Penal Code, 1860 — Section 499, Exception 9 & Section 500 — Defamation — Imputation in Good Faith for Protection of Interests

 SHAHED KAMAL AND OTHERS

Vs.

M/S A. SURTI DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER

( Before : K. V. Viswanathan and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 2033 of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9942 of 2024)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 499, Exception 9 & Section 500 — Defamation — Imputation in Good Faith for Protection of Interests — Exception 9 to S. 499 IPC engrafts the principle of qualified privilege, stating it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided it is made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good — Good faith requires due care and attention but, unlike Exception 1, does not mandate proving the absolute truth of the imputation — In a business relationship like that between homebuyers and a developer, airing specific, fact-based grievances via a banner, using mild and temperate language without malice, to protect their collective interests, falls squarely within this exception. (Relied on: Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590; Harbhajan Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 118; Kuruppanna Goundan vs. Kuppuswami Mudaliar, 1935 MWN 365; Queen-Empress vs. E.M. Slater, (1891) ILR 15 Bom 351; Valmiki Faleiro v. Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1584)

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 — Section 2(17) — ‘Principal Employer’ — Scope and Determination

 AJAY RAJ SHETTY

Vs.

DIRECTOR AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ….of 2025 [@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3743 of 2024]

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 — Section 2(17) — ‘Principal Employer’ — Scope and Determination — The definition of ‘principal employer’ under Section 2(17) is wide and includes not only the owner or occupier of a factory (or head of department in government establishments) but also the managing agent or any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment — Designation is immaterial if the person functions as a managing agent or supervises/controls the establishment — Where concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court, based on company records (which were not controverted by the appellant with evidence like appointment letter/payslips), established that the appellant was functioning as General Manager/Principal Employer/Managing Agent, he falls within the ambit of S. 2(17) and is liable for offences under the Act. (Distinguished: Employees’ State Insurance Corpn., Chandigarh v Gurdial Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1741; J K Industries Limited v Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Habitual Offender/Criminal Antecedents — Consideration of Nature of Current Offence

 ANKIT MISHRA

Vs.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

( Before : Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No(s). ....of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 14566 of 2024)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Habitual Offender/Criminal Antecedents — Consideration of Nature of Current Offence — While the criminal antecedents and alleged status of an accused as a habitual offender are extremely relevant factors that ordinarily weigh against the grant of anticipatory bail, the High Court’s discretion in granting such bail may not warrant interference if (i) the High Court has demonstrably considered the criminal history, and (ii) the specific offences alleged in the present FIR are not heinous in nature — The consideration might differ if the present allegation involved a heinous offence. (Distinguished from principles in Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508)

Circumstantial Evidence — Murder (Filicide) vs. Suicide

 SUBHASH AGGARWAL

Vs.

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

( Before : Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. ….of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1069 of 2025)

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Murder (Filicide) vs. Suicide — In cases based on circumstantial evidence where the question is whether the death was homicidal (filicide) or suicidal, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances that points exclusively to the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence — Conviction upheld where circumstances, including (i) gunshot residue (GSR) found on the accused father’s dominant (right) hand, (ii) the accused being the first to discover the body and propounding a false theory of suicide (by screwdriver), (iii) absence of blood on the alleged suicide weapon (screwdriver), (iv) medical and ballistic evidence indicating a close-range (but not contact) gunshot wound inconsistent with typical suicide patterns (location on chest, weapon not found in hand), (v) false and contradictory explanations by the accused under S. 313 Cr.P.C. regarding the weapon and GSR, formed a complete chain pointing solely to the accused’s guilt. (Relied on: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Ingredients — Nature of Injury vs. Intention/Knowledge

 STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Vs.

SHAMSHER SINGH

( Before : Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 2015

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 307 — Attempt to Murder — Ingredients — Nature of Injury vs. Intention/Knowledge — To attract S. 307 IPC, the crucial element is the intention or knowledge to cause death with which the act is done, irrespective of the nature or severity of the injury actually caused. S. 307 uses the word ‘hurt’, not ‘grievous hurt’ or ‘life-threatening hurt’ — Therefore, an accused cannot be acquitted merely because the injury inflicted was not grievous or dangerous to life, if the evidence establishes that the act was done with the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death. (Relied on: State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kanha @ Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605; State of M.P. vs. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554)

A notice invoking arbitration under S. 21 is mandatory (unless otherwise agreed by parties) as its receipt fixes the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings, which is crucial for determining limitation (S. 43), applicable law

 ADAVYA PROJECTS PVT. LTD.

Vs.

M/S VISHAL STRUCTURALS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS

( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 5297 of 2025 Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 25746 of 2024

Decided on : 17-04-2025

  Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 21 — Notice Invoking Arbitration — Mandatory Nature and Effect of Non-Service — A notice invoking arbitration under S. 21 is mandatory (unless otherwise agreed by parties) as its receipt fixes the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings, which is crucial for determining limitation (S. 43), applicable law (including amendments to the Act), and fulfilling a prerequisite for filing a S. 11 application — However, the non-service of a S. 21 notice on a person does not, by itself, preclude the arbitral tribunal from impleading that person if they are found to be a party to the arbitration agreement — The primary purpose of S. 21 relates to commencement and time-related aspects, while other functions like informing about claims or potential arbitrators are incidental. (Relied on: Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 288; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, (2012) 12 SCC 581; BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738. Partially agreed with, but distinguished on conclusion: Alupro Building Systems Pvt Ltd. v. Ozone Overseas Pvt Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7228)

Divergent Opinions

 N. ESWARANATHAN

Vs.

STATE REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

( Before : Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. )

SLP (Criminal) Diary No(s). 55057 of 2024

Decided on : 17-04-2025

Divergent Opinions — Where there is a divergence of opinion between judges on a Bench regarding the acceptance of an apology tendered by advocates for misconduct and the appropriate consequential orders, the matter should be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

 PINKI

Vs.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. )

Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2025 (Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4658 of 2025) with Criminal Appeal No. 1928 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 592 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1929 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 590 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1930 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4660 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1931 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4661 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1932 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4662 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1933 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4664 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1934 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4665 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1935 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4666 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1936 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4667 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1937 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4668 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1938 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4670 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1939 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4671 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1940 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4672 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1941 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4673 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1942 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4674 of 2025), Criminal Appeal No. 1943 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4675 of 2025) and Criminal Appeal No. 1944 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 4676 of 2025)

Decided on : 15-04-2025

  Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 — Bail — Cancellation of Bail — Factors for Consideration — Child Trafficking — Appeals preferred by victims (kith and kin of trafficked children) assailing High Court orders granting bail to accused involved in a large-scale, organized, interstate child trafficking racket — The offences alleged involve kidnapping, buying, and selling of minor children primarily from impoverished backgrounds, punishable under Ss. 363, 311 & 370(5) IPC — High Court granted bail citing factors such as accused not being named in FIR, disclosure of name by co-accused, non-recovery of victim from the specific accused, grant of bail to similarly situated co-accused, and the principle of ‘bail is rule, jail is exception’ — Such exercise of discretion by the High Court, in cases involving grave offences like organized child trafficking with interstate ramifications, requires deeper scrutiny concerning the serious nature of the crime, modus operandi, societal impact, and potential threat posed by accused if released — The High Court’s approach found to be callous, overlooking critical aspects including the organized nature of the crime and the subsequent absconding of several accused post-bail, thereby jeopardizing the trial.

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c) — Specific Performance — Readiness and Willingness — Effect of Accepting Refund

 SANGITA SINHA

Vs.

BHAWANA BHARDWAJ AND OTHERS

( Before : Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No. 4972 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.28460 of 2024)

Decided on : 04-04-2025

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c) — Specific Performance — Readiness and Willingness — Effect of Accepting Refund — A buyer's continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of an Agreement to Sell, a prerequisite for seeking specific performance, is negated by their conduct of accepting and encashing a substantial portion of the refunded earnest money/advance consideration sent by the seller along with a cancellation notice, especially when such encashment occurs during the pendency of the specific performance suit — Such conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to proceed with the contract.

Education Law — Teacher Qualification — Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) — NIOS 18-Month ODL Programme — Purpose and Scope

 KOUSIK DAS AND OTHERS

Vs.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

( Before : B.R. Gavai and Augustine George Masih, JJ. )

Civil Appeal No….of 2025 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No. 19139 of 2024)

Decided on : 04-04-2025

 Education Law — Teacher Qualification — Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) — NIOS 18-Month ODL Programme — Purpose and Scope — The 18-month Diploma in Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) programme conducted by the National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS) through Open Distance Learning (ODL) mode, pursuant to the NCTE Recognition Order dated 22.09.2017, was a specific, one-time measure necessitated by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 — This programme was designed exclusively to enable untrained elementary teachers, who were already in service as on 10.08.2017, to acquire the minimum required qualification by the statutory deadline of 31.03.2019, thereby safeguarding their continued employment.