugned judgments, failed to note the conduct of the accused persons who refused to cooperate with the authorities.

In these cases, there is a brazen attempt made on the part of the respondents-accused to stall the criminal proceedings initiated against them, in respect of the serious economic offences allegedly committed by them, by not respecting the summons/warrants issued by the Special Court from time to time and thereby causing obstruction in the administration of justice.

Case Details: SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE v. ADITYA SARDA|

Accused Who's Absconding Or Obstructing Warrant Executions Not Entitled To Anticipatory Bail

 The Supreme Court held that an accused person, who is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is absconding from trial proceedings, is not entitled to the privilege of anticipatory bail.

"When after the investigation, a chargesheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case, summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences,"

Accused Who's Absconding Or Obstructing Warrant Executions Not Entitled To Anticipatory Bail

The Supreme Court held that an accused person, who is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is absconding from trial proceedings, is not entitled to the privilege of anticipatory bail.

"When after the investigation, a chargesheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case, summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences,"

The Supreme Court, while cancelling their bail, noted that the Respondents have avoided the execution of non-bailable warrants even after their anticipatory bail applications were rejected latest in 2022. It was only in 2023 that they were granted bail by the High Court. It held that in cases where a warrant of arrest is issued or proclamation proceedings are initiated, the extraordinary power to grant bail cannot be invoked.

In view of this observation, the Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Respondents to surrender within 1 week.

Granting anticipatory bail is certainly not the rule. The respondent accused, who have continuously avoided to follow the due process of law, by avoiding attendance in the Court, by concealing themselves and thereby attempting to derail the proceedings, would not be entitled to the anticipatory bail. If the Rule of Law is to prevail in the society, every person would have to abide by the law, respect the law and follow the due process of law.

A bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and PB Varale, which pronounced the judgment, further noted:

The law aids only the abiding and certainly not its resistants. When after the investigation, a chargesheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case, summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences.

The Court noted that the High Court passed orders utterly disregarding the mandatory conditions of Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, which lays down twin conditions on bail and the conduct of the Respondents. It also noted that in none of the orders passed by the High Court, it bother to look at the orders passed by the Special Court, such as issuing non-bailable warrants and proclamation proceedings etc for securing the presence of the Respondents.

It cannot be gainsaid that the judicial time of every court, even of Magistrate's Court is as precious and valuable as that of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The accused are duty-bound to cooperate with the trial courts in proceeding further with the cases and bound to remain present in the Court as and when required by the Court. Not allowing the Courts to proceed further with the cases by avoiding execution of summons or warrants, disobeying the orders of the Court, and trying to delay the proceedings by hook or crook, would certainly amount to interfering with and causing obstruction in the administration of justice.

In this case, allegations of economic offences were made against the Respondents, Companies of Adarsh Group, and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs directed the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) to investigate them for the various offences under the Companies Act, 1956 and 2013.

Upon investigation, it was found that funds to the tune of Rs.1700 crores were given by the Adarsh Credit Cooperative Society Limited (ACCSL), a Multi-State Credit Cooperative Society, as illegal loans to its own controlled 70 Adarsh Group of Companies (CUIs) and certain other companies belonging to the other groups of persons.

It was found contrary to settled the position that a company could not be a member of a multistate credit cooperative society and therefore loans could not have been given to such companies by the ACCSL. These loads were obtained on the basis of forged financial documents.

Case Details: SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE vs ADITYA SARDA


Supreme Court Lays Down Guidelines For Interpretation Of Deeds & Contracts

 The Supreme Court observed that when the language of a deed is clear and unambiguous, there is no justification for judicial intervention to interpret it differently. It added that applying the literal rule of construction, the words must be given their plain and natural meaning, as they are presumed to convey the true intent of the parties.

“the court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not covey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. In constructing a deed, looking at the surrounding circumstances and subject matter is legitimate only if the words used are doubtful.”, the court observed upon placing reliance on the case of Provash Chandra Dalui and another v. Biswanath Banerjee and another, (1989) Suppl 1 SCC 487.

Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices Pankaj Mithal and SVN Bhatti laid down the guiding tools for the construction of contracts and deeds, which are:

1. The contract is first constructed in its plain, ordinary and literal meaning. This is also known as the literal rule of construction.

2. If there is an absurdity created by literally reading the contract, a shift from literal rule may be allowed. This construction is generally called the golden rule of construction.

3. Lastly, the contract may be purposively constructed in light of its object and context to determine the purpose of the contract. This approach must be used cautiously.

Further, relying on Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court reiterated that when an agreement is reduced to writing, oral evidence cannot be introduced to contradict its terms unless the case falls under specific exceptions such as fraud or mistake mentioned under proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act.

“Unless and until the case falls under one or the other exceptions enabling receipt of oral evidence on a written document, the court is precluded from entertaining oral evidence. The document or deed interpreted in a particular case is not relied upon, but the subject deed is construed on well-established principles. The law recognises both ownership and possession of an owner of a property. A lease recognises the outcome of a rightful separation of ownership and possession between lessor and lessee. Section 108 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with the rights of the lessor and lessee. Under the said section, one of the conditions is that the lessor is bound by lessee's request to put lessee in possession of the property.”, the court observed.

“In the case on hand, admittedly, defendant no. 1 is in possession of the property from defendant no. 2. Whereas the Agreement of Conducting business does not deal with the possession so enjoyed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The absence of such a crucial clause in the agreement dated 16.08.1967 is a vital circumstance in construing the subject matter of 18 the said agreement. This is an added circumstance to hold that what has been entrusted is to run the business in the plaint schedule but not occupying the plaint schedule under leave and licence. In the case on hand, the terms of the agreement dated 16.08.1967 are clear that the entrustment to the plaintiff is the ownership of the hotel business of the first defendant and not the tenancy right of the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff.”, the court added.

Thus, the Court held that the 'conducting agreement' was not a leave and license agreement but an agreement for operating a hotel.

ANNAYA KOCHA SHETTY (DEAD) THROUGH LRS VERSUS LAXMIBAI NARAYAN SATOSE SINCE DECEASED THROUGH LRS & OTHERS

Sunday, 6 April 2025

Supreme Court Rejects UCO Bank's Plea That Employee Dismissed For Misconduct Wasn't Entitled To Pension Despite 10 Yrs Service

 Supreme Court Rejects UCO Bank's Plea That Employee Dismissed For Misconduct Wasn't Entitled To Pension Despite 10 Yrs Service

The Supreme Court rejected UCO Bank's plea that a bank employee who has completed over ten years of service was not entitled to superannuation benefits when he was dismissed on grounds of misconduct.

The bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan upheld the Punjab & Haryana High Court's decision directing the Appellant-UCO Bank to grant pensionary benefits to the Respondent-employee removed from service for misconduct after completing 10 plus years in the service.

The Case

In 1998, the Respondent was charged with assaulting a bank officer and was dismissed following an inquiry in 1999. In 2000, the appellate authority modified the penalty to removal with terminal benefits, a decision that went unchallenged by the Appellant-Bank and attained finality.

In 2004, the Labour Court reduced the penalty to stoppage of increments and ordered reinstatement with 75% back wages. However, in 2009, the High Court set aside the Labour Court's award, reinstating the removal with terminal benefits.

Subsequently, in 2010, the Respondent opted for a pension under the Bipartite Settlement. The High Court later directed the bank to grant pension benefits, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool, (2014) 2 SCC 715.

In SK Kool's judgment, the Court held that if the bank employee has completed the minimum pensionable years of service (10+ years), he would be entitled to the pensionary benefits even if dismissed on account of misconduct.

Answering in negative, the judgment authored by Justice Bhuyan relying on the case of S.K. Kool, harmonized both the provisions and observed that Regulation 22 cannot override the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court rejected the Appellant's argument regarding the non-application of the SK Kool's judgment in the present case. The Appellant argued that in SK Kool's judgment applies only where the employee opted for pension before removal.

“the decision in S.K. Kool (supra) was rendered in a different factual context. The employee in the said case had opted for pension before the penalty of removal from service was imposed on him. In the present case, respondent never opted for pension. Therefore, S.K. Kool (supra) is clearly distinguishable in so far facts and circumstances of the present case is concerned.”, the court observed

“Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had followed the aforesaid decision of this Court. Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had submitted his option for pension on 05.10.2010. Learned Single Judge also held that objection of the appellant to the claim of pension by the respondent was without any basis in as much as the appellate authority had specifically held that respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered. This order of the appellate authority has attained finality. Therefore, it was held that respondent was entitled to receive pension in view of the order passed by the appellate authority. This view of the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool (supra) is binding on us. Therefore, we do not find any compelling reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”, the court observed.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Case Title: UCO BANK & ANR. VERSUS VIJAY KUMAR HANDA

Even As We Near 80 Yrs Of Independence, Not Enough Public Jobs Generated For Eligible Candidates

 


Even As We Near 80 Yrs Of Independence, Not Enough Public Jobs Generated For Eligible Candidates

The Supreme Court recently highlighted the scarcity of government jobs and the hardships faced by deserving candidates unable to secure employment due to limited opportunities.

“Even as we near 80 (eighty) years of independence, generating enough jobs in the public sector to absorb those eager to enter public service remains an elusive goal. While there is no dearth of eligible candidates in the country waiting in the queue, the quest for public employment is thwarted by a lack of sufficient employment opportunities.”,

“The respondent no.7 was seeking relief from the High Court relying on the offending proviso. In a case where the party aggrieved seeks enforcement of a provision of a rule, which is seemingly unconstitutional, would he raise the plea of its unconstitutionality? It would be imprudent for him to do so and hence, the answer cannot but be in the negative. While considering the plea of the respondent no.7, the Division Bench found the offending proviso to be so obtrusively unconstitutional that notwithstanding absence of a specific challenge thereto, it proceeded to declare the same as void. Although the Division Bench had no occasion to refer to the decisions that we have referred to above, nothing much turns on it. The Division Bench must be presumed to be aware of the law on the subject that appointment cannot be claimed as a hereditary right and, thus, without even a challenge being laid to the offending proviso thought of striking it down. We do not see any illegality in such an approach.”,

“We are minded and do hold that, a writ court, when it finds its conscience to be pricked in a rare and very exceptional case by the patent unconstitutionality of a subordinate legislation connected with the issue it is seized of, may, upon grant of full opportunity to the State to defend the subordinate legislation and after hearing it, grant a declaration as to unconstitutionality and/or invalidity of such legislation. After all, as the sentinel on the qui vive, it is not only the duty of the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of others by the three organs of the State. This power is a plenary power resident in all the Constitutional Courts. Should, in a given case, it be found that there has been an egregious violation of a Fundamental Right as a result of operation of a subordinate legislation and the issue is concluded by a binding decision of this Court, we consider it the duty of the writ courts to deliver justice by declaring the subordinate legislation void to safeguard rights of others who might not still have been affected thereby. We reiterate, it can only be done rarely and in cases which stand out from the ordinary.”,

IBC | Difference Between 'Avoidance Transactions' & 'Fraudulent Or Wrongful Trading'

 IBC | Difference Between 'Avoidance Transactions' & 'Fraudulent Or Wrongful Trading'

The Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd v. 63 Moons Technology explained the key difference between how the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 deals with avoidance transactions and transactions relating to fraudulent or wrongful trading.

Notably, under the IBC 2016, 'avoidance transactions' are specific transactions conducted by a corporate debtor prior to insolvency proceedings that are deemed detrimental to the interests of creditors. These include (1) Preferential transactions, (2) Undervalued transactions, (3) Extortionate Credit transactions; (4) Fraudulent transactions.

 

The bench of Justice Bela Trivedi and Justice SC Sharma noted that there was a fundamental distinction between Avoidance Applications under Chapter III and the Applications in respect of Fraudulent Trading or Wrongful Trading under Chapter VI.

Firstly, the ambit of avoidance applications comes under the duties of the resolution professional (RP)  .The RP can file an application for avoidance of transactions in accordance with Chapter III as part of his/her larger duty to 'preserve and protect the assets of the corporate debtor, including the continued business operations'.

Under S.26 of the IBC, filling of an Avoidance Application under Clause (j) of sub section (2) of Section 25 by the RP will not affect the insolvency proceedings.

Secondly, the aspect of 'Fraudulent trading or wrongful trading' within the corporate debtor entity has been separately dealt with under S. 66 under Chapter 4.

As per S.66(1) the Adjudicating Authority can order individuals who knowingly engaged in fraudulent business activities during the CIRP or Liquidation process to contribute to the assets of the Corporate Debtor (CD), based on an application from the Resolution Professional.

 PIRAMAL CAPITAL AND HOUSING FINANCE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEWAN HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED) v. 63 MOONS TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED & OTHERS |

Wife Can Be Affected By Defamation Of Husband; Apart From Individual Reputations, Spouses Share Common Family Reputation

 Wife Can Be Affected By Defamation Of Husband; Apart From Individual Reputations, Spouses Share Common Family Reputation

In a civil matter, the Supreme Court recently observed orally that while a husband and wife have individual reputations, there is also something called "family reputation" and a wife is likely to be affected by anything that tends to lower her husband's reputation.

A bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh was dealing with an appeal filed by Spunklane Media Private Limited(which owns the news portal 'The News Minute) against an order of the Karnataka High Court. It involved an issue as to whether a wife, by way of subsequent impleadment of her husband (as co-plaintiff), can acquire better title in a suit to restrain media houses from publishing about a case against the husband.

The Court did not interfere with the High Court's order which affirmed the Trial Court's decision allowing the wife to join as a party in her husband's suit against the news portal.

Disposing of the appeal, Justice Kant said,

"A woman, a man...two persons...individually can suffer in terms of reputation. But definitely, [if] they are living together as husband and wife, and if they are a family, when you attack one, definitely, that attack impairs the psychology, the emotions and the social reputation of other family members. And most importantly, the wife will suffer because of husband. Husband will suffer because of wife...This was one of your arguments before the High Court...It would be a very dangerous proposition that living under the same roof, husband has a separate reputation, wife has a separate reputation...they may have separate [reputation] also, but they have a common, integral and integrated reputation also that's known as family reputation, a couple's reputation, a husband-wife's reputation."

SPUNKLANE MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED Versus NIVEDITA SINGH AND ORS., 

'No Religion Permits Such Brutal Tree Felling, Pay Compensation From Festival Offerings'

 'No Religion Permits Such Brutal Tree Felling, Pay Compensation From Festival Offerings'

The Supreme Court on Friday (April 4) pulled up the temple committee of the Thiru Keralapuram Sreekrishnaswamy Temple, located in Peroor Village, Kerala, over three cutting of three Wild Jack Trees, each having a diameter of about 1.5 to 2 meters, on the temple premises.

A bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was dealing with an interlocutory application in a property dispute regarding the temple.

According to a report submitted by the District Collector of Kottayam, the trees were cut at the instance of the temple's Administrative Committee.

During the hearing, Justice Oka remarked, “No religion permits felling of trees in such a brutal manner.”

Justice Oka asked the counsel for the temple committee, “How much compensation per tree will you pay to the forest department and how many trees will you plant?”

In response, the counsel submitted that the tree-cutting was done by the previous committee and informed the Court that the present committee had already planted 100 trees after the Court's earlier status quo order. He further submitted that the committee was ready to plant 100 more trees.

The Court asked the temple committee to specify in an affidavit how many trees it had planted and to indicate the compensation amount it was willing to pay for the trees that were cut.

When the counsel for the temple committee submitted that it was a very small and poor temple and that the people did not have money, particularly because the yearly festival was happening, the Court said that the offerings collected from devotees during the festival could be directed towards compensating the forest department.

Justice Oka said, “In this festival people will be offering something to the god, right? So whatever is offered at this festival can go to the forest department. As simple as that. Give an undertaking saying normally how much amount is received by way of the offerings during the festival. That amount you will pay to the forest department by way of compensation. That will solve the problem. Somebody must plant trees and somebody must pay compensation, and somebody must take responsibility.”

Excess Payments To Employee Can't Be Recovered When There Was No Fraud Or Misrepresentation

 Excess Payments To Employee Can't Be Recovered When There Was No Fraud Or Misrepresentation

The Supreme Court has reiterated that excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable.

A bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra was deciding the appeals filed by persons, who were working as Stenographers and Personal Assistants in the Orissa District Judiciary, against the recoveries of excess payments. Amounts in the range of Rs.20,000 to 40,000 were sought to be recovered from the appellants. The recoveries were ordered nearly three years after their retirement and six years after the payment

"This Court has consistently taken the view that if the excess amount was not paid on account of any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the employee or if such excess payment was made by the employer by applying a wrong principle for calculating the pay/allowance or on the basis of a particular interpretation of rule/order, which is subsequently found to be erroneous, such excess payments of emoluments or allowances are not recoverable. It is held that such relief against the recovery is not because of any right of the employee but in equity, exercising judicial discretion to provide relief to the employee from the hardship that will be caused if the recovery is ordered."

In Thomas Daniel, the Court had held that recoveries would be impermissible in following situations :

(i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service).

(ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

(iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

(v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.

Here, the Court noted that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners in obtaining the excess payment. Also, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them before ordering the recoveries.

"The appellants having superannuated on a ministerial post of Stenographer were admittedly not holding any gazetted post as such applying the principle enunciated by this Court in the above quoted judgment, the recovery is found unsustainable," the Court observed while allowing their appeals.

Case : Jogeswar Sahoo and others vs The District Judge Cuttack and others

**Specific Performance Suit Not Maintainable For Cancelled Sale Agreement Without Seeking Declaration Against Cancellation **

 The Supreme Court held that a suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell, filed after its cancellation, is not maintainable unless it includes a prayer for declaratory relief (under Section 34 Specific Relief Act) challenging the validity of the cancellation.

The Court reasoned that declaratory relief challenging the validity of the cancellation was essential when seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell, as the suit could not be sustained without a valid and subsisting agreement.

“this Court is of the opinion that absent a prayer for declaratory relief that termination/cancellation of the agreement is bad in law, a suit for specific performance is not maintainable.”,

“This Court further finds that the seller had admittedly issued a letter dated 7th February 2008 cancelling the Agreement to Sell dated 25th January 2008, prior to the filing of the subject suit on 5th May 2008. Even though the demand drafts enclosed with the letter dated 07th February, 2008 were subsequently encashed in July, 2008 (After Suit's institution), yet this Court is of the view that it was incumbent upon the Respondent No.1-buyer to seek a declaratory relief that the said cancellation is bad in law and not binding on parties for the reason that existence of a valid agreement is sine qua non for the grant of relief of specific performance.”, the court observed.

Reference was drawn to the case of I.S. Sikandar (Dead) By LRs. v. K. Subramani and Others, (2013) 15 SCC 27, where it was held that in the absence of a prayer for declaratory relief that the termination of the agreement is bad in law, the suit for specific performance of that agreement is not maintainable.

“Since in the present case, the seller had issued a letter dated 07th February, 2008 cancelling the agreement to sell prior to the institution of the suit, the same constitutes a jurisdictional fact as till the said cancellation is set aside, the respondent is not entitled to the relief of specific performance.”, the court observed.

Since the trial court in this case didn't consider the issue of the maintainability of the suit, the Court referring to the recent case of R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr. said that it would not trim away the powers of the Appellate Courts/High Court to examine whether the jurisdictional fact did exist for grant of relief as claimed, provided no new facts were required to be pleaded and no new evidence led.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court allowed the appeal holding that the Court below had erred in decreeing the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell despite non-existence of the agreement to sell.

Case Title: SANGITA SINHA VERSUS BHAWANA BHARDWAJ AND ORS.

Saturday, 5 April 2025

S. 34(3) Arbitration Act | Application Filed On Next Working Day After 90 Day Period Is Within Limitation

 Affirming the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha rejected the Appellant's argument of interpreting three months under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act as 90 days, instead, it said that the period should be construed as 3 calendar months.

“At this stage, it is necessary to reiterate that the statutory language of Section 34(3) clearly stipulates the limitation period as “three months”, as opposed to the condonable period as “thirty days”. This difference in language unambiguously demonstrates the legislative intent that the limitation period is 3 calendar months as opposed to 90 days. Therefore, we reject the argument taken by the appellant in its written submissions that 3 months must be read as 90 days in the context of Section 34(3).”, the court said.

“In the present case, the respondent received a signed copy of the award on 09.04.2022. Since Section 12(1) applies, this date must be excluded and the 3-month limitation period must be reckoned from 10.04.2022. This expires on 09.07.2022, which happened to be a second Saturday when the court was not working. Hence, the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act will inure to the benefit of the respondent.”, the Court observed.

“Therefore, the respondent's application under Section 34, which was filed on 11.07.2022, i.e., the next working day of the court, must be considered as being filed within the limitation period. Consequently, there was no delay in filing the application and sufficient cause need not be shown for condonation of delay. The High Court therefore rightly allowed the Section 37 appeal and held that the respondent's Section 34 application was filed within the limitation period.”, the court added.

In this context, the Court referred to State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd. where it upheld the application of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, allowing a party to file an application to set aside an arbitral award on the next working day if the initial three-month period expires on a court holiday.

In terms of the aforesaid, the Court dismissed the appeal.

Case Title: M/S R. K. TRANSPORT COMPANY VERSUS M/S BHARAT ALUMINUM COMPANY LTD. (BALCO)

Supreme Court Directs CEC To Probe Violations Of Forest & Wildlife Laws In Tamil Nadu's Agasthyamalai Landscape


Concerned over encroachments and depleting forest cover in Tamil Nadu's Agasthyamalai landscape, the Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to survey the area and report violations of laws like the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

"Needless to say, that the forests form the lungs of the ecosystem, and any depletion/destruction of forest areas has a direct impact on the entire environment. The world at large is facing the calamities caused by the climate change, and the primary culprit behind this is the depleting forest cover owing to a myriad of issues including rapid urbanization, unchecked industrialization, encroachments, etc.", the Court observed while directing a survey of encroachment on forest land.

"India has a forest cover of about 7,15,343 sq. km as per 'India State of Forest Report 2023', which is about 21.76% (approx.) of the total landmass of the country. Nepal has 44.74% (approx.), Bhutan has 72% (approx.), and Sri Lanka has 29% (approx.) forest cover. Hence, clearly the forest cover in India is not adequate and needs to be enhanced. A recent report, submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, in proceedings before the National Green Tribunal indicates that almost 13000 sq. kms. area of forests is under encroachment. This Court has time and again taken up this issue and passed mandatory directions to remove the encroachments from the forest areas and to curb any attempt to reduce the forest cover in the country.",

“In view of the submissions noted above and as an interim measure, to initiate the process of restoration of the pristine forest areas and to protect the tiger habitats/wildlife reserves/sanctuaries falling under the Agasthyamalai landscape, we hereby direct the CEC to conduct an extensive survey of the entire Agasthyamalai landscape, which would include Periyar Tiger Reserve, Srivilliputhur Grizzled Squirrel Wildlife Sanctuary, Meghamalai and Thirunelveli Wildlife Sanctuaries. The CEC shall indicate in its report all instances of non-forestry activities going on in these areas contrary to the statutory provisions viz, the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, etc.”,

“The CEC shall also recommend measures for restoration of (a) the reserved forests, (b) the tiger habitats, and (c) elephant corridors and (d) other wildlife reserves (sanctuaries) in and around the Agsthyamalai landscape, including the abovementioned sanctuaries/reserves. For this purpose, the CEC may employ all scientific procedures including Remote Sensing Satellite Imagery, Geo Mapping, etc., so that the process of survey can be expedited.”,

A. JOHN KENNEDY ETC. VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS ETC.

Teacher In-Service As On Aug 10, 2017 With 18-Month D.El.Ed. From NIOS Before Apr 1, 2019 'At Par' With 2-Yr Diploma Holder


Dealing with the issue of eligibility for teacher recruitment process in West Bengal, the Supreme Court today held that any teacher who was in-service as on 10.08.2017 and who acquired the Diploma In Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) qualification through National Institute of Open Schooling's (NIOS) 18-months programme prior to 01.04.2019 is a valid diploma holder and at par with a teacher who completed the 2 years D. El. Ed. programme.

"such of the teachers who were in employment as on 10th August 2017 and who completed the 18 months D. El. Ed. (ODL) programme through NIOS before 1st April 2019 shall be considered as valid diploma holders for the purpose of applying in other institutions and/or for promotional avenues",

"Having availed of the one-time scheme, such of the teachers even though they only undertook the 18 months D. El. Ed. programme through NIOS they should be considered at par with a 2 years D. El. Ed., if they completed their 18 months programme through NIOS prior to 1st April 2019."

The bench of Justices Gavai and Masih made reference to another order passed by the Court, dated 10.12.2024, which disposed of certain review petitions and miscellaneous applications filed in connection with Jaiveer Singh. This order clarified that teachers who acquired the 18 months D. El. Ed. through NIOS and who were in employment as on 10.08.2017 would be treated as a valid diploma holder for the purpose of applying in other institutions or for promotional avenues. It further mentioned that the clarification would be effective from the date of pronouncement of the judgment in Jaiveer Singh (ie 28.11.2023).

With regard to the decision of the Single Bench of the High Court (which was upheld by the Division Bench), it was opined that though reliance was placed on Jaiveer Singh, the bench came to the wrong conclusion inasmuch as it put a blanket ban on all teachers holding an 18 months D. El. Ed. through NIOS.

"the judgment of this Court in the case of Jaiveer Singh unequivocally held that the entire scheme emanating from the NCTE Recognition Order dated 22nd September 2017 was for the purpose of providing a window to the in-service teachers inasmuch as unless they would have acquired requisite qualifications prior to 1st April 2019, they would not have continued to remain in service and would have faced dismissal from service."

In closing, the appeal was allowed and the impugned decisions of the High Court set aside. The respondent-authorities were directed to consider candidature of such appellants who were in-service as on 10.08.2017. On verification, those who are found to satisfy the eligibility criteria, shall be appointed within a period of 3 months, the Court further said.

KOUSIK DAS & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS., SLP(C) No. 19139 of 2024