S.156(3) CrPC v S.175(3) BNSS | BNSS Mandates Magistrate To Hear Police Officer On Refusal To Register FIR, Ensures Reasoned Order: Supreme Court

 

The Supreme Court recently criticized the routine use of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order police investigations, even in simple cases where the court could proceed directly to trial, stressing that magistrates should act judicially, not mechanically as a mere post office.

 

The Court also highlighted the changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in Section 175 (corresponding to Section 156 of the Cr.P.C.), noting that Section 174(4) of BNSS is a new addition providing additional safeguards for public servants before an FIR can be registered against them. These safeguards include requiring a report from their superior officer detailing the facts and circumstances of the incident and considering the accused public servant's account of the situation that led to the alleged incident.

OM PRAKASH AMBADKAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

'Shocking' : Supreme Court Slams J&K Admin For 16 Years' Refusal To Comply With HC Order On Regularisation Of Daily Wager

The Supreme Court of India made a scathing observation regarding the 16-year long delay by the UT of J&K in complying with the High Court's order, which directed the government to consider the case of the respondent daily wagers for regularization as per specific Government Order SRO 64 of 1994.

IN 2007, J&K High Court had passed the directions to appellants to consider the case of the respondent at par with other daily wage workers, who had received the benefits of regularization under SRO 64 of 1994 back in 2006.

A bench comprising Justice Surya Kant and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh observed that, “What concerns us is not the delay of decades alone, but also the incontrovertible fact that the poor respondents, being daily wage workers, have been repeatedly harassed by the petitioners by passing cryptic orders, thereby overlooking the true import and spirit of the order of the learned Single Judge.”

The court further stated, “We consider the instant case fit for imposing exemplary costs on the delinquent officers, besides also recommending strong disciplinary actions against them.”

Supreme Court Discharges Employers In Culpable Homicide Case Over Electrocution Death Of Workers Engaged For Decoration

The Supreme Court recently discharged two persons accused of not providing safety equipment (e.g., helmets, safety belts, rubber shoes) to their employees, leading to their deaths due to electrocution while working on a signboard by using an iron ladder.

An FIR was registered against the Appellants under Sections 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and 304A (causing death by negligence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Trial Court and High Court rejected the appellants' (employers) discharge application, holding that there was sufficient material to proceed with the trial under Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

The Court held that the appellants lacked requisite knowledge or intention to cause death.

“the two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death. It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A IPC.”,

Supreme Court Exempts Wife From Paying Stamp Duty For Flat Acquired As Part Of Compromise In Divorce Case

 Supreme Court Exempts Wife From Paying Stamp Duty For Flat Acquired As Part Of Compromise In Divorce Case

The Supreme Court recently exempted a wife, who received a flat as part of a compromise with her husband in a matrimonial dispute, from the payment of stamp duty under the Registration Act, 1908 (“Act”).

During the mediation proceedings, a dispute arose between the parties regarding their respective rights over a flat in Bombay, as both claimed to have contributed to its purchase. Consequently, a settlement was reached wherein the petitioner-husband agreed to relinquish his rights over the flat in favor of the respondent-wife, who, in return, agreed to forgo any claim for alimony.

Now, the question that appeared for the Court's consideration was whether the exclusive title of the flat in question can be transferred in the name of the respondent-wife without requiring her to pay the stamp duty.

Answering affirmatively, the Court, relying on the recent case of Mukesh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2024) said that since the flat was the subject matter of the compromise and formed part of the proceedings before the Court, the transfer would be exempt from stamp duty under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act.

“Manifestly, the flat-in-question is the subject matter of the compromise and as a consequence, it forms part of the proceedings before this Court. Hence, the exclusion provided by Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 will apply and the registration of the flat-in-question in the exclusive name of the respondent-wife would be exempted from the payment of stamp duty.”,

ARUN RAMESHCHAND ARYA VERSUS PARUL SINGH

'Agreement To Lease Didn't Create Leasehold Rights Without Execution'

 

While interpreting the clauses in an agreement to lease entered into between the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and a party, the Supreme Court noted that the agreement to lease did not create leasehold rights unless the lease deed was executed and registered.

The bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was deciding Delhi Development Authority's (DDA) appeal against the High Court's ruling, which had affirmed the auction sale of the suit property.

“Thus, the scenario which emerges is that the first respondent(SGG Towers) is not entitled to either ownership or leasehold rights in respect of the said plot. The first respondent cannot claim to be a lessee as the lease in terms of the lease agreement was never executed.”, the court observed.

The auction sale to the first respondent was conducted on an as it is basis, meaning the purchaser acquired only whatever rights M/s Mehta Constructions had (which were none).

The Court clarified that since the agreement to lease (which was never executed) in favor of M/s Mehta Constructions was on an "as it is basis”, the subsequent transferee, i.e., the first respondent (S.G.G. Towers), could only acquire the rights that M/s Mehta Constructions held.

"The first respondent will get only those rights which M/s Mehta Constructions had under the lease agreement, provided the rights can be claimed at this stage. In fact, in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court had observed that the auction would not amount to sale of the said plot. The impugned judgment leaves the remedy of the appellant open to proceed against the concerned parties. These findings have been accepted by the first respondent."

With these observations, the Court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the first respondent, S.G.G. Towers, had no rights over the plot. It further held that the DDA is free to pursue remedies for possession recovery and unearned income against the first respondent. Additionally, the Court stated that if S.G.G. Towers seeks to regularize the transaction, it may apply to the DDA for approval, subject to the payment of unearned income.

“Thus, the scenario which emerges is that the first respondent is not entitled to either ownership or leasehold rights in respect of the said plot. The first respondent cannot claim to be a lessee as the lease in terms of the lease agreement was never executed. At the same time, if according to the case of the appellant, M/s Mehta Constructions had committed breach of the lease agreement, notwithstanding the impugned orders, it will be always open for the appellant to adopt appropriate remedy for recovery of possession and/or recovery of unearned income against the first respondent.”, the court held.

Case Title: Delhi Development Authority Versus S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd. & Ors.

NCDRC Asks Surgeon & Hospital To Pay Rs 75 Lakh Compensation To Patient Who Lost Leg Due To Medical Negligence

 

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission recently directed a surgeon and a hospital to jointly and severally pay a compensation of Rs 75 lakhs to a patient who lost her right leg due to negligence in surgery.

The complaint was filed against Dr. Anirban Chatterjee and Nightingale Diagnostic & Medicare Centre Private Limited, Kolkata.

The surgery was carried out in the year 2015, when the patient was aged 17 years old. The procedure was conducted after the patient developed a lump in the right gluteal region. In 2015, a procedure known as vascular embolization was performed on the patient. However, during the surgery some amount of glue slipped into the main artery of the right leg. This subsequently led to the stoppage of blood circulation in the right leg of the patient and development of gangrene. Ultimately, the patient was shifted to Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi. Since the condition of the leg worsened, it had to be amputated to prevent further complications. She was subsequently certified to have 90% permanent disability.

In 2017, the patient, along with her father, filed the consumer complaint seeking a compensation of over Rs. 20 crores from the hospital and the doctor.

The Commission, after examining the evidence on record, found that negligence resulted in the slippage of N-Butyl Cyanoacrylate Glue entering into the artery of her right leg leading to stoppage of blood flow and amputation of her right leg. The Commission found that no informed consent was taken from the patient regarding the inherent risks in the surgical procedure. Since the patient had an Arterio-Venous Malformation (AVM), the doctor had the duty to specifically inform her about the inherent risks, rather than take a general consent in the stereotype format.

Jaita Mitra Basu and another v. Dr.Anirben Chatterjee and another | CC NO. 2644 OF 2017

When Selection Is Based Entirely On Interview Marks, It's Reasonable To Presume Existence Of Arbitrariness & Favouritism

 

The Court opined that it was desirable to have a selection process based on a written exam and rules.

The Supreme Court recently upheld the 2016 decision of the then BJP government of Assam to cancel a select list for the recruitment process of 104 Constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) notified in 2014 by the then Indian National Congress government.

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan found that the cancellation was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate, given the anomalies in the recruitment process identified by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, including skewed district representation and reservation policy violations.

The Court further highlighted that the recruitment was based on interviews without any written exam and was not governed by any Rules.

“Last but not the least, having regard to present times when corruption has been held to be a walk of life by certain responsible citizens of the country, it would have been desirable if the process of recruitment of 104 Constables were conducted after framing of recruitment rules and also prescribing a written examination to keep the process absolutely above board”, the Court observed.

The Court observed –

“the Government itself felt that the selection being entirely based on interview, the same admitted an element of arbitrariness and that the assessment of candidates being based merely on the basis of marks at the interview, was reasonable for drawing a presumption of being misused for favouritism and could well be regarded as suffering from the vice of arbitrariness. In such circumstances, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, for a court to law to substitute its decision for the one taken by the Government reasoning that the selection has not been challenged by any unsuccessful candidate.”

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

Motor Accident Claims | 'Legal Representative' Is One Who Suffers Loss; Need Not Be Spouse, Child Or Parent Of Deceased

 

The Supreme Court recently ruled that the term 'legal representative' under the Motor Vehicle Act should not be given a narrow interpretation to exclude those persons as claimants who were dependent on the deceased's income

The Court said that if the claimants were dependent on the deceased's income, then they shall be granted compensation. A "legal representative" is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child, the Court held, referring to precedents.

The bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra heard the case where the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (“MACT”), while awarding compensation, didn't consider the 24-year-old deceased-Appellants' (Father and Sister) as dependents of the deceased. The MACT held that the father was not dependent on the income of the deceased and since the father was alive, the younger sister cannot also be held as a dependent of the deceased.

The High Court upheld this part of the MACT's ruling, leading the Appellants to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Setting aside the impugned decision, the Court observed that the Court below had erred in refusing to consider the Appellants as dependents of the deceased.

Citing Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (1987) 3 SCC 234 and N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd. (2022) 14 SCC 712, the Court noted that proving loss of dependency alone is sufficient to claim compensation. It clarified that compensation is not limited to spouses, parents, or children but extends to all individuals affected by the deceased's death.

"In our view, the term “legal representative” should be given a wider interpretation for the purpose of Chapter XII of the MV Act and it should not be confined only to mean the spouse, parents and children of the deceased..We are also of the view that in order to maintain a claim petition, it is sufficient for the claimant to establish his loss of dependency. Section 166 of the MV Act makes it clear that every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation.",

“In our view, in furtherance of the above exposition of law, the appellant Nos.4 and 5 being the father and younger sister of the deceased, both not financially independent, would fall under the definition of legal representatives for the purpose of claiming the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and they were considered as dependents upon the income of the deceased, as he was doing wholesale business of selling fruits to meet the day-to-day expenses of the family.”

Thus, the Court considered the Appellants were dependents and awarded them compensation.

Case Title: SADHANA TOMAR & ORS. VERSUS ASHOK KUSHWAHA & ORS.

Prevention Of Corruption Act | 'Demand & Acceptance Of Bribe Not Proved In Trap Case'

 

The Supreme Court recently acquitted two government employees accused of demanding and accepting bribe after noting that the prosecution failed to prove the factum of demand and acceptance of bribe.

The Court reiterated that a presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”) would not arise against the accused unless the factum of demand and acceptance of bribe is established by the prosecution.

Further, the Court stressed the importance of the independent witnesses' testimony in trap cases to ensure the credibility of the evidence i.e., if independent witnesses turn hostile or contradict the prosecution's case, it raises reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt.

The Court found this discrepancy fatal to the prosecution's case.

“PW 8 who led the trap team merely spoke of a recovery of the bribe amounts from the possession of the accused and the hands and trousers of the accused having positively reacted to the test solution. The said deposition is contrary to the statements made by the independent witnesses that some notes were found thrown on the floor. None of the officers spoke of any of the accused having taken out the notes and thrown it on the floor.”, the court observed.

"On an examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the trap team of the ACB. In that circumstance there is no question of a presumption under Section 20 arising in this case. The conviction and sentence of the accused as brought out by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court, hence, is set aside.”, the court added.

MADAN LAL VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Sale Under Power Of Attorney Unaffected By Subsequent Cancellation Of PoA

 The Supreme Court has observed that sale transactions carried out on the basis of a valid Power of Attorney (PoA) cannot be sought to be set aside later on the ground that the PoA was cancelled subsequently.

Holding so, the Court affirmed an order of the Trial Court rejecting a plaint, which sought to annul certain past sale transactions on the basis of the subsequent cancellation of the PoA.

The PoA was executed by the plaintiff in the name of the first respondent on 15.10.2004. In 2018, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking to annul certain sale transactions carried out between 2004-2006 and in 2009. The plaintiff claimed that he got knowledge about the sale transactions only on 21.09.2015 and the suit was filed within the three-year limitation period from such date. The power of attorney was cancelled on 22.09.2015.

"We are clear in our minds that the cancellation does not affect the prior conveyances made which are clearly on the strength of the power conferred on the appellant. There is no contention raised as to the power of attorney having not conferred the power to enter into conveyances or that such power of attorney was executed by reason of a fraud or coercion employed on the executant. The power holder having exercised the authority conferred; to convey the properties in the name of the purchasers, the cancellation of the power of attorney will have no effect on the conveyances carried out under the valid power conferred. Nor would it confer the person who executed the power of attorney any cause of action, by virtue of a cancellation of the power conferred by a subsequent document, to challenge the valid exercise of the power when it existed."

V Ravikumar v S Kumar